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KNSLKinsale Capital Group, Inc.

Industry Insurance Updated 24 Sep 2026

The idea

Best-in-class E&S underwriter (57% loss ratio) at 16x earnings; the bull case needs the 32.7% Commercial Property decline to prove cyclical and ex-property growth to reaccelerate.

Events to watch

  • Q3 release ~2026-10-22: gross written premium ex-Commercial-Property and the current accident year ex-cat loss ratio
  • the first buyback in the company's history
How we got the target

Scorecard: base ~$381 (15.1x 2028E operating EPS). Time frame: 2028.

Target: from the research notes. Prices: market data get_latest_stock_price, close of 2026-09-22 (fetched 2026-09-23)

What would prove it wrong

8 warning signs
  1. The share-count half is dead.

    Details

    The count is now falling, not rising — 23,145,751 → 22,778,425 over H1 2026 under the first buyback authorisation in the company's history, with $337.5m of capacity remaining. A rising share count is no longer the thing to watch; the reason for the falling one is.

  2. The loss-ratio half measures the wrong series.

    Details

    The reported loss ratio is net of prior-year development, and Q2 2026's 53.8% is held there by 4.5 points of release. Watch instead the current accident year ex-catastrophe loss ratio, which Kinsale discloses every quarter: 57.0% in Q2 2026 against 58.1% in Q2 2025. Two consecutive quarters above 62% is the kill.

  3. Current accident year ex-cat loss ratio above 62% for two consecutive quarters.

  4. Gross written premium EXCLUDING Commercial Property turns negative year on year.

    Details

    It was +3.7% in Q2 2026. That is the line separating "one division re-priced" from "the franchise re-priced".

  5. Expense ratio above 24%.

    Details

    It went 20.7% → 21.7% in one year because retention rose and ceding commissions fell. The cluster's entire S0 pass rests on this being structurally low.

  6. Net retention ratio above 90% while gross premium is still falling.

    Details

    82.6% → 85.8% already. Retaining more of a shrinking book is how an underwriter buys a flat net line with real risk.

  7. Favourable prior-year development above 5.0 points of net earned premium for a full year.

    Details

    It went 2.79 points (2024) → 3.99 (2025) → 4.62 (H1 2026) while gross written premium growth went +12% → +5.7% → negative. Kinsale's 17-year favourable record is real and this is not an allegation that the releases are not; it is the line past which the reported combined ratio is being held together by the prior book rather than the current one — and the bonus pool is a percentage of a profit measure struck after that release (DEF 14A 2026-04-09).

  8. Operating ROE below 20% in any quarter.

    Details

    This is management's own floor, restated on every call in the window ("we manage everything to a 20% ROE or greater", 2026-07-24 [14]). It is the only number Kinsale commits to, it has never been missed, and a miss would be the first.

How far along

7 of 10 steps done · 3 done in a group review

Next step

on the Q3 2026 release (~2026-10-22) read two numbers before anything else: gross written premium ex-Commercial-Property, and the current accident year ex-catastrophe loss ratio. The first says whether a 32.7% decline in one division is a division problem or the front edge of a company problem — ex-CP growth was +3.7% in Q2 and +4.8% over the half, so it is still a division problem today. The second is the only underwriting series a reserve release cannot flatter, and at 57.0% (from 58.1%) it says the underwriting is still excellent. The bear case requires both to turn; either one alone is noise.

Needs your decision

S6 product test / expert call, S7 conviction.

Failed checks

none. S0/S4/S7 are not closed by design (cluster stages, carried forward), with the S0 note recording that one of its three scoring points is eroding. S8 closed closed on 2026-09-24 — reliable, 6 rows, 1 withdrawn. S3's 2026-09-22 transcript deviation is resolved: eight quarters of market data transcripts are now on disk and were read, the dodge log below is opened from them, and the earnings-quality check is written (2 flags). The open warnings are all ⚠️ rather than failed: the expense ratio (S0 falsifier), the withdrawn growth range (S8), the accelerating prior-year release against a bonus pool struck after development (S3 EQ flag 2), and the narrowing cash conversion (S3 EQ flag 1).

Who runs it

The Front Office

Step by step

  1. S0How it does as AI gets cheapDone in a group review

    carry-forward (cluster: Insurance — Stage 0 re-score, 2026-09-22)

    RE-SCORED 2026-09-22 under the SKILL.md §4.3 risk-carrying variant, which supersedes the closed 3/4 this line used to carry from Insurance & reinsurance — cluster pass, 2026-09-22.

    Full notes

    lens 4/4: reserve honesty 1 (favourable 5 of 5, −32.0/−35.9/−35.8/−37.7/−62.8 $m; paid- to-incurred flat at 0.34-0.39 across a book that grew 2.7x), edge survives the cycle 1 (combined ratio plus development added back: 83.0/78.7/79.2/79.9 over 2022-25), capital theirs 1 (NPW/equity 0.82x, ceded share not rising), no dilution 1 — and this is the test the old instrument had no box for: net earned premium $582.9m → $1,575.8m and reserves $881m → $2,891m on a diluted count flat at 23.1m → 23.3m (WATCHLIST_PLAN.md §21 predicted exactly this).

    ⚠️ THE PRESSURE POINT MOVED RATHER THAN GOING AWAY: the expense ratio rose 20.7% → 21.7% in Q2 2026 because Kinsale cut cessions to defend net premium, and it is now the FALSIFIER under test 4 rather than a scoring point under "bottleneck". Second new number: favourable development rose 67% in 2025 to 3.99 points of net earned premium, its largest of the five years, in the year gross written premium growth fell to +5.7%. Owner checks dropped 2026-09-21 (README §Stage 0 override). Liquidity: ADV $69.6m/day (21 sessions to 2026-09-21, market data NYSE:KNSL) on 22.8m shares — the binding constraint on any position size.

  2. S1Where the idea came fromDone

    watchlist (owner, Apple Stocks, 2026-09-20). No Tier 0 promotion.

  3. S2Quick deal-breaker checkDone

    FY2025 revenue $1,874m, net income $503.6m, net earned premium $1,576m, equity $1,960m, reserves $2,891m (XBRL)

    Full notes

    Five-year record is the cleanest in the repo: premiums earned $413m (2020) → $1,576m (2025), 3.8x, net income $88m → $504m, 5.7x, on a diluted share count of 22.9m → 23.3m — i.e. essentially all of it per share. No debt question ($6.5m of interest expense in a half). Survives outright.

    ⚠️ THE TREND BROKE THIS YEAR: gross written premiums FELL 5.0% in Q2 2026 and 2.9% over the half, the first decline on the public record. Average premium per policy −14% ($14,300 → $12,300).

    ⚠️ GAAP EPS +34.0% overstates it: operating EPS +15.9%, the gap being $56.2m of equity-portfolio marks against $28.6m a year earlier. · capital allocation (2026-09-24, dossier-2026-09-24.md): compounds. FY2021-25 operating cash flow $3,844.6m; $100.0m of buybacks and $64.6m of dividends returned = 4.3% of it, the lowest ratio in this repository — the other 95.7% funded the book (NPE $582.9m to $1,575.8m, reserves $881m to $2,891m, equity $699m to $1,960m). ROE 23.9/22.0/33.6/32.3/29.3%, five-year average 28.2%; BVPS $25.32 (2020-12-31) to $84.66 (2025-12-31) = +27.3%/yr, +28.1%/yr with the $2.80 of dividends added back; $89.34 at 2026-06-30. Zero acquisitions and zero goodwill in five years — all of the growth was written, not bought. Capex $6.6m/$23.9m/$53.7m (2023-25) is the new headquarters building, substantially complete in Q4 2025 (10-K), not capitalised software. SBC $52.9m over five years = 1.4% of OCF; diluted shares 23.062m to 23.259m (+0.9%), outstanding now falling to 22.778m at 2026-06-30. Buyback price: Q4 2025 119,752 sh at $422.43 = 4.99x book; Q2 2026 321,055 sh at $314.18 = 3.52x book — the pace rose as the price fell ($10m/qtr at ~$425, then $162.5m in two quarters at $310-330), bridged by a $30.0m revolver draw repaid inside H1 2026.

    ⚠️ CORRECTION to the 2026-09-22 log: the December 2025 $250m authorisation was the second, not the first. The first was October 2024, $100.0m, exhausted in October 2025 (FY2025 10-K, Item 5 note (3) and the liquidity note). Bonus metric (DEF 14A 2026-04-09, the read the 2026-09-22 pass recorded as not extracted): the pool is a percentage of actual underwriting profit, the company-selected pay-versus-performance measure. No EPS metric, so the §25 EPS-pay-plus-buybacks flag does NOT fire — but the measure is struck after prior-year development, so a reserve release raises the pool. See S3's EQ flag 2.

  4. S3Reading the company's reportsDone

    (gate-minimum)

    FY2025 10-K Item 1A (reserve risk, occurrence mix) and KPMG's report.

    Full notes

    Q2 2026 10-Q MD&A in full (premium by division, retention, loss-ratio and expense-ratio tables, development paragraphs) plus the buyback and shelf notes; the 2026-07-23 results 8-K; the 2026-04-09 DEF 14A ownership table; and a filing-index red-flag sweep (no NT 10-K ever, no 10-K/A or 10-Q/A, comment-letter correspondence last closed 2023-10-30. KPMG since 2009; sole CAM is reserves). Three disclosed risks named with locators.

    ⚠️ Deviation: no Q2 2026 transcript — the Equibles connector failed to connect for this session and fool.com has no Q2 2026 KNSL transcript (404). The Q1 2026 fool.com transcript was read as [search-summary] only and is quoted nowhere. EQ: 2 flags (2026-09-24, dossier-2026-09-24.md) — (1) prior-year releases rising as growth falls: favourable PYD 2.79 points of net earned premium in 2024 to 3.99 in 2025 (+66.8% in absolute terms, $37.7m to $62.8m, 9.9% of pre-tax income) and 4.62 points in H1 2026, against a bonus pool struck after development; (2) cash conversion narrowing one way for three years, OCF/net income 2.79x (2023) to 2.35x to 2.07x (2025) to 1.70x (H1 2026) — the level is still excellent and the direction is mechanical (float growth reverses with premium growth), but the same reported profit will be less cash-backed in 2027. Clean: SBC 0.95% of revenue and 1.7% of OCF, FCF after SBC 98.2% of reported FCF; accruals -16.9/-13.0/-9.9% of average assets; premiums-receivable days 48.7 to 37.8 to 28.9; DAC 8.24% to 7.53% of NEP; no capitalised software. The non-GAAP bridge has exactly three adjustments, all investment marks, all removing income ($503.6m net income to $453.7m operating) — conservative, not inflationary.

    ⚠️ Reading caution: the GAAP-to-operating gap is widening with the equity allocation (8% to 11.7%), so GAAP ROE 29.3% sits 2.9 points above operating 26.4%.

    ⚠️ RESOLVED: the 2026-09-22 transcript deviation above is closed — eight quarters (FY2024-Q3 to FY2026-Q2, market data) are now in _transcripts/KNSL/ and were read.

  5. S4Rivals and suppliersDone in a group review
  6. S5Who owns the stockDone

    13F by manager at 2026-06-30 (BAMCO/Baron 2,663,958 sh / $878.6m, ADDING 636,193. BlackRock 2,035,890, −138,454. State Street 718,344. Giverny +262,520. Turtle Creek −423,361.

    Full notes

    First Manhattan −427,656), 13D/G census, proxy ownership (14 officers and directors = 5.6%. CEO Kehoe alone 4.0%. BlackRock 9.1%, Baron 7.6% on the proxy's older 13G/A basis). Who is on the other side: a founder-CEO with 4%, one conviction growth manager adding, and index money. Shelf: S-3ASR filed 2025-08-27, unlimited by construction — on paper yes, in behaviour no (the company is repurchasing, and has never issued equity for growth).

    ⚠️ the Q2-26 13F quarter is incompletely ingested (381 filers vs 569); no exit read from an absence.

    ⚠️

    ⚠️ the Sixth Street row is NOT a holding — see ACGL/dossier-2026-09-22.md §5.

  7. S6What workers and customers sayDone

    carry-forward (cluster: Insurance & reinsurance — cluster pass, 2026-09-22)

    Eisman's "which I think could be a problematic company" against Tunis's constructive read, off the board's own claim rows. Product test / expert call open OPEN (user)

  8. S7The case for it, and pricesDone in a group review

    carry-forward (cluster: Insurance & reinsurance — cluster pass, 2026-09-22)

    conviction open OPEN (user) · valuation (bear/base/bull; moved from S8 2026-09-23): 16.3x 2026E and 15.1x 2028E model OPERATING EPS at $358.19 (2026-09-21); 4.01x book ($89.34 BVPS at 2026-06-30); 14.5x LTM GAAP EPS. Base ~$381, bear ~$208, bull ~$560.

    Full notes

    ADV $69.6m. · valuation, base case re-read 2026-09-24 against S8: the verdict is reliable, so no guidance haircut — Kinsale publishes no earnings guidance to haircut, and the returns target it does publish ("low 20s ROE or better") has been beaten every year of the window. Two adjustments to the ASSUMPTIONS rather than the numbers: (a) any growth rate above high single digits is now the modeller's own, not management's — the 10-20% range was withdrawn silently (S8 row 6) and the last three quarters printed +5.7%, -0.5%, -5.0%. (b) the earnings the multiple is struck on carry 3.99 points of prior-year release (4.62 in H1 2026) and a widening equity mark — use OPERATING EPS ex-development for the base case, not GAAP.

  9. S8Do the bosses keep their word?Done

    6 rows (2026-09-24, dossier-2026-09-24.md): 2 beat, 3 met, 1 withdrawn

    reliable. All 6 belong to executives still in place (Kehoe Chairman/CEO throughout and President from 2026-03-02. Petrucelli EVP/CFO throughout); no departed rows.

    Full notes

    Kinsale guides a target, not a forecast — no revenue, EPS or combined-ratio guidance in eight calls. What it does put on the record it hits: the California wildfire net loss $22m against a guided ~$25m; the equity allocation at 11.7% against 12% "over the next year or so"; $10m/quarter of buybacks delivered and then deliberately bettered. $162.5m of the $250m December authorisation deployed in under seven months against "over the next year or so"; operating ROE 26.4% FY2025 and 24.4% in Q2 2026 against "low 20s or better".

    ⚠️ THE ONE WITHDRAWN ROW IS THE WHOLE FINDING: the 10-20% gross-written-premium growth range "over the cycle" was stated on five consecutive calls (2024-10-25 [46] through 2025-10-24 [21]) and is not spoken on any of the three calls since, while the actual rate went +5.7% (FY2025) to -0.5% (Q1 2026) to -5.0% (Q2 2026). Nobody withdrew it, re-based it or replaced it. Brian Haney — President/COO and the executive who restated it most often — gave notice on 2025-10-17 (8-K 0001669162-25-000057), a week before the last call it was spoken on, and retired 2026-03-02. Consequence for S7: no earnings guidance exists to haircut, but any model still carrying a 10-20% growth assumption is carrying a number management stopped repeating three calls ago.

  10. S9What to watch nextDone

    trigger written; next earnings expected ~2026-10-22 (DERIVED from filing cadence: Q3 releases went 2025-10-23 and Q2 2026-07-23, a consistent Thursday-after-quarter pattern. market data's calendar needs a paid plan and Equibles was unreachable)

    Full notes

    Tier 0 EDGAR sweep covers the feed (cik 1669162)

Sources and notes

Sources 7 documents
Short nameDocumentWhere it came fromRead on
10K-2025Kinsale 10-K for FY2025, filed 2026-02-20https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1669162/000166916226000015/knsl-20251231.htm2026-09-22
10Q-Q2-26Kinsale 10-Q for the quarter ended 2026-06-30, filed 2026-07-23https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1669162/000166916226000040/knsl-20260630.htm2026-09-22
8K-Q2-26Kinsale 8-K filed 2026-07-23, Exhibit 99.1 — second quarter 2026 results releasehttps://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1669162/000166916226000039/earningsrelease2q2026.htm2026-09-22
DEF14A-26Kinsale DEF 14A filed 2026-04-09 (ownership table as of 2026-03-27)https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1669162/000166916226000020/knsl-20260409.htm2026-09-22
13F-Q2-26Institutional holders by manager, 13F report date 2026-06-30 (ingestion incomplete — see the edge note)python ledger/research/tools/threespread.py holders KNSL2026-09-22
EDGAR-INDEXKinsale EDGAR filing index and XBRL company concepts (CIK 1669162)https://data.sec.gov/submissions/CIK0001669162.json2026-09-22
CLUSTER-INSInsurance & reinsurance cluster pass, 2026-09-22, slot cluster-insuranceledger/research/_clusters/cluster-insurance-2026-09-22.md2026-09-22
Links to other companies 11 links
context 3issuer of 2officer of 1key person risk 1auditor of 1governance structure 1holds 1competitor 1
FromLinkToDateWhere it says so
Kinsale Commercial Property DivisioncontextKNSL2026-06-3010Q-Q2-26 — Item 2, MD&A, Results of Operations — Gross written premiums, three months ended June 30, 2026
KNSLcontextKNSL2026-06-3010Q-Q2-26 — Item 2, MD&A, Results of Operations — Net retention ratio paragraph, three months ended June 30, 2026
KNSLissuer ofKinsale share repurchase program2026-06-3010Q-Q2-26 — Notes to condensed consolidated financial statements — Share repurchase program
Michael P. Kehoeofficer ofKNSL2026-07-238K-Q2-26 — Exhibit 99.1, CEO quote following 'Highlights for the quarter included'
KNSLcontextKNSL2026-06-3010Q-Q2-26 — Item 2, MD&A, Loss ratio — three months ended June 30, 2026 development paragraph
KNSLkey person riskKNSL2025-12-3110K-2025 — Item 1A, Risk Factors, first risk — 'Our loss reserves may be inadequate…', bullet on occurrence policies
KPMG LLPauditor ofKNSL2026-02-2010K-2025 — Item 8, Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm — signature block
Michael P. Kehoegovernance structureKNSL2026-03-27DEF14A-26 — Security Ownership of Certain Beneficial Owners and Management — group row and note (3)
BAMCO Inc /NY/ (Baron Capital)holdsKNSL2026-06-3013F-Q2-26 — holders table, row 1; WARNING lines beneath it
KNSLissuer ofKinsale S-3ASR automatic shelf registration (filed 2025-08-27)2025-08-27EDGAR-INDEX — filings.recent — form S-3ASR, accession 0001669162-25-000052, filed 2025-08-27
KNSLcompetitorArch Capital Group Ltd.2026-06-30CLUSTER-INS — §1 — The cycle, from a filing rather than from commentary
History 4 entries
  • 2026-09-22 — first pass, slot names-insurance-1, model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine. S1, S2, S3 (gate-minimum, no transcript — Equibles down, fool.com 404), S5 and S9 closed; S0/S4/S6/S7 carried forward from Insurance & reinsurance — cluster pass, 2026-09-22; S8 modelled and left open. Run finding: the compounder's top line turned — gross written premium −5.0% in the quarter, driven by a 32.7% fall in the Commercial Property Division that management attributes to "heightened competition", with average premium per policy −14%. Net written premium was held nearly flat (−1.4%) only by cutting cessions (retention 82.6% → 85.8%), which cost ceding commissions and pushed the expense ratio from 20.7% to 21.7% — i.e. the moat the cluster pass scored is being spent to defend the line. Second finding: the first share repurchase authorisation in the company's history (December 2025, $250m; topped up $250m in July 2026) has taken the share count below 23m for the first time. Third: the release mix is the same shape as Arch's — $22.6m from 2021-2025 accident years, "particularly in our shorter-tail lines", offset by adverse development in 2017-2019 construction liability. The underwriting itself is still excellent: current accident year ex-cat loss ratio 57.0% from 58.1%, combined ratio 75.5%. Also: the Sixth Street 13F row is a filing defect, documented once in ACGL/dossier-2026-09-22.md §5 and guarded mechanically in threespread.py. Evidence and access limits in dossier-2026-09-22.md. Nothing here is human-verified.
  • 2026-09-22 — S0 re-scored, slot cluster-insurance-rescore, model-drafted unattended. The S0 line above now points at Insurance — Stage 0 re-score, 2026-09-22 instead of Insurance & reinsurance — cluster pass, 2026-09-22, which scored this name ✅ 3/4 with the AI-surplus four. Under the risk-carrying instrument (SKILL.md §4.3) it is 4/4, and the point it scores on is the one WATCHLIST_PLAN.md §21 said had been "smuggled in under bottleneck": premiums compounding on a flat share count. Nothing else in this scorecard changed — S4, S6 and S7 still carry forward from the 2026-09-22 cluster file. The expense-ratio warning this line used to carry against the old test 4 is kept, re-filed as the falsifier: it is the cost of defending the line, and it is the number that would flip the 4/4.
  • 2026-09-23 — stage redefinition, owner decision (WATCHLIST_PLAN.md §25): S8 is now Management credibility and is not yet run for this name; the old S8 valuation figures moved to the valuation: line under S7, and any proposed buy price or position size was removed (the pipeline no longer drafts either). No research was redone. S2 capital allocation and S3 earnings quality are also pending, in the same backfill slot.
  • 2026-09-24 — backfill, slot backfill-2026-09-23-6, model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine. Wrote the three checks added on 2026-09-23 (WATCHLIST_PLAN.md §25) into dossier-2026-09-24.md and updated this file: S8 management credibility (6 rows, 2 beat / 3 met / 1 withdrawn — reliable), S2 capital allocation (compounds) and S3 earnings quality (2 flags). No other stage was redone. Sources: FY2025 10-K, Q2 2026 10-Q, the 2025-12-11 repurchase 8-K, the Item 5.02 8-Ks of 2025-10-23 and 2026-02-04, the DEF 14A of 2026-04-09, XBRL companyfacts, and all eight archived market data transcripts. Run finding: the 10-20% "over the cycle" growth range that Kinsale stated on five consecutive calls was dropped from the script after 2025-10-24 and never replaced, in the quarters the actual rate went negative — no withdrawal, no re-basing, no analyst told. It is the only withdrawn row in a record that is otherwise met or beaten, and the executive who restated it most often (Brian Haney, President and COO) gave notice a week before the last call it was spoken on. Second finding: favourable prior-year development is accelerating as growth disappears — 2.79 points of net earned premium in 2024, 3.99 in 2025 (+66.8% in dollars), 4.62 in H1 2026 — and the annual bonus pool is a percentage of "actual underwriting profit", which is struck after that development (DEF 14A 2026-04-09). The releases have 17 years of being right behind them; the incentive is still worth writing down. Third: the 2026-09-22 log's "first share repurchase authorisation in the company's history (December 2025, $250m)" is wrong — the first was October 2024, $100m, exhausted October 2025; December 2025 was the second. Corrected in the S2 line, not silently rewritten. Also closed: the 2026-09-22 S3 transcript deviation (eight quarters now on disk and read; the dodge log above is opened from the two most recent) and its "proxy compensation structure not extracted" gap. Nothing here is human-verified.
Full notes, 24 Sep 2026 20 min read

KNSL — dossier, 2026-09-24 (backfill: S8, S2 capital allocation, S3 earnings quality)

Slot backfill-2026-09-23-6. Model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine; nothing here is human-verified. This file holds only the three checks added on 2026-09-23 (WATCHLIST_PLAN.md §25). Every other stage stands as written in dossier-2026-09-22.md. Anything from background knowledge is marked [background].

Sources this pass. EDGAR, User-Agent ddboard-research gorkem@celebico.com (CIK 1669162): the FY2025 10-K (0001669162-26-000015, filed 2026-02-20) for the consolidated statements, MD&A, Item 5 issuer-purchases table, Item 7A and the non-GAAP reconciliation; the Q2 2026 10-Q (0001669162-26-000040, filed 2026-07-23) for the H1 financing detail and its Item 5 table; the share-repurchase 8-K of 2025-12-11 (0001669162-25-000064); the Item 5.02 8-Ks of 2025-10-23 (0001669162-25-000057) and 2026-02-04 (0001669162-26-000007); the DEF 14A of 2026-04-09 (0001669162-26-000020) for the incentive-plan structure — the compensation read the 2026-09-22 pass recorded as not extracted; and XBRL companyfacts for CIK 1669162. Transcripts entirely from the archive ledger/research/_transcripts/KNSL/ (market data, eight quarters FY2024-Q3 through FY2026-Q2, call dates from _transcripts/index.json). Equibles: 0 calls. market data: 0 calls. 3spread: 0 calls. Nothing was fetched from the open web.

This pass also closes the transcript gap the 2026-09-22 run recorded as its S3 deviation: that session had no transcript at all (Equibles was down, fool.com 404). Eight are now on disk and were read.

Quote discipline: every transcript quote was located by exact substring in the archived JSON bytes and copied from it; filing quotes were matched against a whitespace-collapsed text extraction of the EDGAR HTML. Turn numbers [n] are newline positions in the market data content string.

S8 — management credibility

How Kinsale guides: a target, not a forecast. There is no revenue, EPS or combined-ratio guidance in any of the eight calls or any earnings release in the window. What management puts on the record is (a) a standing return-on-equity floor, (b) a standing long-run growth range, (c) discrete catastrophe-event estimates, and (d) capital-return commitments — the buyback pace and the equity-allocation shift. That is four checkable kinds of promise and six scoreable rows, which clears the gate of four.

Who promised, and who is still here. market data labels turns by name only; roles are read off EDGAR as of each call date.

  • Michael P. Kehoe, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer throughout the window, and additionally President from 2026-03-02 (8-K 0001669162-25-000057, filed 2025-10-23, Item 5.02: "On October 23, 2025, in connection with Mr. Haney's announced retirement, the Company announced that Michael P. Kehoe, will assume the additional title of President, effective March 2, 2026."). Made rows 1, 4, 5 and 6.
  • Bryan P. Petrucelli, Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer across the entire window; title read off his signature block on the 8-K of 2026-02-04 (0001669162-26-000007). Made rows 2 and 3.
  • Brian D. Haney, President and Chief Operating Officer — retired effective 2026-03-02, and the notice is dated three weeks before the last call on which the growth range was spoken: "On October 17, 2025, Brian D. Haney, President and Chief Operating Officer of Kinsale Capital Group, Inc. (the "Company"), notified the Company of his intent to retire from the Company, effective March 2, 2026" (same 8-K). He is the executive who restated the growth range most often — see row 6, which is the row that matters.
  • Stuart P. Winston, promoted from Senior Vice President to Executive Vice President, Chief Underwriting Officer on 2025-10-23 (same 8-K). Made no scored row.

No scored row belongs to a departed executive. 0 departed rows.

Say vs do (guides made 2024-10-25 → 2026-07-24)

#Promise (period · metric · figure)Made where · by whomResult · locatorScore
1Q1 2025 · Southern California wildfires · pre-tax loss net of reinsurance ≈ $25mcall 2025-02-14 [1] · Michael Kehoe (Chairman & CEO): "For Kinsale, we expect our pretax losses net of reinsurance to be approximately $25 million."$22m net — call 2025-04-25 [1] · Kehoe: "The Palisades wildfire loss that we estimated in February at $45 million is now estimated to be about $41 million gross and $22 million net of reinsurance."beat (below the estimate)
22025 · equity allocation from 8% to 10% of cash and invested assets, 12% "over the next year or so"call 2025-02-14 [2] · Bryan Petrucelli (EVP & CFO): "we're gradually increasing our allocation to common stock from 8% to 10% of cash and invested assets and will eventually increase allocation to 12% over the next year or so."11.7% — FY2025 10-K Item 7A: "As of December 31, 2025, approximately 11.7% of the fair value of our investment portfolio (including cash and cash equivalents) was invested in common stocks and ETFs."met
3from Q1 2025 · buyback pace · "similar modest levels" to Q4 2024's $10m, each quartercall 2025-02-14 [2] · Petrucelli: "We repurchased $10 million in shares during the fourth quarter. We'd expect similar modest levels of repurchases each quarter"$10.0m in Q1 2025, restated on the call of 2025-04-25 [2] ("we repurchased $10 million in shares during the first quarter"); H1 2025 total $20.0m (Q2 2026 10-Q: "During the first six months of 2025, cash used in financing activities reflected... share repurchases of $20.0 million"). Then deliberately superseded, and said so — see row 4met
4from Dec 2025 · deploy the $250m repurchase authorisation "over the next year or so"call 2026-02-13 [1] · Kehoe: "we are returning more excess capital to shareholders, mostly through the $250,000,000 buyback authorization that we announced in December. Subject to a variety of considerations, we generally expect to deploy this authorization over the next year or so."$162.5m of $250m deployed by 2026-06-30, i.e. 65% in under seven months — Q2 2026 10-Q: "At June 30, 2026, the Company had $87.5 million of capacity remaining under its share repurchase program", and the Board added $250m in July 2026 "bringing the remaining capacity to $337.5 million"met (on or ahead of the stated pace)
5standing · operating ROE "low 20s or better"restated on every call in the window; e.g. call 2026-02-13 [103] · Kehoe: "we are always going to prioritize generating that low 20s ROE or better", and call 2026-07-24 [14] · Kehoe: "Well, we manage everything to a 20% ROE or greater."FY2025 operating ROE 26.4% (FY2025 10-K: "Our operating return on equity, a non-GAAP financial measure, was 26.4% for the year ended December 31, 2025"); Q1 2026 annualised 24.0% and Q2 2026 24.4% (calls of 2026-04-24 [1] and 2026-07-24 [1])beat
6standing · gross written premium growth of 10–20% "over the cycle"first located on the call of 2024-10-25 [46] · Kehoe: "we think our long-term growth opportunity is best estimated in the 10% to 20% range"; restated on 2025-02-14 [3] by Brian Haney ("consistent with our expectation of 10% to 20% growth over the long term"), on 2025-04-25 [1] by Kehoe ("slightly below our expectations of 10% to 20% across the cycle"), on 2025-07-25 and last on 2025-10-24 [21] · Kehoe: "over the cycle, we think 10% to 20% is a good conservative estimate of our growth potential"FY2025 gross written premiums +5.7% (FY2025 10-K: "During 2025, our gross written premiums increased by 5.7%, to $2.0 billion"), Q1 2026 −0.5% and Q2 2026 −5.0% (calls of 2026-04-24 [1] and 2026-07-24 [1]) — and the range is not spoken on any of the three calls after 2025-10-24. A substring search for "10% to 20%", "10 to 20" and the growth language over FY2025-Q4, FY2026-Q1 and FY2026-Q2 returns nothingwithdrawn

Not scored (open).

  • Q3 2026 expense ratio: "if you look in aggregate, the second quarter expense ratio should be a good measure for you going forward" (call 2026-07-24 [10], Petrucelli) — 21.7% is the number to check against the Q3 2026 release, expected ~2026-10-22 (scorecard.md S9).
  • Operating cash flow "trending it with net written premiums" (call 2026-04-24 [53], Petrucelli, agreeing with Mark Hughes) — a shape, not a figure; it is scored below under earnings quality instead, where it is a number.

Tally: 6 rows — 2 beat, 3 met, 1 withdrawn. All 6 belong to executives still in place; 0 departed rows.

Two things sit on top of the tally.

  1. Row 6 is the whole finding. Five rows are arithmetic that management controls — a reinsurance-net loss estimate, an asset-allocation shift, two buyback paces, and a return floor that the business has cleared by 400bp or more every year. The one row that was a claim about the market is the one that stopped being said. It was repeated on five consecutive calls while it was being met or nearly met, and then vanished from the script in the quarter the actual number went negative. Nobody withdrew it, nobody re-based it, no analyst has been told what replaced it. Under SKILL.md §S8 that is withdrawn, and moved goalposts are the most informative rows.
  2. The executive who said it most often left with it. Haney announced his retirement on 2025-10-17; the range was spoken for the last time on 2025-10-24, by Kehoe, and not again. This is not evidence of anything on its own — Haney was President and COO, not CEO or CFO, so the §S8 "CEO or CFO leaving within two quarters of a withdrawn guide" flag does not fire — but the coincidence of dates is on the record and worth carrying.

Dodge-log roll-up (§3.1). scorecard.md carried no dodge log — the 2026-09-22 pass closed S3 without a transcript. The log is opened here from the two most recent calls, read in this pass.

  1. Line-level economics — dodged in two consecutive quarters, and it is the same topic both times. Q1 2026 (2026-04-24): Mark Hughes asked whether the expense advantage is "something you've already deployed, so to speak, to the extent that you choose to" — i.e. will Kinsale trade expense margin for top line [33]; Kehoe answered with loss-cost estimation by line, reserving conservatism and the 17-year favourable-development record, and closed on the shape of the book, never addressing whether the expense advantage is being spent for growth [34]. Q2 2026 (2026-07-24): Hristian Getsov asked "How much are ROEs compressing in the line [E&S casualty], assuming your views on loss trends... have not changed?" [13]; Kehoe answered with the group number — "Well, we manage everything to a 20% ROE or greater. And I think most of our product lines are probably running ahead of that. I think we are, what, 24.4% for the quarter." [14] — which is the consolidated figure, not the line. Two quarters, two analysts, one topic: what the growth is costing at the line level. Under §3.1 that is a thread to pull, and it lands exactly on the scorecard's existing S0 falsifier (the expense ratio, 20.7% → 21.7%).
  2. Note, not a dodge — a stated refusal to forecast. Asked whether Q2 2026 is the trough in commercial property [18], Stuart Winston answered "there is there is no telling where it is gonna go in 2027" [19]; asked where the current accident year loss ratio settles, Salmaan Allibhai said "it is hard to say. It could drift up over time" [40]. Both are refusals to guess, not evasions.
  3. Note — a disclosure gap, answered honestly. Rowland Mayor asked what share of Commercial Property premium is the large-account business [38]; Kehoe: "We don't have a specific breakout" [39], then gave the average premium per policy instead. The company does not compute it; that is a disclosure limit, not a dodge, and it is the number the scorecard's ➡️ next action wants.

Verdict — reliable. Five of six rows landed at or better than the guide, the two capital-return commitments were met and then bettered, and the one return target management sets for itself has been cleared every year of the window. Against that, the single withdrawn row is the one the market scores the company on, and it was dropped silently rather than re-based. That is not over-promises (1 of 6 withdrawn, 0 missed), and it is enough to withhold conservative: a company that guides this little should be held to whether the few things it says stay said, and the growth range did not. Consequence for S7: the base case does not need a guidance haircut — Kinsale supplies no earnings guidance to haircut — but any forward model that still carries a 10–20% growth assumption is carrying a number management stopped repeating three calls ago. The S7 valuation line is updated to say so.

S2 — capital allocation

All figures $m, calendar fiscal years. Sources: XBRL companyfacts (CIK 1669162) — OCF NetCashProvidedByUsedInOperatingActivities, buybacks PaymentsForRepurchaseOfCommonStock, dividends PaymentsOfDividends, capex PaymentsToAcquirePropertyPlantAndEquipment, SBC ShareBasedCompensation, PremiumsEarnedNet, StockholdersEquity, WeightedAverageNumberOfDilutedSharesOutstanding, CommonStockSharesOutstanding — plus the FY2025 10-K for the Item 5 repurchase table and the ROE reconciliation.

FY2021FY2022FY2023FY2024FY20255y total
Operating cash flow407.0557.8859.8976.31,043.73,844.6
Capex (property & equipment)5.96.96.623.953.797.0
Acquisitions (cash)—————0
Buybacks00010.090.0100.0
Dividends paid10.011.913.013.915.864.6
Stock-based compensation4.86.79.414.117.952.9
SBC as % of revenue0.74%0.80%0.77%0.89%0.95%
Goodwill impairmentn/a — no goodwill on the balance sheet
Diluted weighted-average shares (m)23.06223.12523.30723.33223.259+0.9%
Shares outstanding, year end (m)22.83423.09123.18223.27223.146

Where the cash went: almost nowhere, on purpose. $3.84bn of operating cash flow over five years against $164.6m returned — 4.3% of operating cash flow, the lowest ratio of any name in this repository. The other 95.7% funded the book, and it shows in the denominators: net premiums earned $582.9m (2021) → $1,575.8m (2025), reserves $881.3m → $2,890.9m, equity $699.3m → $1,959.6m. For an underwriter growing 2.7x in five years that is not hoarding; retained capital is the product. The question this check exists to ask — what did the retained cash earn — is answered below, and the answer is 28%.

No acquisitions, no goodwill, nothing to write down. PaymentsToAcquireBusinessesNetOfCashAcquired is not tagged in any year and no goodwill or goodwill-impairment line appears in the FY2025 10-K. Every dollar of the growth above was written, not bought. That removes the single largest way an insurer destroys capital and it is the cleanest such record the backfill slots have seen.

The capex line is a building, not software. $6.6m (2023) → $23.9m (2024) → $53.7m (2025) looks like a cost being capitalised until the 10-K says what it is: "During the fourth quarter of 2025, construction of our new headquarters building was substantially completed and the property was placed into service. In December 2025, upon moving our operations to the new headquarters, we reclassified our former headquarters and related assets from property and equipment to real estate investments due to a change in the intended use of the property." Depreciable life 39 years for the building. It is not capitalised software — the earnings-quality test below confirms there is no such line — and the spike should not recur.

Buybacks at what price — and the scorecard's log has this wrong. The 2026-09-22 log records "the first share repurchase authorisation in the company's history (December 2025, $250m)". The FY2025 10-K says otherwise, twice: "In October 2024, our Board of Directors authorized a share repurchase program authorizing the repurchase of up to $100.0 million of our common stock. This share repurchase program was exhausted in October 2025." and "In December 2025, our Board of Directors authorized a new share repurchase program authorizing the repurchase of up to $250.0 million of our common stock." The first authorisation was October 2024, $100m; December 2025 was the second. Kehoe describes the same sequence on the call of 2026-07-24 [42]: "we had our first buyback authorization of $100 million that we exhausted. We did a $250 million authorization after that". The log below carries the correction.

Prices paid, from the two issuer-purchases tables:

WindowSharesAverage priceBook value per share at the period endMultiple of book
Q4 2025 (10-K Item 5)119,752$422.43$84.66 (equity $1,959.6m / 23.146m shares)4.99x
Q2 2026 (10-Q Item 5)321,055$314.18$89.34 (equity $2,035.1m / 22.778m shares)3.52x

FY2025 in aggregate: $90.0m against a 212,036 net rise in treasury shares (22,626 → 234,662) — ≈$425 a share implied, consistent with the Q4 table. H1 2026: "share repurchases and related excise tax of $163.1 million" (Q2 2026 10-Q), of which Q2 was $100.9m at $314.18.

The pace accelerated as the price fell, which is the right direction and the opposite of the usual pattern: $10m a quarter at ~$425, then $162.5m in two quarters at $310–330. The one number that complicates it is in the same 10-Q paragraph: "in connection with timing of our share repurchases, we drew down $30.0 million under our revolving credit facility during the first six months of 2026, which we subsequently repaid in full during the period." A revolver draw to bridge a buyback is small and was repaid inside the half; it is logged, not flagged.

What the bonus is paid on — the gap the 2026-09-22 dossier recorded as not extracted. DEF 14A of 2026-04-09: "the CNCG Committee approved the bonus pool calculation parameters for 2025, which is determined by calculating the amount that is equal to a specified percentage of actual underwriting profit in 2025. Actual underwriting profit is defined as earned premiums plus fee income less net loss and loss adjustment expenses and underwriting expenses, before any deduction for bonuses." The pay-versus-performance section names the same measure: "Our company-selected measure, the most important financial performance measure used to link compensation paid to all employees, including executive officers, to company performance for the most recently completed year, is actual underwriting profit."

There is no EPS metric and no buyback-flattered metric — so the §25 "EPS-based pay plus buybacks" flag does not fire. What does deserve a line is subtler and is carried into the earnings-quality check below: net loss and loss adjustment expenses is stated after prior-year reserve development, so a favourable release raises the bonus pool in the year it is taken. That is ordinary industry practice and it is also a direct, checkable link between the reserve judgement and the pay of the people making it.

Returns (insurer form — ROE and book value per share compounded with dividends, per SKILL.md).

FY2021FY2022FY2023FY2024FY2025
Net income ($m)152.7159.1308.1414.8503.6
Average equity ($m)637.8722.4916.11,285.21,721.6
ROE23.9%22.0%33.6%32.3%29.3%

The 2024 and 2025 figures tie to the 10-K's own reconciliation (32.3% and 29.3%); the operating ROE on the same basis is 29.2% and 26.4%. Five-year average ROE 28.2%, with no year below 22%.

Book value per share $25.32 at 2020-12-31 ($576.2m / 22.757m shares) → $84.66 at 2025-12-31 — +27.3% a year compounded, and +28.1% a year adding back the $2.80 of dividends per share declared across 2021–2025. $89.34 at 2026-06-30.

Dilution: none, and the direction has turned. Diluted weighted-average shares rose 0.9% over the five years — 23.062m to 23.259m — which is SBC net of the $100m of buybacks, and shares outstanding have since fallen to 22.778m at 2026-06-30. SBC of $52.9m over the window is 1.4% of operating cash flow. In 2024 the $10.0m of buybacks did not cover the $14.1m of SBC and the count rose; in 2025 the $90.0m did, and it fell.

Verdict: compounds. 28% average ROE on retained capital, book value per share +27% a year, zero acquisitions and zero goodwill, a share count that has started to fall, and buybacks whose pace rose as the price fell. Two things to watch, both directions rather than verdicts: the return is now being earned on a much larger equity base against a shrinking top line — operating ROE 29.2% → 26.4% → 24.4% in the latest quarter — and the company is for the first time returning capital faster than it can deploy it, which is the soft market arriving in the cash flow statement before it arrives in the combined ratio.

S3 addendum — earnings quality

Sources: the FY2025 10-K non-GAAP reconciliation, consolidated statements, MD&A and Item 7A; the Q2 2026 10-Q; XBRL companyfacts.

  1. The non-GAAP bridge. Clean, and conservative in the rare direction. Kinsale's headline non-GAAP measure is net operating earnings, and the FY2025 reconciliation has exactly three adjustments, all investment-related, all removing income: net income $503,614k → change in the fair value of equity securities after taxes $(46,480)k → net realised investment gains after taxes $(3,468)k → change in allowance for credit losses after taxes $2k → net operating earnings $453,668k. There is no restructuring line, no transaction cost, no SBC add-back and no "one-off" of any kind in three years of three. A bridge that lowers the headline by 9.9% is the opposite of the drift this test hunts for. Reading caution, not a flag: the gap is widening because the equity allocation is. The pre-tax equity mark was $43.4m (2024) → $58.8m (2025) as the allocation went from 8% to 11.7%, and GAAP ROE now sits 2.9 points above operating ROE (29.3% vs 26.4%). GAAP EPS is increasingly a market number. This is already the scorecard's S2 ⚠️ and it stands.
  2. Stock-based compensation. Clean. FY2025 SBC $17.9m = 0.95% of revenue and 1.7% of operating cash flow. Free cash flow $990.0m (OCF $1,043.7m less capex $53.7m); after SBC $972.1m, i.e. 98.2% of reported FCF — the test's threshold is half.
  3. Cash conversion. Clean on the level, and this is flag 1 on the trend. Operating cash flow over net income: 2.79x (2023), 2.35x (2024), 2.07x (2025), 1.70x (H1 2026: $490.8m / $288.4m). Accruals ((net income − OCF) / average total assets): −16.9%, −13.0%, −9.9% — strongly negative in all three years, which is what a growing underwriter's float should do. The level is excellent and the direction is one-way: the cushion of cash over reported profit has halved in three years, because it was never operating quality so much as growth — premium written today, claims paid years later. As gross written premium goes from +19% to −5%, that arithmetic reverses. Nothing is wrong with the 2025 numbers; the 2027 ones will be less cash-backed at the same reported profit. Flag 1 (mild, mechanical).
  4. Working capital. Clean, improving. Premiums receivable $143.2m (2023) → $140.0m (2024) → $124.6m (2025) against net premiums earned of $1,072.5m → $1,350.5m → $1,575.8m. Days on earned premium: 48.7 → 37.8 → 28.9. Receivables fell 13% over two years while earned premium grew 47%. There is no receivable-stuffing here in either direction.
  5. Costs moved onto the balance sheet. Clean. Deferred policy acquisition costs $88.4m (2023) → $109.3m (2024) → $118.7m (2025); as a share of net earned premium 8.24% → 8.09% → 7.53%, i.e. falling for two years running. No capitalised-software line is tagged or disclosed — the 10-K's only internal-use-software text is the not-yet-adopted ASU 2025-06 note — and the capex spike is the headquarters building (S2 above).
  6. Sector equivalent — prior-year reserve development as a share of pre-tax income. Flag 2, and it is the one that matters. XBRL SupplementalInformationForPropertyCasualtyInsuranceUnderwritersPriorYearClaimsAndClaimsAdjustmentExpense (negative = favourable) against IncomeLossFromContinuingOperationsBeforeIncomeTaxes...:
FY2021FY2022FY2023FY2024FY2025
Favourable PYD ($m)32.035.935.837.762.8
Pre-tax income ($m)188.8195.6384.0514.7634.3
PYD as % of pre-tax income16.9%18.4%9.3%7.3%9.9%
PYD as points of net earned premium5.494.523.342.793.99

Favourable in five of five years, which is the §4.3 test-1 result the S0 lens already scores 1 on, and it stands. What is new is the 2025 reversal: after three years of falling, the release rose 66.8% in absolute terms and from 2.79 to 3.99 points of net earned premium — in the year gross written premium growth fell to 5.7%. H1 2026 is running higher still at 4.62 points ($38.1m on $824.5m of net earned premium), and the Q2 2026 call puts the quarter at "4.5 points from net favorable prior year loss reserve development, compared to 3.9 points last year" [2]. Management's own framing cuts the other way and is worth holding them to: "we are being a little more conservative as we have for a couple of years. In slowing down the release of IBNR" (call 2026-07-24 [33], Kehoe). What makes it a flag rather than a note is the pay link found in S2 above: the bonus pool is a percentage of "actual underwriting profit... less net loss and loss adjustment expenses", and that line is struck after prior-year development. Releasing reserves raises the bonus pool in the year it is done. The releases so far are real — 17 years of favourable development is the record — and this is not an allegation that they are not. It is the observation that the series is accelerating exactly as the growth that used to fund conservatism disappears, and that the people deciding it are paid on the number it moves.

EQ summary: 2 flags — prior-year releases rising as growth falls (2.79 → 3.99 points of net earned premium in 2025, 4.62 in H1 2026) against a bonus pool struck after development; and cash conversion narrowing one way for three years (OCF/net income 2.79x → 2.07x → 1.70x) as the premium growth that generated it reverses. The non-GAAP bridge, SBC, receivables, DAC and capitalised costs are all clean, and the bridge is conservative in the rare direction of removing income rather than adding it back.

Full notes, 22 Sep 2026 14 min read

KNSL — Kinsale Capital Group, Inc. — dossier, 2026-09-22

Slot names-insurance-1. Model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine (Opus 5), following .claude/skills/stock-sourcing-pipeline/SKILL.md. Nothing here is human-verified. Sourced facts carry the document they were read from; [background] marks background knowledge and [search-summary] marks anything that came from a search result or a summarising fetch. Private: this directory never reaches dist/.

Access this run is recorded once, in ACGL/dossier-2026-09-22.md §"Access this run", and applies identically here: EDGAR and 3spread reachable, Equibles unreachable (connector failed to connect — 0 of the 25-call budget spent because none could be), market data prices yes / calendar paid, fool.com reachable but carrying no Q2 2026 KNSL transcript.

§1 — The finding: the compounder's top line turned, and the moat paid for it

The cluster pass of the same date scored Kinsale ✅ 3/4 — the only pass among eight members — and wrote its falsifier as: "Kinsale has never underwritten through a soft E&S market. Its whole record (2020-2025) is a hardening one." That falsifier is no longer hypothetical. It is in the Q2 2026 10-Q, filed 2026-07-23, three weeks before the cluster pass was written and not read by it.

Gross written premiums fell.

Q2 2026Q2 2025ΔH1 2026H1 2025Δ
Gross written premiums $m527.6555.5−5.0%1,009.61,039.8−2.9%
Ceded written premiums $m(75.1)(96.8)−22.4%(153.9)(199.4)−22.8%
Net written premiums $m452.5458.7−1.4%855.7840.4+1.8%
Net earned premiums $m417.6383.6+8.9%824.5749.4+10.0%

This is the first decline in the company's public record, in a business whose earned premiums went 3.8x in five years. Management names the cause in one sentence and does not hedge it:

"The decrease in gross written premiums was primarily due to a 32.7% decline in the Commercial Property Division, one of the Company's larger divisions, driven by heightened competition." — 10-Q Q2 2026, Item 2 MD&A, Gross written premiums, three months ended June 30, 2026

Two qualifiers that cut in Kinsale's favour, both from the same paragraph: excluding Commercial Property, gross written premium grew 3.7% in the quarter and 4.8% over the half, on "continued strong submission flow across most divisions and an increase in bound accounts"; and the decline is price, not volume — the average premium per policy written fell from ~$14,300 to ~$12,300, −14%, "due to an increase in competition, primarily on larger accounts and in our Commercial Property Division". Kinsale's model has always been small-account; it is the large-account end that is being competed away, which is the end it cares least about.

The part the cluster pass would want to know about

The net line was held nearly flat while the gross line fell 5%. That did not happen by itself. Ceded premium dropped 22% and:

"The net retention ratio was 85.8% for the three months ended June 30, 2026 compared to 82.6% for the three months ended June 30, 2025 due to increased retention in our reinsurance treaties and change in the mix of business." — same MD&A, Net retention ratio

Retaining more has a price and the filing states it plainly: the expense ratio rose from 20.7% to 21.7%, "primarily due to lower ceding commissions as a result of increased retention on our reinsurance treaties". Direct commissions paid as a share of gross written premium barely moved (14.9% against 14.8%), so this is not distribution cost — it is the disappearance of the reinsurers' contribution to Kinsale's overheads.

That matters because the expense ratio is the single scoring point on which the cluster's S0 pass rests. The cluster file's fourth test, the only one Kinsale scored where the other seven members scored zero, reads: "The expense ratio is the moat, not the capital: an owned technology stack in a market where competitors run on brokered paper." One year of a softening market has moved it a full point in the wrong direction, and the mechanism is the company's own response to the softening. The moat is real; it is being spent.

§2 — What has NOT deteriorated, stated as plainly as what has

A soft-market narrative is easy to over-tell. Three series say the underwriting is still excellent:

Q2 2026Q2 2025
Current accident year loss ratio before catastrophes57.0%58.1%
Current year catastrophe losses1.3%0.9%
Effect of prior year development(4.5)%(3.9)%
Reported loss ratio53.8%55.1%
Expense ratio21.7%20.7%
Combined ratio75.5%75.8%

The current accident year ex-cat loss ratio is the one series a reserve release cannot flatter, and it improved, 58.1% → 57.0%. Annualised ROE for the half was 28.9% and operating ROE 24.4%. Underwriting income was $105.4m in the quarter. Net investment income +19.9% to $55.7m as the float compounds. On the evidence in this filing, Kinsale is writing less business at better margins, which is the correct response to competition and exactly what the cluster pass praised Arch for doing.

One caution on the headline: GAAP EPS grew 34.0% and operating EPS grew 15.9%. The gap is mark-to-market on the equity portfolio — $56.2m of fair-value change in Q2 2026 against $28.6m in Q2 2025, plus $6.7m of realised gains against $0.1m. Any screen reading GAAP EPS growth here is reading the equity market, not the insurance company. Use the operating series.

§3 — The second finding: the first buyback in the company's history

Kinsale's entire investment case, as the cluster file put it, is that "premiums earned 3.8x in five years with the diluted share count flat at 23m throughout. Nobody else in this cluster grew 4x without issuing a share." That is still true of the past. It is no longer the current policy.

  • December 2025: the Board authorised the first share repurchase program in the company's public life, up to $250.0m.
  • 2026-06-30: $87.5m of capacity remained, i.e. $162.5m spent in roughly six months.
  • July 2026: "In July 2026, our Board of Directors approved an additional share repurchase authorization of up to $250.0 million of our common stock, bringing the remaining capacity to $337.5 million under the share repurchase program."
  • Share count: 23,145,751 (2025-12-31) → 22,778,425 (2026-06-30), −1.6%, after five years inside 23.0-23.4m.

Put the two findings in the order they happened and the sequence is the ordinary one: the reinvestment opportunity narrows (gross premium −5%, average premium −14%), and the capital comes back instead. The CEO's framing in the release is "We are generating significant operating cash flows resulting in excess capital and are pleased to report an additional share repurchase authorization of $250 million" — excess capital, not a narrower opportunity set. Both descriptions fit the same facts; only one of them is a change in the thesis.

Buying back at 4.01x book is a different act from Arch buying back at 1.41x. It is accretive to EPS and dilutive to book value per share, and for a company whose compounding has come from redeploying capital into premium at ~25% returns on equity, returning it at four times book is a statement about the redeployment rate.

§4 — S2 kill test

FY2021FY2022FY2023FY2024FY2025
Revenues $m6538391,2241,5881,874
Net earned premiums $m5837941,0731,3501,576
Losses and LAE $m—458600773891
Net income $m153159308415504
Equity $m6997451,0871,4841,960
Loss reserves $m8811,2381,6932,2862,891
Diluted weighted shares m23.0623.1323.3123.3323.26

(XBRL companyconcept, CIK 1669162.)

Share count over five years: 22.85m (2020) → 23.26m (2025) → 22.79m outstanding at 2026-06-30. Cumulative dilution over the entire five-year 3.8x growth phase: under 2%, now reversing.

Survives or dies: survives outright, with no balance-sheet question to answer. $2.0bn of equity against $2.9bn of reserves, $6.5m of interest expense in a half, no maturity wall, an unlevered underwriter with a 75.5% combined ratio and 24.4% operating ROE. The kill test for this name has never been about survival; it is about whether the growth rate survives a market it has never seen. This pass's answer: the first evidence is in, it is a 5% decline concentrated in one division, the rest of the book still grew, and the margin held. That is a warning, not a verdict.

§5 — S3 gate: the three biggest risks management itself discloses

Kinsale's Item 1A is ordered and the first risk is the one this pass cares most about.

  1. Reserve adequacy — listed first, ahead of everything else. "Our loss reserves may be inadequate to cover our actual losses, which could have a material adverse effect on our financial condition, results of operations and cash flows." The same risk factor supplies the figure that makes it concrete: "Approximately 84.2% of our net casualty loss reserves were associated with \"occurrence\" policies as of December 31, 2025." On an occurrence policy the claim can arrive years after the policy lapses — which is why the adverse development Kinsale is already taking on 2017-2019 construction liability is worth more attention than its size suggests.
  2. Loss limitations and coverage issues. "The failure of any of the loss limitations or exclusions we employ, or changes in other claims or coverage issues, could have a material adverse effect on our financial condition or results of operations." (Item 1A, cross-referenced from the reserve risk.)
  3. Claims inflation and litigation trends, disclosed inside the reserve risk as the named drivers management monitors: "claims inflation, which is the sustained increase in cost of raw materials, labor, medical services and other components of claims cost" and "litigation, judicial and regulatory trends (e.g., increased litigation, higher jury awards and third-party litigation funding, among others)". This is social inflation, named by the company, in the reserve risk, in a book that is 74.1% casualty by gross written premium in H1 2026.

Prior-year development, and why it rhymes with Arch. The Q2 2026 release of $19.4m is a net figure:

"During the three months ended June 30, 2026, prior accident years developed favorably by $19.4 million, of which $22.6 million was attributable to the 2021 through 2025 accident years due to lower emergence of reported losses than expected across most lines of business, particularly in our shorter-tail lines of business."

— offset by adverse development "primarily in the construction liability business in the 2017 through 2019 accident years". Recent short-tail years funding older long-tail casualty, which is the identical shape found in Arch's Note 5 in the same reporting season and documented in ACGL/dossier-2026-09-22.md §1. Two books with nothing in common but the calendar.

Auditor and red-flag sweep. KPMG, "We have served as the Company's auditor since 2009." — i.e. seven years before the IPO. Sole critical audit matter: "Reserves for unpaid losses and loss adjustment expenses". Filing index back to 2010: no NT 10-K or NT 10-Q ever, no 10-K/A, no 10-Q/A. SEC comment-letter correspondence exists — 7 UPLOAD and 11 CORRESP — but it clusters around the 2016 IPO and the most recent exchange closed 2023-10-30, three years ago. Nothing open.

§6 — S5 ownership

13F holders at 2026-06-30 (threespread.py holders KNSL):

ManagerShares$mQoQ
BAMCO Inc /NY/ (Baron)2,663,958878.6+636,193
BlackRock, Inc.2,035,890671.5−138,454
State Street Corp718,344236.9+26,386
Giverny Capital Inc.481,462158.8+262,520
Turtle Creek Asset Management399,131131.6−423,361
First Manhattan Co. LLC188,37562.1−427,656

The register is doing something interesting: Baron added 636k shares and Giverny added 263k into the quarter in which gross premium declined, while Turtle Creek and First Manhattan each sold more than 400k. That is a genuine disagreement between concentrated active holders, not index drift, and it is the most informative thing in this name's S5.

⚠️ Quarter incompletely ingested — 381 filers against 569 for 2026-03-31; both Vanguard entities, Capital World, Geode, Morgan Stanley, Davenport, JPMorgan, Kayne Anderson Rudnick and Dimensional have no filing in it. No exit may be read from an absence.

⚠️⚠️ The Sixth Street row (199,715 shares, $65.9m, byte-identical to Schwab's) is not a holding. It is a defective 13F filing, traced to the source and documented once in ACGL/dossier-2026-09-22.md §5; threespread.py holders now warns on it automatically.

Proxy (DEF 14A 2026-04-09, as of 2026-03-27): "All executive officers and directors as a group (14 persons) (16)" hold 1,283,428 shares = 5.6% of 23,057,896 outstanding. CEO Michael P. Kehoe alone holds 916,362 = 4.0% (291,734 direct, 16,314 restricted, 22,576 exercisable options, 585,738 through M.P. Kehoe, LLC). The proxy's 5% table, on older 13G/A data, shows BlackRock 9.1% and Baron Capital Group 7.6%.

Shelf: an S-3ASR automatic shelf was filed 2025-08-27 and is the most recent registration on the index. Unlimited by construction, so it hangs over the name on paper; in behaviour the company is repurchasing and has never issued equity for growth. Both halves belong in the answer.

§7 — S8 valuation and sizing (proposals only — ⏳ OPEN (user))

Price $358.19 at 2026-09-21 (market data NYSE:KNSL). Shares 22.778m → market cap $8.16bn. Equity $2,035m → BVPS $89.34, P/B 4.01 — by a distance the most expensive name in the cluster and in this slot. ADV $69.6m over the 21 sessions to 2026-09-21. LTM GAAP EPS $24.64 (FY2025 $21.65 less H1 2025 $9.59 plus H1 2026 $12.58) → LTM P/E 14.5x.

The model runs on operating EPS, because GAAP EPS here is one-third equity-market beta. Assumptions: gross written premium −3% in 2026 then flat, earned premium therefore decelerating from +10% to ~+3% by 2028 as the written decline earns through; current accident year ex-cat loss ratio drifting 57% → 60% with competition; expense ratio 21.7% → 23.0% as retention stays high; favourable PYD fading 4.5 → 2.0 points; net investment income compounding ~15% a year on a growing float; tax 20%; buyback at the current pace.

FY2025A2026E2027E2028E
Net earned premium $m1,576~1,690~1,730~1,780
Combined ratio75.4%~76.5%~80.0%~83.0%
Underwriting income $m~388~397~346~303
Net investment income $m~193~230~265~300
Operating earnings $m~425~500~518~515
Diluted shares m23.26~22.9~22.2~21.6
Operating EPS~$18.3 (est.)~$22.0~$23.3~$23.8

At $358.19 that is 16.3x 2026E and 15.1x 2028E operating EPS. Note the shape: operating earnings are roughly flat 2026-2028 in this model, and the EPS growth that remains comes from the buyback. That is a very different security from the one the five-year record describes.

BasisValue
Bearsoft market generalises beyond Commercial Property, gross premium −8%/yr, combined ratio to 90%, operating EPS ~$16 by 2028, multiple compresses to 13x~$208
Base2028 operating EPS $23.8 at 16x — a premium multiple retained for a 24% ROE and a clean reserve record, applied to flat earnings~$381
Bullthe Commercial Property decline proves cyclical and ex-CP growth reaccelerates to low double digits; 2028 operating EPS ~$28 at 20x~$560

Base is +6% over ~2.3 years. The distribution is wide and skewed — bear is −42%, bull is +56% — which is the honest description of a high-multiple compounder meeting its first soft market.

Proposed buy price and size: ⏳ OPEN (user). The sizing input the owner needs: ADV $69.6m/day on 22.8m shares is the thinnest of the three names in this slot other than nothing, and the name is a 4x-book compounder, so a position that takes more than a day or two of volume to exit is taking liquidity risk on top of multiple risk.

§8 — S9 monitoring

  • Next earnings ~2026-10-22, DERIVED from filing cadence. Q3 2025 results went out 2025-10-23 and Q2 2026 on 2026-07-23; Kinsale reports on the Thursday of the fourth week after quarter end, consistently, with the 10-Q filed the same day. Not a scheduled date — market data's calendar needs a paid plan and Equibles did not connect.
  • Filing feed: Tier 0 EDGAR sweep covers CIK 1669162.
  • Leading indicator between quarters: E&S property rate filings and the wholesale brokers' quarterly submission-flow commentary. Kinsale's own "submission flow remains strong while average premium falls 14%" is a rate story, and rate is observable before Kinsale's next print.
  • The specific trigger that converts this to a buy: gross written premium returns to growth including Commercial Property while the current accident year ex-cat loss ratio stays below 60% and the expense ratio stops rising — i.e. the franchise reprices through the soft patch without giving up margin — with the shares below ~3.0x book (≈$280 on today's book, less as book compounds). Today it is 4.01x book with the top line falling; the trigger is a long way off in both dimensions.

§9 — Evidence that is thin, named

  • No earnings-call transcript. Equibles did not connect; fool.com has no Q2 2026 KNSL transcript. The Q1 2026 transcript exists there and was read, but WebFetch returns a model summary rather than a locatable span, so it is [search-summary] and quoted nowhere — the one thing it adds, that management described Commercial Property competition as "an abundance of competition and falling rates" on larger layered accounts a quarter earlier, is consistent with the 10-Q and is recorded here as summary only.
  • No short interest. Equibles was the route; it is down. The cluster pass did not carry one for this name either.
  • No analyst-coverage count. Standing gap across every name slot so far.
  • FY2025 operating EPS is estimated, not read. The non-GAAP reconciliation in the FY2025 10-K was not extracted; the ~$18.3 figure is derived from the H1 2025 GAAP/operating gap and is marked "(est.)" in the table.
  • Proxy compensation structure not extracted — ownership table only. Fifth consecutive name slot to leave it.
  • Division-level premium table not transcribed. The 10-Q publishes gross written premium by division; this pass read the Commercial Property line and the ex-CP aggregate from the MD&A narrative rather than reproducing the table.

Process support, not investment advice.