ALLThe Allstate Corporation
Industry Insurance Updated 24 Sep 2026
The idea
7.4x normalised 2028 EPS on peak-cycle personal-auto profitability; consensus Hold with targets ~$267-300. The bear column ($148) is larger than the upside — asymmetric the wrong way.
Events to watch
- September monthly catastrophe release ~2026-10-15 (July-August already $1.43bn vs $558m for all of Q3 2025)
- Q3 results late Oct/early Nov
- buyback pace
How we got the target
Scorecard model table: base ~$249 ('about 8% of upside'). The summary line says ~$245. Time frame: 2028 (normalised).
Target: from the research notes. Prices: market data get_latest_stock_price, close of 2026-09-22 (fetched 2026-09-23)
What would prove it wrong
7 warning signsPrior-year reserve development turns adverse in any quarter, or releases fall below 1.5 points of the combined ratio for two consecutive quarters.
Details
H1 2026 ran at 5.6 points. Half the reported margin is this line, and management says it does not assume more.
Full-year catastrophe losses exceed 13 points of the combined ratio.
Details
— i.e. two points above Allstate's own ten-year average. July and August 2026 alone are $1.43bn; Q2 2026 was $1,722m. Read the monthly 8-K, not the quarterly one; it is six to eight weeks earlier.
The ex-catastrophe, ex-development Property-Liability combined ratio crosses 85.
Details
It was 79.7 (FY2025) and 79.9 (H1 2026). This is the number the whole case rests on and the only one that would say the machine itself had stopped working.
Buybacks continue at the H1 2026 pace ($1.66bn per half) into a quarter with adverse development.
Details
Arch did the same thing at 1.41x book in the slot before this one; Allstate is buying at 1.86x.
A third call passes without management saying where the auto combined ratio settles.
Details
Two analysts asked on 2026-08-05 and both were redirected. A management that believes a twelve-point cushion is structural answers that question; one that expects it to be competed or priced away does not. The Q3 2026 call is the next test.
The auto underlying combined ratio deteriorates more than two points year on year in any quarter while rate change stays flat.
Details
The recorded ratio is release-assisted and management says the releases stop; the underlying one (88.1 FY2025, ~88.5 H1 2026) is the series that would show the cushion going.
The new CFO restates, re-bases or re-presents the combined-ratio or reserve disclosures.
Details
Christian M. Lown started 2026-08-03 from CoStar and Freddie Mac with no insurance role on the record of his appointing 8-K. The current disclosure — publishing the release-adjusted combined ratio on a slide — is unusually candid and is one of the reasons S8 scores reliable. If it changes, so does the score.
How far along
7 of 10 steps done · 3 done in a group review
Next step
read the September 2026 monthly catastrophe release (~2026-10-15) before the quarter closes. July and August 2026 are already $1.43bn against $558m for the whole of Q3 2025. If September lands anywhere near the July/August run rate, Q3 2026 catastrophe losses are roughly three times the prior-year quarter, against a Q2 2026 Property-Liability underwriting income of $2,006m — and the quarter will be the first clean test of whether the reserve releases are used to fill the hole.
Needs your decision
S6 product test / expert call, S7 conviction.
Failed checks
none. S0/S4/S6/S7 are not closed/closed by carry-forward (cluster stages). S3 is closed with the one-transcript deviation named above — narrowed on 2026-09-24, which read all eight archived calls for S8. S8 is closed reliable, S2's capital-allocation verdict is compounds and S3's earnings-quality check carries 1 flag.
Who runs it
The Front OfficeStep by step
- S0How it does as AI gets cheapDone in a group review
carry-forward (cluster: Insurance — Stage 0 re-score, 2026-09-22 §4)
lens 3/4 under the SKILL.md §4.3 risk-carrying variant, which supersedes the failed 1/4 the AI-surplus four gave this name in Insurance & reinsurance — cluster pass, 2026-09-22.
Full notes
Reserve honesty 0 (adverse development in 3 of 5 years: +122 / +1,741 / +549, then −308 / −1,809 $m); edge survives the cycle 1 (Property-Liability combined ratio ex-cat AND ex-development 87.3 / 95.6 / 91.7 / 85.6 / 79.7, below 95 in 4 of 5); capital theirs 1 (premium-to-surplus 2.01x, 1-in-100 PML ~$3.1bn = 10.1% of equity; two of four legs unmeasured); no dilution 1 (net earned premium $44.1bn → $61.4bn on diluted shares 299.1m → 267.1m). Glyph records the lens ran, not its verdict (owner decision 2026-09-22). Liquidity: ADV $450.6m/day (21 sessions to 2026-09-22, market data NYSE:ALL) — no constraint at any plausible size. This pass sharpened the 0, did not move it: see S3.
- S1Where the idea came fromDone
watchlist (owner, Apple Stocks, 2026-09-20). No Tier 0 promotion; first member of the second insurance name slot.
- S2Quick deal-breaker checkDone
FY2025 revenue $67,685m, net income $10,282m, net earned premium $61,449m, equity $30,610m, operating cash flow $10,110m (XBRL 10-K 0000899051-26-000031)
Full notes
H1 2026: net income $5,729m (H1 2025 $2,695m), diluted EPS $21.73 (vs $9.85), equity $33,698m, BVPS $123.38 (+49.7% y/y). Five-year diluted share count 315.5m (2020) → 267.1m (2025) → 259.1m (Q2 2026 weighted): −18%. Long-term debt $7,490m against $10.1bn of annual operating cash flow; debt/equity 22.2%; interest expense $194m per half. No runway question of any kind. Survives comfortably. Analyst coverage: consensus Hold, average target $266.74 [search-summary]. · capital allocation (2026-09-24, dossier-2026-09-24.md): compounds. FY2021-25 buybacks $7,210m + common dividends $4,734m = 35.6% of $33,506m of operating cash flow — funded out of the business, not out of disposals, while net premiums earned grew 39% ($44,052m -> $61,449m) and debt stayed flat. ROE 5.9 / -7.3 / -2.0 / 25.9 / 42.4%, five-year average 13.0% (the company's adjusted measure puts FY2025 at 38.3%). Equity per share $99.40 (2020-12-31) -> $117.69 (2025-12-31) = +18.4%, +36.4% (6.4%/yr) with the $17.88 of dividends declared; the reported BVPS jumped $72.35 -> $108.45 in 2025 alone. Acquisitions: the best record of the three names in this slot — $4bn paid for National General in Jan 2021, $3.25bn (81%) recovered in cash by selling Employer Voluntary Benefits ($2.0bn, closed 2025-04-01) and group health ($1.25bn, closed 2025-07-01) while keeping the P&C business. no goodwill impairment anywhere in the window.
⚠️ The buyback bought least when the stock was cheapest. 26m shares at $123.87 (2021), 3m at $118.18 (2023), 278,000 shares at $174.03 in the whole of 2024, then 6m at ~$205 (2025) and ~$1bn in Q2 2026 alone. The diluted count ROSE 262.5m -> 267.8m through the trough. The defence is real — capital had to be rebuilt first ("you have to get the target and target means you've rebuilt a stress layer", call 2025-05-01 [53], Rizzo) — and it is still what a reserve strengthening costs.
- S3Reading the company's reportsDone
(gate-minimum)
FY2025 10-K Item 1A (three disclosed risks named below, in management's own ordering) and Deloitte's report.
Full notes
Q2 2026 10-Q MD&A (Property-Liability ratio table, the PYD paragraph, the buyback note, the equity roll-forward); the 2026-04-10 DEF 14A (ownership table and the incentive-plan definitions at p.83). the 2026-08-20 and 2026-09-17 monthly Reg FD 8-Ks, which are the only place Q3 2026 catastrophe losses exist; the Q2 FY2026 call transcript (Equibles, speaker-labelled); and a full efts.sec.gov red-flag sweep — zero "changes in accountants", zero "non-reliance", no NT 10-K, no 10-K/A or 10-Q/A in the index; the "restatement" hits are clawback-policy exhibits and award agreements and the "material weakness" hits are each 10-K's own ICFR boilerplate. Deloitte & Touche, PCAOB 34, sole CAM the P&C claims reserve. Deviation: one transcript, not two (budget; see the log). EQ: 1 flag (2026-09-24, dossier-2026-09-24.md) — favourable prior-year development at 13.8% of FY2025 pre-tax income (15.7% excluding the $1,603m of divestiture gains), against 5.3% in FY2024. The four-year arithmetic: $2,412m of adverse development taken in 2021-23, $2,117m released in 2024-25. FY2025 auto recorded combined ratio 85.0 against 88.1 underlying, with Q4 2025 alone carrying $719m of releases worth 7.5 points; auto releases are $1.5bn in H1 2026 and 6.6 points in Q2. Management publishes the release-adjusted series itself and says not to expect more ("we don't assume there'll be any more coming ever", call 2026-08-05 [68], Wilson). Clean: the non-GAAP bridge removes income (adjusted net income $9,304m BELOW reported $10,165m). SBC 0.18% of revenue; restructuring 0.09%; intangible amortisation falling $376m -> $231m; cash conversion 1.16x ex-gain. Not checked: DAC and premiums-receivable days — neither is tagged in XBRL for this registrant.
- S4Rivals and suppliersDone in a group review
carry-forward (cluster: Insurance & reinsurance — cluster pass, 2026-09-22 §2)
personal lines, absorbs loss, paid on risk margin, pricing power "falling from a peak".
- S5Who owns the stockDone
13F by manager at 2026-06-30 (BlackRock 22.9m sh / $5,439m, +971k QoQ; State Street 12.5m.
Full notes
T. Rowe Price 7.9m, −2.88m QoQ, a 27% trim), 13D/G census (no activist, no strategic block), proxy ownership (21 officers and directors = 1.55%, only the CEO above 1%). Who is on the other side: index money and one large active trimmer. Short interest 6,318,184 shares at the 2026-08-31 settlement (~2.4% of shares out, 4.2 days to cover) — no short case is being expressed. Shelf/ATM: none read this run. Buyback: $4.00bn authorised 2026-02-04, $2.60bn remaining at 2026-06-30, 8m shares / $1.66bn bought in H1 2026.
⚠️ the Q2-26 13F quarter is incompletely ingested (1,222 filers vs 1,668) — both Vanguard entities, Franklin, Geode, GQG, Morgan Stanley, Northern Trust and Dimensional have no filing in it, so no "exit" may be read from an absence.
⚠️
⚠️ the Sixth Street row is NOT a holding — see the log.
- S6What workers and customers sayDone
carry-forward (cluster: Insurance & reinsurance — cluster pass, 2026-09-22 §4)
the 2026-09-07 Real Eisman Playbook personal-lines passage ("which I've not been more negative on in my career"), plus this run's outside data points: Mizuho target raised to $300, Outperform, 2026-09-18.
Full notes
Zacks cut Strong Buy → Hold 2026-09-17; consensus Hold, average target $266.74 [search-summary]. Product test / expert call open OPEN (user)
- S7The case for it, and pricesDone in a group review
carry-forward (cluster: Insurance & reinsurance — cluster pass, 2026-09-22 §5)
"a peak-earnings insurer in a line whose exposure base is structurally shrinking". This pass contradicts the second half of that sentence (see the kill criteria) and confirms the first.
Full notes
Conviction open OPEN (user) · valuation (bear/base/bull; moved from S8 2026-09-23): see the valuation table below. 7.4x normalised 2028E EPS and 1.86x book ($123.38 BVPS at 2026-06-30) at $229.50 (2026-09-22). Base ~$245, bear ~$150, bull ~$340.
- S8Do the bosses keep their word?Done
8 rows (2026-09-24, dossier-2026-09-24.md): 2 beat, 5 met, 1 withdrawn
reliable, and every promiser is still at the company (Wilson CEO throughout. Rizzo and Merten swapped seats on 2025-10-01, 8-K 0000899051-25-000083, and both still run what they committed)
Full notes
Allstate gives no revenue or EPS guidance and refuses to guide the buyback pace; what it commits to are standing margin targets and dated transactions, and it hits them: auto recorded combined ratio 95.0 (FY2024) against a mid-90s target and 85.0 (FY2025); homeowners 90.1 then 84.4 recorded / 57.9 underlying against low-90s and low-to-mid-60s; the $2.0bn EVB sale closed 2025-04-01 inside its guided H1; the $1.25bn group health sale closed 2025-07-01 inside 2025; the $1.5bn buyback programme completed in Q1 2026. The withdrawn row is benign and was disclosed unprompted — the old 14-17% ROE target, retired on the call of 2025-02-06 [22] in the year the company earned 26.8% adjusted ROE.
⚠️ The FY2025 beats are release-assisted. Recorded auto 85.0 against 88.1 underlying; see the S3 EQ flag. Credit where due: management publishes the release-adjusted combined ratio itself.
⚠️ Not scored as conservative for two reasons: the margin targets are self-set ranges, not point guidance; and on the call of 2026-08-05 the question of where the combined ratio goes from here was put by two analysts and redirected both times (Dodge log). Consequence for S7: no guidance haircut, but build the base case off the underlying combined ratio (88.1 FY2025, ~88.5 H1 2026) and assume the reserve tailwind decays — which is what management itself says to assume.
⚠️ Three CFOs in ten months: Merten to 2025-10-01, Dugenske interim, then Christian M. Lown from 2026-08-03 (8-K 0000899051-26-000109) — an outsider from CoStar and Freddie Mac with no insurance role on the record of his appointing 8-K, who joined two days before the Q2 call and did not speak on it.
- S9What to watch nextDone
trigger written.
Full notes
the September 2026 monthly catastrophe release is due ~2026-10-15 (the monthly 8-K has landed on the 15th–21st of the following month in every one of the last fourteen months) and Q3 results ~2026-10-28 to 2026-11-05 (DERIVED from filing cadence: 2024-10-30 and 2025-11-05. Equibles' IR calendar has no scheduled date and market data's needs a paid plan). Tier 0 EDGAR sweep covers the feed (cik 899051).
Sources and notes
Sources 12 documents
- Full notes, 24 Sep 2026
- Full notes, 23 Sep 2026
- Insurance — Stage 0 re-score, 2026-09-22
- Insurance & reinsurance — cluster pass, 2026-09-22
- EDGAR filings CIK 899051
| Short name | Document | Where it came from | Read on |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10K-2025 | Allstate 10-K for FY2025, filed 2026-02-20 | https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/899051/000089905126000031/all-20251231.htm | 2026-09-23 |
| 10Q-Q2-26 | Allstate 10-Q for the quarter ended 2026-06-30, filed 2026-08-05 | https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/899051/000089905126000118/all-20260630.htm | 2026-09-23 |
| 8K-MONTHLY-AUG26 | Allstate 8-K filed 2026-09-17, Exhibit 99 — August 2026 monthly catastrophe-loss release | https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/899051/000089905126000135/exhibit99newsrelease091726.htm | 2026-09-23 |
| 8K-MONTHLY-JUL26 | Allstate 8-K filed 2026-08-20, Exhibit 99 — July 2026 monthly catastrophe-loss release | https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/899051/000089905126000127/exhibit99newsrelease082026.htm | 2026-09-23 |
| 8K-MONTHLY-MAY26 | Allstate 8-K filed 2026-06-18, Exhibit 99 — May 2026 monthly release (last one carrying the policies-in-force table) | https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/899051/000089905126000096/exhibit99newsrelease061826.htm | 2026-09-23 |
| 8K-MONTHLY-AUG25 | Allstate 8-K filed 2025-09-18, Exhibit 99 — August 2025 monthly catastrophe-loss release (prior-year comparison) | https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/899051/000089905125000078/exhibit99newsrelease91825.htm | 2026-09-23 |
| 8K-MONTHLY-SEP25 | Allstate 8-K filed 2025-10-16, Exhibit 99 — September 2025 monthly release, carrying the full Q3 2025 catastrophe total | https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/899051/000089905125000092/exhibit99newsrelease101625.htm | 2026-09-23 |
| DEF14A-26 | Allstate DEF 14A filed 2026-04-10 (ownership table as of 2026-03-01; incentive-plan definitions at p.83) | https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/899051/000089905126000063/all-20260410.htm | 2026-09-23 |
| 13F-Q2-26 | Institutional holders by manager, 13F report date 2026-06-30 (ingestion incomplete — see the edge note) | python ledger/research/tools/threespread.py holders ALL | 2026-09-23 |
| CALL-Q2-26 | Allstate Q2 FY2026 earnings call, 2026-08-06 13:00 UTC, speaker-labelled transcript | Equibles GetEarningsCallTranscript(ticker=ALL, fiscalYear=2026, fiscalQuarter=2) — https://equibles.com/stocks/all/earnings-calls | 2026-09-23 |
| CLUSTER-INS-RESCORE | Insurance Stage 0 re-score, 2026-09-22, slot cluster-insurance-rescore (§4 is this name) | ledger/research/_clusters/cluster-insurance-rescore-2026-09-22.md | 2026-09-23 |
| CLUSTER-INS | Insurance & reinsurance cluster pass, 2026-09-22, slot cluster-insurance (S4 / S6 / S7) | ledger/research/_clusters/cluster-insurance-2026-09-22.md | 2026-09-23 |
Links to other companies 17 links
| From | Link | To | Date | Where it says so |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tom Wilson (Chair, President and CEO) | officer of | ALL | 2026-03-01 | DEF14A-26 — Security Ownership table, footnote (5), ownership as of 2026-03-01 |
| Jesse Merten (CFO on the Q2 FY2026 call) | officer of | ALL | 2026-08-06 | CALL-Q2-26 — Q2 FY2026 call, turns 11-52, answers to Bob Wong (Morgan Stanley) and Pablo Singson (J.P. Morgan) |
| Deloitte & Touche LLP (PCAOB ID 34) | auditor of | ALL | 2026-02-20 | 10K-2025 — Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm, Critical Audit Matter — 'Reserve for Property and Casualty Insurance Claims and Claims Expense' |
| ALL | event | NYSE Texas | 2026-09-17 | 8K-MONTHLY-AUG26 — 8-K cover page, 'Securities registered pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Act' table |
| ALL | context | ALL | 2026-09-17 | 8K-MONTHLY-AUG26 — Exhibit 99, 'August 2026 Monthly Release', first paragraph |
| ALL | context | ALL | 2025-09-18 | 8K-MONTHLY-AUG25 — Exhibit 99, 'August 2025 Monthly Release', first paragraph |
| ALL | context | ALL | 2025-10-16 | 8K-MONTHLY-SEP25 — Exhibit 99, 'September 2025 Monthly Release', first paragraph |
| ALL | governance structure | ALL | 2026-04-10 | DEF14A-26 — Compensation Discussion and Analysis, 'Performance Net Income' definition, p.83; 2025 annual incentive table |
| ALL | context | ALL | 2026-06-30 | 10Q-Q2-26 — MD&A, Property-Liability underwriting results table and the paragraph beneath it |
| Tom Wilson (Chair, President and CEO) | context | ALL | 2026-08-06 | CALL-Q2-26 — Q2 FY2026 call, answer to Andrew Gliederman (TD Cowen), final analyst question |
| ALL | context | ALL | 2026-05-31 | 8K-MONTHLY-MAY26 — Exhibit 99, 'Allstate Protection Policies in Force' table and the sentence following it |
| BlackRock, Inc. | holds | ALL | 2026-06-30 | 13F-Q2-26 — 13F-HR, accession 0002100119-26-003238 (holders table, row 1) |
| State Street Corp | holds | ALL | 2026-06-30 | 13F-Q2-26 — 13F-HR, accession 0000093751-26-000507 (holders table, row 2) |
| T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. | holds | ALL | 2026-06-30 | 13F-Q2-26 — 13F-HR, accession 0000080255-26-000519 (holders table, row 3) |
| The Vanguard Group, Inc. | context | ALL | 2026-03-26 | DEF14A-26 — Beneficial owners of more than 5% table, footnote (1) |
| Sixth Street Partners Management Company, L.P. | context | Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc. | 2026-06-30 | 13F-Q2-26 — threespread.py holders ALL — identical-share-count warning, rows 13 and 14 |
| The Heritage Foundation (shareholder proponent) | shareholder proposal | ALL | 2025-12-17 | DEF14A-26 — Shareholder proposal section, proponent identification paragraph |
History 3 entries
- 2026-09-23 — first pass, slot
names-insurance-2, model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine. S1, S2, S3 (gate-minimum), S5 and S9 closed; S0 carried forward fromInsurance — Stage 0 re-score, 2026-09-22and S4/S6/S7 fromInsurance & reinsurance — cluster pass, 2026-09-22; S8 modelled and left open. Run finding: the two monthly Reg FD 8-Ks filed since the 10-Q put Q3 2026 catastrophe losses at $1.43bn for July and August against $558m for the whole of Q3 2025, and the proxy's incentive definition replaces actual catastrophe losses with plan catastrophe losses while leaving prior-year development in. Second finding: the cluster's S7 framing of a shrinking exposure base is contradicted by the company's own last monthly unit table (+2.4% y/y total, +2.7% auto), and the kill criterion built on it is replaced here. Third: the monthly policies-in-force series ended with the May 2026 release — disclosed in that release, moved to the quarterly earnings release, and put to management on the Q2 call by Josh Anker (BofA), so it is a cadence change and not a red flag, but S9's unit monitoring drops from monthly to quarterly because of it. Tooling: the Sixth Street / Charles Schwab IM 13F defect recorded inledger/research/README.mdappears here for the fifth issuer (1,856,753 shares, byte-identical); the row is discarded. The Vanguard "disappearance" from the Q2-26 13F stream is confirmed by this issuer's proxy to be the same 2026-01-12 internal realignment found at APH — two issuers now, so it is firm-wide and not issuer-specific. Evidence and access limits indossier-2026-09-23.md. Nothing here is human-verified. - 2026-09-23 — stage redefinition, owner decision (WATCHLIST_PLAN.md §25): S8 is now Management credibility and is not yet run for this name; the old S8 valuation figures moved to the
valuation:line under S7, and any proposed buy price or position size was removed (the pipeline no longer drafts either). No research was redone. S2 capital allocation and S3 earnings quality are also pending, in the same backfill slot. - 2026-09-24 — backfill, slot
backfill-2026-09-23-5, model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine. S8 management credibility (8 rows, 2 beat / 5 met / 1 withdrawn — reliable), S2 capital allocation (compounds) and S3 earnings quality (1 flag) are now written. Evidence: EDGAR only (the 2026-02-04 Q4/FY2025 release, three Item 8.01 8-Ks, three Item 5.02 8-Ks, XBRLcompanyfacts) plus all eight archived market data transcripts. 0 Equibles calls, 0 market data calls, 0 3spread calls. No other stage was redone. Run finding 1 — the reserve cycle moved ~$2bn of earnings across four years. $2,412m of adverse development taken in 2021-23; $2,117m released in 2024-25, $1,809m of it in FY2025 alone (13.8% of pre-tax income, 15.7% ex the divestiture gains). The FY2025 auto beat is recorded 85.0 against 88.1 underlying. Management publishes the adjusted series itself and says not to expect more — which is the honest version of a flag, and is why S8 still scores reliable. Run finding 2 — the National General round trip. $4bn paid in January 2021; $3.25bn (81%) recovered in cash by selling Employer Voluntary Benefits ($2.0bn, closed 2025-04-01) and group health ($1.25bn, closed 2025-07-01), both inside their guided windows, while keeping the P&C business. No goodwill impairment anywhere in the five years. This is the best acquisition record of the three names in this slot. Run finding 3 — the buyback's timing. 26m shares at $123.87 in 2021, 278,000 shares at $174.03 in the whole of 2024, 6m at ~$205 in 2025 and ~$1bn in Q2 2026 alone; the diluted count rose through the trough. Forced by capital adequacy after the reserve strengthening, and still the price of having needed one. Run finding 4 — the unanswered question. Two analysts on the 2026-08-05 call asked where the auto combined ratio settles from an 88.5 underlying against a self-set mid-90s target; both were redirected. It is the reason S8 stops at reliable rather than conservative. Run finding 5 — three CFOs in ten months, the incumbent (Christian M. Lown, from 2026-08-03) an outsider from CoStar and Freddie Mac. The CEO and both operating presidents are unchanged, so this is a chair, not a team. Nothing here is human-verified.
Full notes, 24 Sep 2026 19 min read
ALL — dossier, 2026-09-24 (backfill: S8, S2 capital allocation, S3 earnings quality)
Slot backfill-2026-09-23-5. Model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine; nothing here is human-verified. This file holds only the three checks added on 2026-09-23 (WATCHLIST_PLAN.md §25). Every other stage stands as written in dossier-2026-09-23.md. Anything from background knowledge is marked [background].
Sources this pass. EDGAR, User-Agent ddboard-research gorkem@celebico.com (CIK 899051): the Q4/FY2025 earnings release 8-K Ex. 99.1 of 2026-02-04 (allcorp123125earningsrelea.htm); the Item 8.01 8-Ks of 2024-08-13 (EVB purchase agreement), 2025-04-01 (EVB completion) and 2025-07-01 (group health completion); the Item 5.02 8-Ks of 2025-10-01, 2025-11-20 and 2026-07-14; XBRL companyfacts for CIK 899051. Transcripts entirely from the archive ledger/research/_transcripts/ALL/ (market data, eight quarters FY2024-Q3 through FY2026-Q2, call dates from _transcripts/index.json). Equibles: 0 calls. market data: 0 calls. 3spread: 0 calls. Nothing was fetched from the open web.
Quote discipline: transcript quotes were located by exact substring in the archived JSON bytes and copied from them; filing quotes were matched against a whitespace-collapsed text extraction of the EDGAR HTML. Turn numbers [n] are newline positions in the market data content string. Two turns in the FY2026-Q2 file are visibly garbled by the transcription (see the National General note in S2); where that happens the figure is taken from a clean turn on an earlier call and both are cited.
S8 — management credibility
How Allstate guides. No revenue or EPS guidance, and an explicit refusal to guide the buyback pace — "we don't put forward guidance out on how we're going to buy repurchase stock" (call 2025-05-01 [36], Jess Merten, then EVP & CFO). What Allstate does commit to, and repeats on every call, are standing margin targets — a mid-90s recorded combined ratio in auto, a low-90s recorded and low-to-mid-60s underlying combined ratio in homeowners — plus dated transaction and capital-programme commitments. Those are what can be scored.
Who promised, and who is still here. market data labels turns by name only; roles from EDGAR.
- Thomas J. Wilson, Chair, President and CEO — across the entire window, unchanged. Made the margin targets and the capital commitments.
- Mario Rizzo — President, Property-Liability until 2025-10-01, then Chief Operating Officer (8-K 0000899051-25-000083 Item 5.02: "Effective October 1, 2025, Mario Rizzo will serve as Chief Operating Officer, responsible for the Property-Liability and Protection Services businesses"). He was EVP & CFO from January 2018 to September 2022. Still at the company.
- Jesse E. (Jess) Merten — EVP & CFO until 2025-10-01, then President, Property-Liability (same 8-K). Still at the company. He made the two divestiture-timing commitments as CFO and reports the P-L results now.
- John E. Dugenske — interim CFO from 2025-10-01 alongside President, Investments and Corporate Strategy (same 8-K). Made the $4bn buyback commitment.
- Christian M. Lown — EVP & CFO from 2026-08-03 (8-K 0000899051-26-000109 Item 5.02), previously CFO of CoStar Group and, before that, of Freddie Mac. He joined two days before the Q2 2026 call and does not appear on it.
- Gregg M. Sherrill retired from the board and as Lead Director effective 2025-11-21; Richard T. Hume succeeded him (8-K 0000899051-25-000111).
Nobody who made a promise here has left the company — Rizzo and Merten moved seats and both still run the businesses they committed. That is the opposite of AIG's position in the same cluster, and it is why this verdict is about the record rather than about the roster. The one real caveat: the CFO chair has had three occupants in ten months (Merten → Dugenske interim → Lown), and the incumbent is an outsider with no prior insurance experience on the record of his appointing 8-K.
Say vs do (FY2024 and FY2025 against the standing targets, plus the dated commitments)
| # | Promise (period · metric · figure) | Made where · by whom | Result · locator | Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Auto insurance: mid-90s recorded combined ratio — FY2024 | the standing target, stated on the call of 2025-11-06 [3] · Mario Rizzo: "In auto insurance, we target a mid-90s reported combined ratio." Declared restored on 2025-02-06 [5]: "Auto and homeowner combined ratios in the quarter were both better than the targets for those businesses of mid-nineties for auto and low nineties for homeowners." | 95.0 — release 2026-02-04, Allstate Protection Auto Results, twelve months 2024 column, "Recorded combined ratio ... 85.0 95.0" | met |
| 2 | Auto insurance: mid-90s recorded combined ratio — FY2025 | same standing target | 85.0, ten points better than 2024 and ten points inside the target — same table | beat — ⚠️ see the release note below |
| 3 | Homeowners: low-90s recorded combined ratio — FY2024 | call 2025-02-06 [5] · Rizzo: "For the full year 2024, the homeowners insurance business recorded a combined ratio of 90.1 in line with our low nineties target, while generating total underwriting profit of $1.3 billion." | 90.1 — release 2026-02-04, Allstate Protection Homeowners Results, twelve months 2024 column | met |
| 4 | Homeowners: low-90s recorded, low-to-mid-60s underlying — FY2025 | call 2025-11-06 [3] · Rizzo: "In homeowners insurance, we target a low 90s reported combined ratio and an underlying combined ratio in the low to mid-60s." | 84.4 recorded, 57.9 underlying — same table. Both inside the target on the favourable side, on premiums earned up 15.0% | beat |
| 5 | Sale of the Employer Voluntary Benefits business to StanCorp for $2.0bn · closing in H1 2025 | call 2024-10-31 [4] · Jess Merten (EVP & CFO): "The transaction is expected to close in the first half of 2025, pending regulatory approvals." Agreement signed 2024-08-13 (8-K 0000899051-24-000058 Item 8.01, "$2 billion in cash, adjusted for the closing balance sheet") | completed 2025-04-01 — 8-K 0000899051-25-000022 Item 8.01: "On April 1, 2025, the Registrant issued a press release announcing that it had completed the previously announced sale of the Registrant's Employer Voluntary Benefits business." Inside the guided half-year | met |
| 6 | Sale of the group health business to Nationwide for $1.25bn · closing "sometime in 2025" | call 2025-02-06 [9] · Merten: "Last week, we marked another major milestone with our agreement to sell the group health business to Nationwide for $1.25 billion which we expect to close sometime in 2025." | completed 2025-07-01 — 8-K 0000899051-25-000060 Item 8.01 | met |
| 7 | The $1.5bn share repurchase programme announced February 2025, to be completed in 2026 | call 2025-05-01 [2] · Tom Wilson: "we increased quarterly dividend to $1 a share and instituted $1.5 billion share repurchase program"; completion date set on 2026-02-05 [5] · John Dugenske (interim CFO): "a $4 billion share repurchase program has been authorized and execution will begin upon completion of the existing $1.5 billion share repurchase program, which will be completed in 2026." | completed in Q1 2026 — call 2026-04-30 [5] · Dugenske: "We completed the former $1.5 billion share repurchase program and launched a new $4 billion share repurchase program, accelerating the pace of repurchases." | met |
| 8 | The long-standing 14–17% return-on-equity target | [background] set years before this window and carried publicly | retired — call 2025-02-06 [22] · Tom Wilson, to Gregory Peters: "as you remember, I don't remember how many years ago it was. At one time, we put out a target of fourteen to seventeen percent. But I would say that was a different company and a different time." No replacement range was put out | withdrawn |
Not scored (open). The $4bn repurchase programme, authorised February 2026 and reaffirmed in terms — "We committed to do $4 billion. We're going to do $4 billion... we're going to meet our commitment to get to $4 billion done" (call 2026-08-05 [38], Wilson). Progress: "$2.6 billion remain under the $4 billion repurchase authorization announced in February" at 2026-06-30 (call 2026-08-05 [10], Merten), i.e. $1.4bn spent in the first half. Also open: the EVB gain — Merten guided "we're estimating a $600 million gain and had previously disclosed that we expect the transaction to generate approximately $1.6 billion of capital" (call 2024-10-31 [4]), and XBRL reports DisposalGroupNotDiscontinuedOperationGainLossOnDisposal of $1,603m for FY2025, which covers both divestitures and cannot be split from the tag. Recorded, not scored.
Tally: 8 rows — 2 beat, 5 met, 1 withdrawn. Every row belongs to people still at the company.
⚠️ The release note, and it is the whole texture of rows 2 and 4. FY2025's margin beats are substantially the reversal of the 2022–23 reserve strengthening. The FY2025 auto recorded combined ratio of 85.0 sits against an underlying 88.1 (release 2026-02-04, same table), and the fourth quarter alone carried "$719 million in the fourth quarter, a 7.5 point benefit to the combined ratio, reflecting favorable severity development in personal auto injury and physical damage coverages" (same release). It continues: "Auto claim reserve releases have totaled $1.5 billion this year" for H1 2026 (call 2026-08-05 [6], Merten). The beats are real — 88.1 underlying is still seven points inside a mid-90s target — and they are flattered. Credit where it is due: management now publishes the release-adjusted combined ratio itself, as a slide: "The bottom rows adjusts for the impact of claim reserve releases on each year and shows what the combined ratio would have been with these changes" (call 2026-08-05 [6], Merten). A company that hands analysts the adjusted series is not hiding the thing this note is about.
Dodge-log roll-up (§3.1). No dodge log existed for this name; it is opened below from the most recent call, with one item from the quarter before.
- Where the auto combined ratio goes from here — asked twice in one call, by two analysts, and redirected both times. Call 2026-08-05 [20] · Charles (Greg) Peters: "you're running substantially below your 10-year average combined ratio. And I'm reconciling Slide 9 where your flat rate change -- just curious about the competitive environment and when you might start to see that combined ratio drift up more towards the 10-y[ear average]". Tom Wilson's answer opens by changing the subject in terms: "Let me go up a little bit and answer growth because I know there will be other people interested in growth as well" [22]. Later the same call, Elyse Greenspan asked it again from the disclosure side — "year-to-date, right, you guys are running at around an 88.5 obviously well below, right? I think you guys say you target a mid-90s across the cycle in auto... So how do you, I guess, think about just where you[ go]" [52] — and was answered about 2022: "Slide 8 was really to show how quickly we can move when we need to. So I would really focus on the far left-hand side. So we move the combined ratio by over 7 points in a year in response to a huge increase in cost" [54]. Neither answer addressed the question asked, and the question is the one the whole thesis turns on: whether a 12-point margin cushion gets competed away, given away as price, or kept.
- What is generating the prior-year reserve releases. Call 2026-08-05 [66] · Andrew Kligerman: "I'm looking at the prior year reserve reestimates in auto, and they've been fantastic, I mean, 6.6 points this quarter, each of the last 4 prior quarters, you've had sizable releases... Maybe you could help us unpack what's generating these very favorable prior year reserve reestimates and whether you think that can continue?" The continue half was answered squarely — "every quarter, we think we got reserves as accurate as we can get them. So we don't assume there'll be any more coming ever" [68] — and the unpack half was not: the follow-on answer was about the post-COVID inflationary period in general [70], with no split by coverage or accident year. Half-answered; logged as a note.
- Notes, not dodges — stated refusals. The forward severity question (call 2026-08-05 [32] → [34], Merten: "obviously, we're not going to give you a forward look on what severity is going to me[an]"), and the buyback pace (call 2025-05-01 [36], Merten). Both are consistent policy.
Verdict — reliable. Seven of eight rows met or beaten, two divestitures closed inside their guided windows, a buyback programme completed and the next one running ahead of schedule, and the one withdrawn row was a long-term ROE target the CEO retired on the record, unprompted, in the year the company earned 26.8% adjusted ROE — the benign kind of withdrawal, and he said why. Every promiser is still at Allstate. The case for scoring this conservative is real; two things hold it at reliable. First, the margin targets are self-set ranges, not point guidance, and a range you set yourself and describe as "mid-90s" is wide. Second, the same call that reported the beats declined twice, to two analysts, to say where the combined ratio goes from here — which is exactly the question a management confident in a structural twelve-point cushion would answer. Consequence for S7: no guidance haircut (there is no guidance to haircut), but the base case should be built off the underlying combined ratio (auto 88.1 FY2025, ~88.5 H1 2026) rather than the recorded one, and should assume the reserve tailwind decays — which is what management itself says to assume.
S2 — capital allocation
All figures $m, calendar fiscal years, from XBRL companyfacts (CIK 899051): OCF NetCashProvidedByUsedInOperatingActivities, buybacks PaymentsForRepurchaseOfCommonStock, dividends PaymentsOfDividendsCommonStock / ...PreferredStockAndPreferenceStock, SBC AllocatedShareBasedCompensationExpense, debt ProceedsFromIssuanceOfLongTermDebt / RepaymentsOfLongTermDebt, buyback prices TreasuryStockSharesAcquired and TreasuryStockAcquiredAverageCostPerShare.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | 5y total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating cash flow | 5,116 | 5,121 | 4,228 | 8,931 | 10,110 | 33,506 |
| Buybacks | 3,120 | 2,520 | 335 | 2 | 1,233 | 7,210 |
| Common dividends | 885 | 926 | 925 | 962 | 1,036 | 4,734 |
| Preferred dividends | 114 | 105 | 107 | 117 | 117 | 560 |
| Debt raised | 0 | 0 | 743 | 495 | 0 | 1,238 |
| Debt repaid | 436 | 0 | 750 | 350 | 600 | 2,136 |
| Stock-based compensation | 120 | 93 | 73 | 125 | 123 | 534 |
| Restructuring charges | 170 | 51 | 169 | 61 | 61 | 512 |
| Shares repurchased (m) | 26 | 20 | 3 | 0.278 | 6 | 55.3 |
| Average price paid | $123.87 | $126.56 | $118.18 | $174.03 | ~$205 | |
| Diluted weighted-average shares (m) | 299.1 | 271.2 | 262.5 | 267.8 | 267.1 | −10.7% |
| Long-term debt (year end) | 7,976 | 7,964 | 7,942 | 8,085 | 7,490 | −6% |
(FY2025's average price is not tagged; $1,233m over the 6m shares in TreasuryStockSharesAcquired gives ~$205.)
Where the cash went. $11,944m of buybacks and common dividends against $33,506m of operating cash flow — 35.6%, and unlike AIG's 122% it came out of the business, not out of asset sales. The rest funded a book that grew hard: net premiums earned $44,052m (2021) → $61,449m (2025), homeowners premiums earned up 15.0% in 2025 alone, policies in force up 2.0%. Debt is essentially unchanged at $7.5bn. This is a self-funded expansion.
Flag: the buyback bought least when the stock was cheapest. 26m shares at $123.87 in 2021, then the auto crisis hit and the programme stopped — 3m shares at $118.18 in 2023 and 278,000 shares at $174.03 in the whole of 2024 — and it restarted at ~$205 in 2025 and ~$1bn in the second quarter of 2026 alone (call 2026-08-05 [10], Merten). The share count went up, 262.5m (2023) → 267.8m (2024), in the trough. The defence is real and management stated it at the time: capital had to be rebuilt before repurchases could resume — "you have to get the target and target means you've rebuilt a stress layer" (call 2025-05-01 [53], Mario Rizzo) — and an insurer whose auto book is running a 100+ combined ratio genuinely cannot buy stock. It is still what happened, and it is the cost of having needed a reserve strengthening. The right kill criterion is not "they bought high"; it is whether the same thing happens again, which is written into scorecard.md.
What the acquisitions were worth — and this part is very good. Allstate paid $4bn for National General in January 2021 (call 2025-02-06 [44] · Jess Merten: "we paid $4 billion for National General"). It then sold two pieces of it — the Employer Voluntary Benefits business for $2.0bn (2025-04-01) and the group health business for $1.25bn (2025-07-01) — recovering $3.25bn, 81% of the purchase price, while keeping the P&C business, which management says has "more than double in size" (call 2026-08-05 [38], Wilson; that turn is garbled in the market data text, so the $4bn figure is taken from the clean 2025-02-06 turn). On Square Trade / protection plans Wilson claims a similar outcome on the same turn. No goodwill impairment anywhere in the window — GoodwillAndIntangibleAssetImpairment is $0 for 2020 and 2021 and untagged thereafter; goodwill fell $3,502m → $3,118m through the disposals, not through write-downs. Five years, two acquisitions, no write-offs and 81% of one purchase price back in cash: this is the strongest acquisition record of the three names in this slot.
Returns (insurer form — ROE and book value per share compounded with dividends, per SKILL.md). Common equity is taken as StockholdersEquity less the $2,050m of preferred stock and additional paid-in capital on the FY2025 balance sheet (release 2026-02-04). The method is validated against the company's own disclosure: it reproduces the reported 25.8% for FY2024 and 42.3% for FY2025 to within 0.1pt.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net income (loss) to common ($m) | 1,500 | (1,394) | (316) | 4,550 | 10,165 |
| Average common equity ($m) | 25,531 | 19,166 | 15,579 | 17,556 | 23,976 |
| ROE | 5.9% | (7.3)% | (2.0)% | 25.9% | 42.4% |
Five-year average ≈13.0%, and it is two different companies inside one table: three years of the auto-inflation crisis, then two of the recovery. The company's adjusted measure — which strips the $1,603m of divestiture gains — puts FY2025 at 38.3% (release 2026-02-04, "Adjusted net income return on Allstate common shareholders' equity ... 38.3 %").
Book value per share. Allstate's reported BVPS was $72.35 at 2024-12-31 and $108.45 at 2025-12-31, +49.9% (release 2026-02-04). For a consistent five-year series this file uses total Allstate shareholders' equity per share including preferred, computed the same way at both ends: $99.40 at 2020-12-31 ($30,217m over 304.0m shares) → $117.69 at 2025-12-31 ($30,610m over 260.1m). That is +18.4% over five years; adding the $17.88 of dividends declared across 2021–2025 (XBRL CommonStockDividendsPerShareDeclared: 3.24, 3.40, 3.56, 3.68, 4.00) takes the total to +36.4%, i.e. 6.4% a year. Modest for five years — and the shape matters more than the average: the first three years destroyed book value and the last two rebuilt it and more.
Verdict: compounds. It is the narrower of the two calls available and it goes this way on three things the other names cannot show: capital return funded entirely out of operating cash flow (36% of it) rather than out of disposals; an acquisition record with no impairments and 81% of a $4bn purchase price recovered in cash while keeping the business; and a book that grew net premiums earned 39% in five years while debt stayed flat. What stops it being unqualified is the middle of the table — three years of negative or near-zero ROE, a share count that rose in the trough, and a buyback that has bought most heavily at its highest prices. ⚠️ The five-year total return on book of 6.4% a year is the number that says the recovery has not yet paid for the crisis.
S3 addendum — earnings quality
Sources: the release of 2026-02-04 (including its non-GAAP reconciliation and the Auto and Homeowners results tables); XBRL companyfacts; the calls of 2026-02-05, 2026-04-30 and 2026-08-05.
- The non-GAAP bridge. Clean, and conservative in FY2025. Adjusted net income of $9,304m ($34.83 diluted) sits below net income applicable to common of $10,165m ($38.06 diluted) (release 2026-02-04) — the adjustment removes the $1,603m of divestiture gains and realised investment results rather than adding costs back. In FY2024 it ran the other way ($4,906m adjusted against $4,550m reported). The add-back that would be the usual flag, restructuring, is small and falling:
RestructuringCharges$170m (2021) → $51m → $169m → $61m → $61m (2025), 0.09% of revenue. No flag. - Stock-based compensation. Clean, and the cleanest of the three names in this slot. $123m in FY2025 = 0.18% of revenue and 1.2% of operating cash flow, against $1,233m of buybacks.
- Cash conversion. Clean, with one note. Operating cash flow over net income: not meaningful in 2023 (a loss), 1.91x (2024), 0.98x (2025) — and the 2025 figure is depressed by the $1,603m of divestiture gains that sit in net income but whose cash arrived in investing; ex-gain it is 1.16x. Accruals ((net income − OCF) / average total assets): −4.0% (2024) and +0.15% (2025). The sign flip is worth a note rather than a flag — it is the first year in the series where reported profit slightly exceeds operating cash, and the divestiture gains explain it.
- Working capital / deferred costs. Not disclosed via XBRL.
DeferredPolicyAcquisitionCostsis tagged only through 2020 andPremiumsReceivableAtCarryingValueis not tagged at all for this registrant, so the receivables-days and DAC tests could not be run fromcompanyfacts. Recorded as not checked, not as clean; it needs the 10-K balance sheet. - Costs moved onto the balance sheet.
AmortizationOfIntangibleAssetsis falling steadily — $376m (2021) → $353m → $329m → $280m → $231m (2025) — consistent with the National General intangibles running off and nothing new being capitalised. No separately tagged capitalised software. Clean on the evidence available. - Sector equivalent — prior-year reserve development as a share of pre-tax income. Flag 1, and it is the largest single number in this file. XBRL
SupplementalInformationForPropertyCasualtyInsuranceUnderwritersPriorYearClaimsAndClaimsAdjustmentExpense(positive = adverse, negative = favourable):
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PYD ($m) | +122 adverse | +1,741 adverse | +549 adverse | (308) fav | (1,809) fav |
| Pre-tax income ($m) | — | — | (348) | 5,761 | 13,156 |
| Favourable PYD as % of pre-tax income | — | — | — | 5.3% | 13.8% |
Excluding the $1,603m of divestiture gains from FY2025 pre-tax income, the FY2025 figure is 15.7%. The four-year arithmetic is the point: $2,412m of adverse development taken in 2021–23, $2,117m released in 2024–25. The reserve cycle has moved roughly $2bn of earnings out of the crisis years and into the recovery years, and the recorded combined ratios follow it — FY2025 auto 85.0 recorded against 88.1 underlying, with Q4 2025 alone carrying "$719 million ... a 7.5 point benefit to the combined ratio, reflecting favorable severity development in personal auto injury and physical damage coverages" (release 2026-02-04). It has not stopped: auto releases are $1.5bn in the first half of 2026 and 6.6 points in Q2 alone (call 2026-08-05 [6] and [66]). Two things keep this a flag and not a finding against management. They publish the release-adjusted series themselves on a slide (call 2026-08-05 [6]), and asked whether it continues, the CEO said no: "every quarter, we think we got reserves as accurate as we can get them. So we don't assume there'll be any more coming ever" [68]. Take him at his word and the FY2027 combined ratio is the underlying one. ⚠️ One cross-carrier note, because it is the same question read two ways in the same cluster. Allstate attributes part of the improvement to tort reform — "Tort reform has reduced litigation in Florida, which has enabled the top five insurance companies in the state to request rate reductions of 5.9% in 2025" (call 2026-02-05 [2], Wilson) — while AIG's CEO said in the same season that social inflation "hasn't" moderated (AIG/dossier-2026-09-23.md). One of the two is booking releases on a read the other rejects.
EQ summary: 1 flag — favourable prior-year development at 13.8% of pre-tax income (15.7% ex the divestiture gains), releasing in 2024–25 roughly what was strengthened in 2021–23, with the FY2025 auto recorded combined ratio 3.1 points better than the underlying one and $1.5bn more released in H1 2026. Disclosed openly by management, including an adjusted series. Clean: the non-GAAP bridge (which removes income), stock-based compensation at 0.18% of revenue, restructuring at 0.09%, falling intangible amortisation, and cash conversion once the divestiture gains are removed. Not checked: DAC and premiums-receivable days — neither is tagged in XBRL for this registrant.
Full notes, 23 Sep 2026 14 min read
ALL — dossier, 2026-09-23
Slot names-insurance-2, first member. Model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine. Nothing here is human-verified. Every figure carries the document it was read from; anything from background knowledge is marked [background]. Quotes were located by exact substring search in a text extraction of the filing and copied out — never re-typed.
Written after ACGL, KNSL and AX (slot names-insurance-1, 2026-09-22) and after the Stage 0 re-score (_clusters/cluster-insurance-rescore-2026-09-22.md, which scores this name 3/4).
1. What is new since the last filing anyone has read
The Q2 2026 10-Q was filed 2026-08-05. Two Reg FD 8-Ks have landed since, and they contain the most decision-relevant facts on this name:
| Filed | Item | Content |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-20 | 7.01 | July 2026 catastrophe losses $682m pre-tax / $539m after tax, 23 events, ~75% from two wind-and-hail events |
| 2026-09-17 | 7.01 | August 2026 catastrophe losses $748m pre-tax / $591m after tax, 21 events, ~50% from one wind-and-hail event — "Total catastrophe losses for July and August were $1.43 billion or $1.13 billion, after-tax." |
Against the same two months a year earlier, from the equivalent releases:
| Period | Cat losses, pre-tax | Source |
|---|---|---|
| July + August 2026 | $1,430m | 8-K 2026-09-17, Ex-99 |
| July + August 2025 | $397m | 8-K 2025-09-18, Ex-99 — "Total catastrophe losses for July and August were $397 million or $313 million, after-tax." |
| Whole of Q3 2025 | $558m | 8-K 2025-10-16, Ex-99 — "Total catastrophe losses for the third quarter were $558 million or $441 million, after-tax." |
| Q2 2026 (for scale) | $1,722m | 10-Q Q2 2026, Property-Liability underwriting results |
Two months of Q3 2026 are 2.6x the entire prior-year quarter, with September unreported. The September release is due around 2026-10-15 on the observed cadence (the monthly 8-K has landed on the 15th–21st of the following month in each of the last fourteen months).
Market reaction, stated as correlation and not as cause. ALL closed $252.21 on 2026-09-17, the day the August release was filed, and $229.50 on 2026-09-22 — −9.0% over three sessions, with 2026-09-22 trading 5.26m shares against a 21-session average of about 1.7m and a $227.25–$242.16 range (market data NYSE:ALL daily closes). Other things happened in those sessions; this dossier does not claim the release caused the move, only that the move followed it on volume.
2. Why the reported margin improved, and how much of it is repeatable
From the Q2 2026 10-Q, Property-Liability GAAP operating ratios (MD&A, ratio table):
| Q2 2026 | Q2 2025 | H1 2026 | H1 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Combined ratio, reported | 86.6 | 91.1 | 84.3 | 94.2 |
| Effect of catastrophe losses (pts) | 11.5 | 13.9 | 10.0 | 14.8 |
| Effect of prior-year reserve reestimates (pts) | (4.3) | (2.6) | (5.6) | (2.2) |
| Ex-cat, ex-development (computed) | 79.4 | 79.8 | 79.9 | 81.6 |
The reported improvement is 9.9 points over the half. The underlying improvement is 1.7. The rest is weather and reserve releases — and the 10-Q states plainly:
"Prior year reserve reestimates, including catastrophes, decreased reserves by $641 million in the second quarter of 2026 and $1.65 billion in the first six months of 2026." — Q2 2026 10-Q, MD&A, paragraph following the Property-Liability underwriting results table
H1 2025 was $621m. The release roughly tripled.
For the catastrophe side, Allstate supplies its own benchmark in the same filing:
"The ten-year average effect of total catastrophe losses on the total combined ratio was 13.5 points and 11.0 points in the second quarter and first six months of 2026, respectively." — Q2 2026 10-Q, MD&A, footnote (1) to the combined-ratio table
H1 2026 ran at 10.0 points against an 11.0-point ten-year average — i.e. below normal, before a third quarter that is running far above it.
The FY2025 series, from the Stage 0 re-score file (_clusters/cluster-insurance-rescore-2026-09-22.md §4, sourced there to Allstate's own ratio tables), puts the ex-cat ex-development combined ratio at 87.3 / 95.6 / 91.7 / 85.6 / 79.7 for 2021–2025. The H1 2026 figure of 79.9 continues 2025's level; the machine is working. The question this dossier raises is not whether it works, but what is being reported on top of it.
3. The pay metric, which is where the two halves meet
The annual incentive pool is 70% business-unit profitable growth and 30% "Performance Net Income" (DEF 14A 2026-04-10, CD&A, 2025 plan design). The definition of that measure, on p.83 of the same document:
"Performance Net Income is adjusted to replace actual catastrophe losses with plan catastrophe losses." — DEF 14A filed 2026-04-10, "Performance Net Income" definition, p.83
The list of adjustments on that page removes restructuring, run-off underwriting, disposals, unplanned alternative capital, buybacks differing from plan, Health & Benefits, and anything non-recurring above $20m after tax. Prior-year reserve reestimates are not on the list. For 2025 the metric printed $8,634m against threshold $4,540m / target $5,340m / maximum $6,140m, funding the 30% component at 200.0% (CD&A, 2025 annual incentive table).
So the measure that sets the bonus is immunised against the catastrophe losses now running at 2.6x last year, and fully exposed to the reserve releases that supplied 5.6 points of the H1 combined ratio. That is not an accusation of anything; it is the incentive geometry, read out of the filing, and it is the concrete content of the 0 that §4.3 test 1 gives this name.
4. Management on the reserves, in their own words
From the Q2 FY2026 earnings call (2026-08-06, Equibles speaker-labelled transcript), the final analyst question. Andrew Gliederman (TD Cowen) asks about auto prior-year reestimates — "6.6 points this quarter, each of the last four prior quarters you've had sizable releases" — and what is generating them. The answer:
"every quarter we think we get we've got reserves as accurate as we can get them so we don't assume there'll be any more coming ever" — Tom Wilson, Q2 FY2026 call, answer to Andrew Gliederman (TD Cowen)
and the reason offered for the releases is external: tort reform in Florida, Georgia and Louisiana, and New York legislation, making earlier loss-cost estimates too high.
The CFO turn that follows attributes the pattern to "a pretty volatile inflationary period", used-car prices "going up in upwards of 60 percent", and says the process is unchanged and externally audited.
Transcript reliability note, recorded so a later reader does not chase it. This call's speaker labels are not trustworthy: two different names are both tagged CFO, one analyst turn has the next analyst's name on it, one answer is merged into the question turn, and the CEO addresses a colleague as "John" who is not either of the two CFO-tagged names. The quote above is safe because the speaker identifies himself inside the turn ("i'll start and then john can jump in"), but no attribution from this transcript should be carried without that kind of internal check. Nothing else from this call is quoted anywhere in this repo.
Two other things worth having from the same call, not quoted:
- The CEO's closing line is an explicit valuation argument — that at this price you cannot get this combination of operational excellence, sustainable growth and capital generation anywhere else.
- Asked by Rob Cox (Goldman Sachs) whether it is prudent to slow the buyback and hold cash, the answer was a commitment to complete the full $4bn, citing $9.5bn of deployable holding-company capital (the $9.5bn figure is the analyst's, in his question, not management's).
5. The exposure base is growing, which the cluster file assumed it was not
_clusters/cluster-insurance-2026-09-22.md §5 wrote the variant perception as "a peak-earnings insurer in a line whose exposure base is structurally shrinking", with a kill criterion built on personal-auto earned premium declining. The company's own last monthly unit table says otherwise:
| Allstate Protection PIF (000s) | 2026-05-31 | 2026-04-30 | 2025-05-31 | m/m | y/y |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Auto | 25,901 | 25,805 | 25,226 | +0.4% | +2.7% |
| Homeowners | 7,788 | 7,764 | 7,587 | +0.3% | +2.6% |
| Other personal lines | 4,930 | 4,919 | 4,887 | +0.2% | +0.9% |
| Commercial lines | 180 | 179 | 180 | +0.6% | — |
| Total | 38,799 | 38,667 | 37,880 | +0.3% | +2.4% |
— 8-K filed 2026-06-18, Ex-99, "Allstate Protection Policies in Force" table.
Premiums agree: Allstate Protection premiums earned $29,720m in H1 2026 against $28,373m (+4.7%), written $30,056m against $29,344m (+2.4%). The first half of the cluster's sentence survives this pass and the second half does not. The scorecard's kill criteria are rewritten accordingly.
The series itself has ended. The May 2026 release is the last monthly one carrying the table:
"As previously communicated, policies in force will be reported in our quarterly earnings release going forward." — 8-K filed 2026-06-18, Ex-99, sentence following the PIF table
This is disclosed, not silent, and it was put to management on the Q2 call by Josh Anker (Bank of America), who opened with "I know that monthly PIF reporting is going away" and used June as the last month he could compute from. The CEO's reply thanked him for "debunking the conspiracy theory that because we stopped doing monthly things, we had a problem." Recorded here as a monitoring cadence change — the unit series drops from monthly to quarterly — and not as a red flag.
6. Kill test (S2) — the numbers
FY figures from XBRL company-concept series on the FY2025 10-K (accession 0000899051-26-000031); H1 2026 from the Q2 10-Q.
| 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | H1 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net earned premium ($m) | 44,052 | 47,736 | 52,516 | 58,309 | 61,449 | 31,223 (P&C) |
| Net income ($m) | 1,614 | (1,289) | (188) | 4,667 | 10,282 | 5,729 |
| Diluted shares (m) | 299.1 | 271.2 | 262.5 | 267.8 | 267.1 | 259.1 |
| Operating cash flow ($m) | 5,116 | 5,121 | 4,228 | 8,931 | 10,110 | n/r |
| Buybacks ($m) | 3,120 | 2,520 | 335 | 2 | 1,233 | 1,660 |
| Long-term debt ($m) | 7,976 | 7,964 | 7,942 | 8,085 | 7,490 | n/r |
| Shareholders' equity ($m) | 24,944 | 17,488 | 17,770 | 21,442 | 30,610 | 33,698 |
Diluted EPS H1 2026 $21.73 against $9.85. BVPS $123.38 at 2026-06-30 against $82.40 a year earlier (+49.7%) and $108.45 at 2025-12-31. Trailing-twelve-month return on average common equity 49.1% (10-Q MD&A). Debt to equity 22.2%, down from 24.5%.
Survives on every axis by a wide margin. The kill test is not where this name is decided; the reserve line is.
Buyback: "During the first six months of 2026, we repurchased 8 million common shares, or 3.0% of total common shares outstanding at December 31, 2025, for $1.66 billion." — Q2 2026 10-Q, Capital Resources. The authorisation is $4.00bn from 2026-02-04, with $2.60bn remaining at 2026-06-30 and a 2028-02-29 deadline. At $229.50 that is 1.86x book.
7. Ownership (S5)
3spread, 13F report date 2026-06-30 (threespread.py holders ALL; 1,222 filers against 1,668 in the prior quarter — the quarter is incompletely ingested and no exit may be read from an absence; the named non-filers include both Vanguard entities, Franklin, Geode, GQG, Morgan Stanley, Northern Trust, Dimensional, UBS AM and First Trust).
| Manager | Shares | $m | QoQ |
|---|---|---|---|
| BlackRock | 22,860,586 | 5,439.4 | +971,480 |
| State Street | 12,510,392 | 2,989.9 | +250,459 |
| T. Rowe Price | 7,929,054 | 1,886.6 | −2,882,157 |
| Bank of America | 5,927,387 | 1,410.4 | −1,985,933 |
| Deutsche Bank | 4,239,087 | 1,008.6 | +1,315,314 |
| Invesco | 3,598,458 | 856.2 | +231,486 |
The Sixth Street row is not a holding. 3spread reports Sixth Street Partners Management Company as a NEW holder of 1,856,753 shares, byte-identical to Charles Schwab Investment Management's position, and threespread.py holders now flags it automatically. This is the defect documented in ledger/research/README.md: Sixth Street's 13F-HR accession 0001752724-26-000051 carries Schwab's information table. ALL is the fifth issuer where it has appeared, after QCOM, ACGL, KNSL and AX.
Vanguard. The 13G/A cause found at APH on 2026-09-21 is confirmed here from this issuer's own proxy: "On March 26, 2026, The Vanguard Group, Inc. filed a Schedule 13G/A reporting that on January 12, 2026, it underwent an internal realignment such that The Vanguard Group, Inc. and its subsidiaries or business divisions of subsidiaries will report beneficial ownership separately" — DEF 14A, 5% holders table, footnote (1). Two issuers now carry the same footnote, so it is a firm-wide reporting change and every "Vanguard exited" reading in this repo's 13F data is wrong.
Insiders: 21 directors and executive officers hold 1.55% of the common, and "no director or executive officer other than Mr. Wilson, beneficially owned 1% or more of the outstanding common stock" (DEF 14A footnote 5, as of 2026-03-01). No shares pledged. Form 4 traffic: 172 filings in the twelve months to 2026-09-23, most recently 2026-09-08; nine Form 144 proposed sales since 2026-03-27 (2026-08-07 the latest). Transaction codes were not itemised this run — the Form 4 bodies were not opened, so no buy/sell direction is claimed.
13D/13G: no activist and no strategic block; the recent filings are passive 13Gs and the Vanguard 13G/A above.
Short interest (Equibles/FINRA): 6,318,184 shares at the 2026-08-31 settlement, +1,070,697 from 2026-08-14, 4.2 days to cover — about 2.4% of shares outstanding. There is no short case being expressed in the tape. (Equibles also returns a model estimate for the 2026-09-15 settlement of ~6.24m shares; that is a prediction, not a FINRA figure, and is not used anywhere above.)
8. Filings read, and the red-flag sweep (S3)
Three biggest risks, in management's own ordering, from the FY2025 10-K Item 1A summary table and the ordered body beneath it (pp.20–22):
- "Property and casualty actual claim costs may exceed current reserves established for claims due to changes in the inflationary, regulatory and litigation environment" — first risk factor under "Insurance and financial services", p.21.
- "Increases in the frequency or severity of property and casualty claims may adversely affect our results of operations and financial condition" — second, pp.21–22.
- "Catastrophes and severe weather events may subject us to significant losses" — third, p.22.
Management's own summary table lists, in this order: complexity and uncertainty of loss cost estimates and reserves; claim frequency and severity volatility; catastrophes and severe weather. The two risks management ranks first are the two this dossier is about.
Auditor: Deloitte & Touche LLP, PCAOB ID 34. Sole critical audit matter: the reserve for property and casualty insurance claims, and the disclosed procedure includes "Performing a retrospective review, including comparing prior year estimates of expected incurred losses to actual experience during the current year to identify potential bias".
Red-flag sweep (efts.sec.gov full text, CIK 0000899051, 2023-01-01 to 2026-09-23):
| Query | Hits | What they are |
|---|---|---|
"changes in accountants" | 0 | — |
"non-reliance" | 0 | — |
"restatement" | 18 | clawback-policy exhibits (Ex-97) and RSU/PSA award agreements |
"material weakness" | 6 | each 10-K's own ICFR boilerplate |
No NT 10-K in the filing index; no 10-K/A or 10-Q/A of any year; the only amendments are 3/A, 4/A, 8-K/A, ARS/A and 13G/A. Clean.
Also noted from the 8-K cover pages: the common is now registered on NYSE Texas as well as the NYSE, while the preferred and the 5.100% subordinated debentures due 2053 remain NYSE-only.
9. Scuttlebutt (S6) — carried forward, plus this run's outside points
Carried from _clusters/cluster-insurance-2026-09-22.md §4: the 2026-09-07 Real Eisman Playbook episode's personal-lines passage — "which I've not been more negative on in my career" (Ryan Tunis) — with Allstate named as the captive-agent channel losing about 1.5 points of share a year to direct. That quote lives in the board's claim rows, not here.
Added this run, all [search-summary] and none of it primary:
- Mizuho raised its price target to $300, Outperform, 2026-09-18 — i.e. after the August catastrophe release.
- Zacks Research cut Strong Buy to Hold, 2026-09-17.
- Consensus Hold, average target $266.74. (This closes the analyst-coverage-count gap the cluster file flagged as a cheap fix — it cost one search, inside S6.)
- Q2 2026 adjusted EPS of $8.99 beat consensus and revenue of $18.6bn beat — the quarter itself was well received.
The product test and the expert call stay ⏳ OPEN (user).
10. Evidence that is thin, and access limits
- One transcript, not two. The Q1 2026 call was not read; the Equibles budget is shared across three names in this slot. The Q2 call was chosen because it is the only one that post-dates the reserve-release step-up.
- Form 4 transaction codes not itemised. 172 filings were counted and dated; none were opened, so no insider buy/sell direction is asserted.
- No shelf read. No S-3 appears in the recent index, but absence is not proof and no S-3 search was run beyond the index.
- No Investor Day or supplement. The quarterly investor supplement, where the segment-level loss-development tables live, was not read; the ratio tables used here are the 10-Q's own.
- Next-earnings date is derived, not scheduled. Equibles' IR calendar has no upcoming ALL event (last captured 2026-09-14); market data's calendar needs a paid plan. Q3 results are placed at 2026-10-28 to 2026-11-05 from the 2024-10-30 and 2025-11-05 precedents. The September monthly release (~2026-10-15) is the earlier and more informative date and its cadence is well established.
- The $9.5bn deployable-capital figure is an analyst's, spoken in a question on the Q2 call and not confirmed by management in the turn that followed. It is not used in the model.
- No Glassdoor, G2 or channel checks. S6 is carry-forward plus search summaries.