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NVDANVIDIA Corporation

Industry AI semis Updated 24 Sep 2026

The idea

On management's own numbers it trades at ~14x FY28 EPS — the dossier calls it cheap, and says that is the tell: the market is pricing a real chance the FY28 guide misses because a rising share of demand is underwritten by NVIDIA itself.

Events to watch

  • FY28 ~70% growth guide held or raised
  • supply commitments ($279bn) not falling
  • gross margin holding the 71-72% Q4 trough then 72-73%
  • receivables growth slowing
How we got the target

The dossier's base FY28 EPS ~$16.4 (management's ~70% growth guide met) × 18x, an assumed multiple below today's ~23x on FY27. Bear: the dossier's '40-50% drawdown'. Bull: EPS ~$19.5 × 22x. Time frame: FY2028 (Jan 2028).

Target: worked out from expected earnings. Prices: market data get_latest_stock_price, close of 2026-09-22 (fetched 2026-09-23)

What would prove it wrong

6 warning signs
  1. Supply and capacity commitments fall.

    Details

    $119bn → $279bn between Q1 and Q2 FY27 (10-Q, Note 10). A sequential decline is the earliest hard read on demand that is not management commentary.

  2. Gross margin misses its own reset floor.

    Details

    Management guided Q3 FY27 74%, a Q4 trough of 71–72%, then 72–73% in FY28. Below 71% in Q4 FY27 means memory cost is not being priced through.

  3. The AI-lab share of revenue rises above the ~25% management named for FY28 while the guarantees and credit enhancements behind it also rise.

    Details

    That is the circularity compounding, not stabilising.

  4. Receivables keep outrunning revenue.

    Details

    AR $38.5bn → $63.1bn in two quarters, DSO 60 days on "extended payment terms for large purchases." Two more quarters of DSO expansion is revenue being lent, not sold.

  5. Cash conversion stays below 0.8 on non-GAAP net income for two more quarters (H1 FY27: 0.75; 0.63 on GAAP).

    Details

    With receivables, the investment book and the equity gains all rising, this is the number that says whether the revenue is being paid for.

  6. FY28 growth guide cut below ~70%.

    Details

    Management took the unusual step of guiding a full year out; withdrawing or cutting it is the loudest single signal available.

How far along

6 of 10 steps done · 4 done in a group review

Next step

re-test the cluster pass's central claim. AI-capex complex — cluster pass, 2026-09-20 concluded the top layer "is funded from operating cash flow rather than debt." NVDA issued $25.0bn of notes in June 2026 and long-term debt went $7.5bn → $32.4bn in two quarters. The claim needs restating for the sellers, not just the buyers.

Needs your decision

S6 product test / expert call, S7 conviction.

Failed checks

none. S4/S6/S7 are not closed by design (cluster stages, carried forward), and S6 is not closed in the cluster file itself — it has not been attempted for any member. Watch items from the 2026-09-24 backfill: cash conversion fell to 0.63 in H1 FY27 (EQ flag), and management's full-year margin and opex colour has now been reset or overrun three times.

Who runs it

The Front Office

Step by step

  1. S0How it does as AI gets cheapDone in a group review

    carry-forward (cluster: AI-capex complex — cluster pass, 2026-09-20)

    cluster verdict is.

    ⚠️ SPLIT; NVDA sits on the "seller of the shortage" side that passes. Owner checks dropped 2026-09-21 (README §Stage 0 override).

  2. S1Where the idea came fromDone

    watchlist (owner, Apple Stocks, 2026-09-20); no Tier 0 promotion.

  3. S2Quick deal-breaker checkDone

    FY26 rev $215.9bn +65%, GM 71.1%, op margin 60.4%, OCF $102.7bn, capex $6.0bn, FCF ~$96.7bn. Survives on any operating measure.

    ⚠️ the balance sheet, not the P&L, is where the change is (below). · capital allocation: compounds — FY22→FY26 incremental ROIC ~100% (ΔNOPAT $100.8bn on ΔIC $99.3bn); $93.4bn of buybacks vs $19.4bn SBC, diluted count −3.3%; every tranche bought below today's $225.51 (FY26 avg ~$142, H1 FY27 ~$192); no goodwill impairment; 50%-of-FCF return promise beaten (60% YTD).

    ⚠️ uses are shifting: FY26 put $30.5bn into the Groq licence ($13.0bn + $4bn deferred) and non-marketable stakes, against $40.1bn of buybacks.

  4. S3Reading the company's reportsDone

    (gate-minimum, partial)

    FY26 10-K risk factors + MD&A, Q2 FY27 10-Q MD&A, DEF 14A ownership, June-2026 424B5. Q1 and Q2 FY27 calls read Q&A-first (2026-09-24, closes the one-transcript gap)

    Full notes

    Still partial: comp structure and the auditor/restatement full-text sweep not run. EQ: 1 flag — OCF/NI 0.94 → 0.88 → 0.86 → 0.63 (H1 FY27), with equity-stake gains $23.7bn = 20% of H1 GAAP NI; non-GAAP is conservative (below GAAP, SBC included from FY27). DSO 60 days at Q2 FY27, one quarter from a flag.

  5. S4Rivals and suppliersDone in a group review
  6. S5Who owns the stockDone

    proxy 2026-03-23, 13F Q2-26, FINRA short interest, buyback + shelf. No ATM captured (Equibles, ~13 months; absence is not proof). A live S-3ASR shelf drew $25bn of notes in June 2026 — see S5 note.

  7. S6What workers and customers sayDone in a group review

    carry-forward (cluster: AI-capex complex — cluster pass, 2026-09-20)

    not closed there too.

  8. S7The case for it, and pricesDone in a group review

    carry-forward (cluster: AI-capex complex — cluster pass, 2026-09-20)

    conviction open OPEN (user) · valuation (bear/base/bull; moved from S8 2026-09-23): ~22x model FY27 EPS, ~14x model FY28 EPS on management's own ~70% FY28 growth guide.

  9. S8Do the bosses keep their word?Done

    14 rows: 9 beat, 2 met, 2 missed, 1 withdrawn

    conservative on revenue (8/8 quarterly guides beaten above the ±2% band), reliable on quarterly GM (7/8; the miss is the H20 charge); weak on full-year colour: FY26 and FY27 opex guides overrun/raised twice, FY27 "mid-70s" GM withdrawn 2026-08-26 after two repeats.

    Full notes

    Current team (Huang, Kress) made every row. 3 dodges, none repeated.

  10. S9What to watch nextDone

    trigger written. Tier 0 EDGAR sweep covers the feed (cik 1045810); next call 2026-11-17 (sourced, CALL-Q2FY27)

Sources and notes

Sources 7 documents
Short nameDocumentWhere it came fromRead on
10K-FY26NVIDIA 10-K for FY ended 2026-01-25, filed 2026-02-25https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1045810/000104581026000021/nvda-20260125.htm2026-09-21
10Q-Q2FY27NVIDIA 10-Q for the quarter ended 2026-07-26, filed 2026-08-26https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1045810/000104581026000075/nvda-20260726.htm2026-09-21
DEF14A-26NVIDIA DEF 14A filed 2026-05-12 (ownership table as of 2026-03-23)https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1045810/000104581026000036/nvda-20260512.htm2026-09-21
424B5-JUN26NVIDIA 424(b)(5) prospectus supplement, $25,000,000,000 of notes, filed 2026-06-17https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1045810/000119312526273139/d118718d424b5.htm2026-09-21
CALL-Q2FY27NVIDIA Q2 FY2027 earnings call, 2026-08-26 (machine transcript, speaker-labelled)Equibles GetEarningsCallTranscript NVDA, turns 1-6 of 332026-09-21
13F-Q2-26Institutional holders, 13F report date 2026-06-30Equibles GetTopHolders NVDA2026-09-21
8K-EXEC-26NVIDIA 8-K executive and director changes, filed 2026-01-23 / 2026-04-27 / 2026-07-02Equibles GetExecutiveChanges NVDA (each row links its own 8-K on sec.gov)2026-09-21
Links to other companies 28 links
holds 6financing partner 5officer of 2governance structure 2key person risk 2channel concentration 2customer of 2context 2director of 1guarantee of 1supplier dependency 1issuer of 1event 1
FromLinkToDateWhere it says so
Jensen Huangofficer ofNVDA2026-08-26CALL-Q2FY27 — speaker turn 6, 'Jensen Huang (CEO)' — transcript renders the surname 'Wong'
Colette Kressofficer ofNVDA2026-08-26CALL-Q2FY27 — speaker turn 3, 'Colette Kress (CFO)'
Suzanne Nora Johnsondirector ofNVDA2026-07-138K-EXEC-26 — 8-K filed 2026-05-08, Item 5.02
Persis Drellgovernance structureNVDA2026-01-208K-EXEC-26 — 8-K filed 2026-01-23, Item 5.02
Donald Robertsonkey person riskScott Gawel2026-05-048K-EXEC-26 — 8-K filed 2026-04-27, Item 5.02
Ajay K. Purikey person riskNicholas Parker2026-08-248K-EXEC-26 — 8-K filed 2026-07-02, Item 5.02
Mark A. StevensholdsNVDA2026-03-23DEF14A-26 — Ownership of Certain Beneficial Owners and Management table, 'Mark A. Stevens' row
A. Brooke SeawellholdsNVDA2026-03-23DEF14A-26 — Ownership of Certain Beneficial Owners and Management table, 'A. Brooke Seawell' row
BlackRock, Inc.holdsNVDA2026-03-23DEF14A-26 — Ownership table, '5% Stockholders:' block, BlackRock, Inc. row
Vanguard (Vanguard Capital Management LLC / Vanguard Portfolio Management LLC)holdsNVDA2026-03-23DEF14A-26 — Ownership table, '5% Stockholders:' block, Vanguard Capital Management row
FMR LLCholdsNVDA2026-06-3013F-Q2-26 — rank 3 of 6,393 rows
State Street CorpholdsNVDA2026-06-3013F-Q2-26 — rank 4 of 6,393 rows
Direct customer at 22% of FY26 revenue (unnamed in the 10-K)channel concentrationNVDA2026-01-2510K-FY26 — Item 1A, risk factor 'We receive a significant amount of our revenue from a limited number of partners and distributors...'
Direct customer at 14% of FY26 revenue (unnamed in the 10-K)channel concentrationNVDA2026-01-2510K-FY26 — Item 1A, same risk factor; second clause of the same sentence
Amazon.com, Inc.customer ofNVDA2026-08-26CALL-Q2FY27 — Colette Kress prepared remarks, AWS paragraph
Microsoft Corporationgovernance structureNVDA2026-01-2510K-FY26 — Item 1A, risk factor 'Delaware law, provisions in our governing documents and our agreement with Microsoft could delay or prevent a change in control.'
NVDAguarantee ofSB Energy Corp.2026-07-2610Q-Q2FY27 — Item 2 MD&A, 'Recent Developments, Future Objectives and Challenges'; cross-refers Note 10
OpenAIcontextSB Energy Corp.2026-07-2610Q-Q2FY27 — Item 2 MD&A, SB Energy paragraph, second sentence
NVDAcustomer ofOpenAI2026-08-26CALL-Q2FY27 — Colette Kress prepared remarks, Frontier AI labs paragraph
NVDAfinancing partnerApollo2026-07-2610Q-Q2FY27 — Item 2 MD&A, paragraph beginning 'In August 2026, we entered into memorandums of understanding'
NVDAfinancing partnerBlackstone2026-08-26CALL-Q2FY27 — Colette Kress prepared remarks, Frontier AI labs paragraph
NVDAfinancing partnerBrookfield2026-08-26CALL-Q2FY27 — Colette Kress prepared remarks, Frontier AI labs paragraph
NVDAfinancing partnerGoldman Sachs2026-08-26CALL-Q2FY27 — Colette Kress prepared remarks, Frontier AI labs paragraph
NVDAfinancing partnerKKR2026-08-26CALL-Q2FY27 — Colette Kress prepared remarks, Frontier AI labs paragraph
BlackRock, Inc.contextNVDA2026-08-26CALL-Q2FY27 — Colette Kress prepared remarks, Frontier AI labs paragraph, list of six providers
NVDAsupplier dependencyOpenAI2026-07-2610Q-Q2FY27 — Item 2 MD&A, paragraph beginning 'In the second quarter of fiscal year 2027, we introduced a new business model'
NVDAissuer ofNVIDIA senior unsecured notes, seven tranches due 2028-2056, $25.0bn, June 20262026-06-17424B5-JUN26 — cover page, 'Filed Pursuant to Rule 424(b)(5) Registration Statement No. 333-287619'
NVDAeventNVIDIA senior unsecured notes, seven tranches due 2028-2056, $25.0bn, June 20262026-06-17424B5-JUN26 — cover page summary, 'Ranking' paragraph, final sentence
History 3 entries
  • 2026-09-21 — first pass, slot names-ai-capex-1, model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine. S1, S2, S3 (gate-minimum), S5 and S9 closed; S0/S4/S6/S7 carried forward from the 2026-09-20 cluster file; S8 modelled and left open. Evidence and access limits in dossier-2026-09-21.md. Nothing here is human-verified.
  • 2026-09-23 — stage redefinition, owner decision (WATCHLIST_PLAN.md §25): S8 is now Management credibility and is not yet run for this name; the old S8 valuation figures moved to the valuation: line under S7, and any proposed buy price or position size was removed (the pipeline no longer drafts either). No research was redone. S2 capital allocation and S3 earnings quality are also pending, in the same backfill slot.
  • 2026-09-24 — backfill, slot backfill-2026-09-23-1 (manually started session). Wrote S2 capital allocation (compounds), S3 earnings quality (1 flag: cash conversion) and S8 management credibility (✅ conservative, 14 rows) in dossier-2026-09-24.md; added the Dodge log, one kill criterion (cash conversion) and the sourced 2026-11-17 call date. S3 now has two transcripts. No valuation haircut: S8 is not over-promises, and the S7 table already used the reset FY28 72–73% margin. Other stages unchanged. Nothing here is human-verified.
Full notes, 24 Sep 2026 11 min read

NVDA — dossier, 2026-09-24 (backfill)

Slot backfill-2026-09-23-1, backfill pass, manually started research session following .claude/skills/stock-sourcing-pipeline/SKILL.md §0 (backfill slots). Nothing here is human-verified. Only the three checks added on 2026-09-23 are written here — S2 capital allocation, S3 earnings quality and S8 management credibility (WATCHLIST_PLAN.md §25). Every other stage stands as written in dossier-2026-09-21.md.

Every figure carries the document it was read from. Transcript quotes were located by exact substring search in the archived market data files under ledger/research/_transcripts/NVDA/, with the speaker label read back at that position; press-release quotes by substring in a text extraction of the SEC exhibit at the stated URL. market data transcripts label turns by name only and render the CEO as "Jen-Hsun Huang"; roles come from the officer_of edges in relationships.yaml (Colette Kress, EVP and CFO; Jensen Huang, President and CEO, both as of 2026-08-26). Call date is the locator.

Price reference: $225.51 close 2026-09-23 (market data get_latest_stock_price NASDAQ:NVDA).

Sources

KeyDocumentLocator
PR-Q2FY25 … PR-Q2FY27Nine quarterly results releases, 8-K Item 2.02 Ex. 99.1, 2024-08-28 → 2026-08-26https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1045810/<acc>/q<q>fy<yy>pr.htm — e.g. 000104581026000073/q2fy27pr.htm (2026-08-26), 000104581026000051/q1fy27pr.htm (2026-05-20), 000104581026000019/q4fy26pr.htm (2026-02-25), 000104581025000115/q1fy26pr.htm (2025-05-28), 000104581024000262/q2fy25pr.htm (2024-08-28)
10K-FY2610-K for FY ended 2026-01-25https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1045810/000104581026000021/nvda-20260125.htm
10Q-Q2FY2710-Q for the quarter ended 2026-07-26https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1045810/000104581026000075/nvda-20260726.htm
XBRLEDGAR companyfacts, CIK 1045810 (annual 10-K values; quarterly 10-Q values for FY27)https://data.sec.gov/api/xbrl/companyfacts/CIK0001045810.json
CALL-Q4FY26, CALL-Q1FY27, CALL-Q2FY27Earnings calls 2026-02-25, 2026-05-20, 2026-08-26_transcripts/NVDA/FY2026-Q4, FY2027-Q1, FY2027-Q2 (sha256 in _transcripts/index.json)

Equibles: 0 calls for this name. market data: one price call.

S2 — capital allocation and returns (FY2022–FY2026, $m)

FY22FY23FY24FY25FY265-yr
Operating cash flow9,1085,64128,09064,089102,718209,646
Capex (PaymentsToAcquireProductiveAssets)(976)(1,833)(1,069)(3,236)(6,042)(13,156)
Acquisitions, net of cash(263)(49)(83)(1,007)(1,535)(2,937)
Groq, Inc. licence (separate investing line)————(13,000)(13,000)
Non-marketable equity purchases—(85)(862)(1,486)(17,502)(19,935)
Buybacks0(10,039)(9,533)(33,706)(40,086)(93,364)
Dividends(399)(398)(395)(834)(974)(3,000)
Debt repaid(1,000)—(1,250)(1,250)—(3,500)
Stock-based compensation2,0042,7093,5494,7376,38619,385
Diluted shares (m, split-adjusted)25,35025,07024,94024,80424,514−3.3%

Source: XBRL (tags as named; FY22 share count ×10 for the June-2024 split); the Groq line from 10K-FY26's cash-flow statement, which carries it as its own investing row ("Groq, Inc. ( 13,000 )"). H1 FY27 (10Q-Q2FY27, XBRL): OCF 74,421, capex 4,434, buybacks 39,044.

  • What the Groq line is. Not an acquisition of the company: 10K-FY26 describes a non-exclusive licence with the workforce, goodwill recorded in Compute & Networking, and "Total consideration consists of $ 13.0 billion paid at closing and $ 4 billion, inclusive of imputed interest, payable within one year". Goodwill went $5,188m → $20,832m in FY26. Roughly $17bn for a licence and a team is the largest single capital decision in the window after the buybacks.
  • Buybacks did more than offset SBC. $93.4bn repurchased against $19.4bn of SBC; the diluted count fell 3.3% over four years and to 24.29bn at Q2 FY27 (prior dossier).
  • Buybacks at what price. Average paid, cash over shares retired (XBRL StockRepurchasedAndRetiredDuringPeriodShares, split-adjusted): FY23 ~$15.9, FY24 ~$45, FY25 ~$109, FY26 ~$142; H1 FY27 ~$192 ($39.0bn / 203m, prior dossier). Every tranche is below today's $225.51. The rising price paid is the thing to watch, not a finding yet.
  • Capital return promise, kept. "we plan to return roughly 50% of free cash flow to shareholders this year" (Colette Kress, CALL-Q1FY27, 2026-05-20) → "we returned 60% of on a year-to-date basis" (Kress, CALL-Q2FY27, 2026-08-26). H1 FY27 FCF 69,987 against 39,044 of buybacks plus dividends.
  • Returns. Invested capital = equity + debt − cash − marketable debt securities. FY22: 26,612 + 10,946 − 21,208 = 16,350; NOPAT 10,041 × (1 − 1.9% effective tax) ≈ 9,850 → ROIC ~60%. FY26: 157,293 + 8,468 − (10,605 + 39,520) = 115,636; NOPAT 130,387 × (1 − 15.1%) ≈ 110,690 → ROIC ~96%. Incremental return (FY22→FY26): ΔNOPAT 100,840 / ΔIC 99,286 ≈ 100%. The FY26 invested capital already carries ~$35bn of equity investments that earn nothing in NOPAT (they earn mark-to-market gains below the line — see earnings quality), so the operating return is higher still.
  • Goodwill impairments: none in the window (GoodwillImpairmentLoss 0 each year).
  • What the bonus is paid on: not read at this depth (the prior pass did not extract comp structure).

Verdict: compounds. An incremental return near 100% on $99bn of new capital, buybacks that shrank the count, all below today's price. ⚠️ The composition of uses is changing: in FY26, $30.5bn went to Groq and to non-marketable stakes against $40.1bn of buybacks, and H1 FY27 took the investment book to $93.9bn (prior dossier). That spending is where the next five years' return is decided, and it is not in the ROIC above.

S3 — earnings quality

  1. Non-GAAP bridge — conservative, and getting more so. Operating-income add-backs (SBC, acquisition-related, other): FY25 5,336 (4.1% of revenue), FY26 6,913 (3.2%) (PR-Q4FY26 reconciliation). From Q1 FY27 SBC is no longer added back: "Beginning in the first quarter of fiscal 2027, NVIDIA will include stock-based compensation expense in non-GAAP financial measures" (PR-Q4FY26, Outlook). H1 FY27 add-backs are 469 on 117,270 of operating income. And non-GAAP net income sits below GAAP: 99,502 vs 118,010 in H1 FY27, 116,997 vs 120,067 in FY26, because the equity gains are taken out. Clean.
  2. SBC: FY26 6,386 = 3.0% of revenue, 6.6% of FCF (96,676). Clean.
  3. Cash conversion — ❗ flag. OCF / net income: FY24 0.94, FY25 0.88, FY26 0.86, H1 FY27 0.63 (74,421 / 118,010). Two causes, both disclosed. (a) Gains on equity securities: 8,918 in FY26 and 23,707 in H1 FY27, i.e. one-fifth of H1 GAAP net income is mark-to-market on stakes in private and listed AI companies (PR-Q2FY27 reconciliation, "Gains from equity securities, net (7,771) (15,936)"). (b) Working capital: receivables +24.6bn and inventory +10.2bn in H1. On non-GAAP net income the H1 ratio is still 0.75. Accruals (NI − OCF) / average assets: FY25 9.9%, FY26 10.9%.
  4. Working capital. DSO on year-end balances: FY24 60, FY25 65, FY26 65 days. Quarterly: Q3 FY26 53, Q4 51, Q1 FY27 45, Q2 FY27 60 (AR 63,059 on revenue 96,221) — the jump the prior dossier tied to "extended payment terms for large purchases". Inventory days (quarterly COGS): Q3 FY26 119, Q1 FY27 113, Q2 FY27 119 — flat. Not two rising periods yet; DSO is one quarter from a flag.
  5. Costs moved onto the balance sheet: not checked at this depth (capitalised software is not tagged separately in XBRL).

EQ: 1 flag — cash conversion 0.63 in H1 FY27, with equity-investment gains at 20% of GAAP net income; non-GAAP is conservative (below GAAP, SBC included from FY27); DSO 60 days, watch.

S8 — management credibility

NVIDIA guides one quarter in the written outlook (revenue ±2%, gross margin ±50bp, opex) and gives full-year margin and opex colour on the call. Promises by the CFO on the call are read off the speaker label; written outlooks are company (written), read on the call by Kress.

#PromiseWhere madeWhoPathResultLocatorScore
1Q3 FY25 revenue $32.5bn ±2%PR-Q2FY25 2024-08-28company (written)—$35.08bnPR-Q3FY25beat
2Q4 FY25 revenue $37.5bn ±2%PR-Q3FY25 2024-11-20company (written)—$39.33bnPR-Q4FY25beat
3Q1 FY26 revenue $43.0bn ±2%; non-GAAP GM 71.0% ±50bpPR-Q4FY25 2025-02-26company (written)H20 licence requirement imposed 2025-04-09$44.06bn; GM 61.0% (71.3% ex the $4.5bn H20 charge)PR-Q1FY26revenue beat; GM missed (export charge, disclosed)
4Q2 FY26 revenue $45.0bn ±2% ("reflects a loss in H20 revenue of approximately $8.0 billion")PR-Q1FY26 2025-05-28company (written)—$46.74bnPR-Q2FY26beat
5Q3 FY26 revenue $54.0bn ±2%PR-Q2FY26 2025-08-27company (written)—$57.01bnPR-Q3FY26beat
6Q4 FY26 revenue $65.0bn ±2%PR-Q3FY26 2025-11-19company (written)—$68.13bnPR-Q4FY26beat
7Q1 FY27 revenue $78.0bn ±2%PR-Q4FY26 2026-02-25company (written)—$81.62bnPR-Q1FY27beat
8Q2 FY27 revenue $91.0bn ±2%PR-Q1FY27 2026-05-20company (written)—$96.22bnPR-Q2FY27beat
9Quarterly non-GAAP GM, the seven quarters other than row 3 (guides 75.0, 73.5, 72.0, 73.5, 75.0, 75.0, 75.0)each prior releasecompany (written)—75.0, 73.5, 72.7, 73.6, 75.2, 75.0, 75.0each following releasemet ×6, beat ×1 (Q2 FY26, helped by a $180m H20 reserve release)
10FY25 gross margin "in the mid-70% range"PR-Q2FY25 2024-08-28company (written)—non-GAAP 75.5%PR-Q4FY25met
11FY26 non-GAAP opex growth "in the mid-30% range"PR-Q1FY26 2025-05-28company (written)→ "high-30% range" (PR-Q2FY26)42% ($16,694m vs $11,716m)PR-Q4FY26missed (overspent the first guide)
12❗ FY27 gross margin in the mid-70s — "For the full year, we continue to see gross margins in the mid-70s."CALL-Q4FY26 2026-02-25Colette Kress, CFOrepeated "we are still expecting to be in the mid seventies" (CALL-Q1FY27) → "As a result, we are resetting expectations today." Q3 74%, Q4 trough 71–72%, FY28 72–73% (CALL-Q2FY27)FY27 now guided below the mid-70s in H2CALL-Q2FY27 2026-08-26withdrawn — openly, on memory cost
13FY27 non-GAAP opex growth "in the low 40s"CALL-Q4FY26 2026-02-25Colette Kress, CFO→ "somewhere in the upper forties" (CALL-Q1FY27) → "in the low 50s" (CALL-Q2FY27)year not endedCALL-Q2FY27missed (in progress) — first guide raised twice
14Return "roughly 50% of free cash flow to shareholders this year"CALL-Q1FY27 2026-05-20Colette Kress, CFO—"we returned 60% of on a year-to-date basis"CALL-Q2FY27beat (in progress)

Open, not scored: "We expect to grow revenue by approximately 70% in fiscal 2028." (Kress, CALL-Q2FY27) — the first full-year-ahead guide in the record; and "$1 trillion in Blackwell and Rubin revenue ... from 2025 through calendar 2027" (Kress, CALL-Q1FY27).

Are the promisers still there? Kress (CFO) and Huang (CEO) made or read every row and still hold their roles. The Chief Accounting Officer changed on 2026-05-04 (Robertson → Gawel, prior dossier); he makes no guided promise, so no row is departed. No CEO/CFO change within two quarters of a miss.

Dodge log rolled up (§3.1; CALL-Q1FY27 and CALL-Q2FY27 read Q&A-first): three dodges, no topic dodged twice.

  • Q2 FY27 · FY28 cash cost of the ecosystem commitments · Vivek Arya (BofA). Asked whether the ~$500bn he summed from the CFO commentary is the ballpark, and "if there is a specific cash part of that, that we should think about in fiscal '28". Huang answered the custom-chip competition part; Kress answered on supply commitments ("This is essential for the raising of Vera Rubin today as well as all next year."). Neither gave the total or the FY28 cash. CALL-Q2FY27, turns 14–16.
  • Q2 FY27 · how much of the FY28 +70% is price · Stacy Rasgon (Bernstein). "So I assume some of this is pricing." Huang: "The unconstrained would be a lot higher." then the segment split and $/GW by generation; the price share was not given. CALL-Q2FY27, turns 11–12.
  • Q1 FY27 · size of the hyperscale vs ACIE segments · Stacy Rasgon. "I mean, they are both about the same the same magnitude now." Huang answered why AI-native clouds prefer NVIDIA, not the size. The next release answered it by disclosure (hyperscale $49bn of $89bn Data Center in Q2 FY27), so this is a note, not a thread. CALL-Q1FY27, turns 21–22.

Verdict: ✅ conservative on revenue — 8 of 8 quarterly revenue guides beaten, every one above the top of the ±2% band — and reliable on quarterly margin (7 of 8, the miss an export charge). The full-year cost and margin colour is where the record is weak: the FY26 and FY27 opex guides were both overrun or raised, and the FY27 mid-70s gross-margin guide was withdrawn after being repeated twice. Scored rows: 14; beat 9, met 2, missed 2, withdrawn 1 — well short of over-promising. Current team made all of them. S7's base case can take the revenue guide as given and should take the margin guide with the reset already applied (FY28 72–73%, which is what the 2026-09-21 table used).

Gates this changes

  • S2 ✅ stays; capital allocation: compounds. ⚠️ line added for the shift of uses into strategic stakes and the Groq licence.
  • S3 ✅ (gate-minimum, partial) stays partial — two transcripts are now read (Q1 and Q2 FY27), which closes the "one transcript, not two" gap; still partial because comp structure was never extracted and the auditor/restatement full-text sweep was not run. EQ line added.
  • S8 ⬜ → ✅ conservative.
  • Kill criteria: one added — cash conversion (below).
  • S9: next earnings call 2026-11-17 — now sourced: "Our earnings call to discuss the results of our third quarter of fiscal 2027 is scheduled for November 17." (Toshiya Hari, CALL-Q2FY27, turn 30), replacing the cadence-derived date.

Process support, not investment advice.

Full notes, 21 Sep 2026 14 min read

NVDA — dossier, 2026-09-21

Slot names-ai-capex-1, name pass. Drafted unattended by the cloud research routine following .claude/skills/stock-sourcing-pipeline/SKILL.md. Nothing here is human-verified. Every figure carries the document it was read from; anything from background knowledge is marked [background]. Never edited after today — corrections go in scorecard.md's log.

Price reference: $222.27 close 2026-09-18 (market data). Shares outstanding 24,100,000,000 as of 2026-08-21 (EDGAR dei:EntityCommonStockSharesOutstanding, Q2 FY27 10-Q cover). Implied market capitalisation ≈ $5.36tn.


S1 — Source

watchlist (owner, Apple Stocks, 2026-09-20), cluster ai_semis, coverage: sec_domestic, cik 1045810. No Tier 0 promotion: queue.json promoted was empty at the start of this slot.


S2 — Kill test

All figures from EDGAR XBRL companyconcept (free, unmetered) unless noted. Fiscal years end late January; FY2026 ended 2026-01-25.

$bn unless notedFY2022FY2023FY2024FY2025FY2026
Revenue26.927.060.9130.5215.9
Gross profit17.515.444.397.9153.5
Gross margin64.9%56.9%72.7%75.0%71.1%
Operating income10.04.233.081.5130.4
Operating margin37.3%15.7%54.1%62.4%60.4%
Operating cash flow9.15.628.164.1102.7
Capex (PaymentsToAcquireProductiveAssets)——1.073.246.04
Free cash flow——27.060.996.7
Long-term debt10.99.78.58.57.5
Diluted shares (bn, as-reported)2.542.512.4924.8024.51

Share-count note: the FY2025 jump is the 10-for-1 split, not issuance. On a like-for-like basis diluted shares went 24.80bn → 24.51bn → 24.29bn (Q2 FY27) — a falling count, funded by buybacks. Dilution is not a risk here; it is the opposite of AMD's position.

Net debt / EBITDA: not a meaningful constraint. FY26 operating income alone is $130bn against $7.5bn of long-term debt. Even after the June-2026 issuance (below), gross debt of $33.4bn is roughly one quarter's operating income.

Analyst coverage count: not captured this pass — no source on the ladder returns it without spending an Equibles call better used elsewhere. Marked thin.

Verdict — survives or dies: NVIDIA does not die on its operating numbers. Revenue grew 65% on a $130bn base, gross margin is 71%, operating margin 60%, and free cash flow was ~$97bn in FY26 against $6bn of capex. Nothing in the income statement is close to a kill. The kill test has moved to the balance sheet, and the balance sheet changed character in two quarters:

$m, Q2 FY27 10-Q balance sheet2026-07-262026-01-25change
Cash and cash equivalents22,44310,605+112%
Marketable debt securities34,14339,065−13%
Marketable equity securities42,78312,886+232%
Non-marketable securities51,15722,251+130%
Accounts receivable, net63,05938,466+64%
Inventories31,57521,403+48%
Short-term debt1,000999—
Long-term debt32,3667,469+333%
Total assets320,272206,803+55%

Liquid position: $56.6bn of cash and marketable debt securities against $33.4bn of debt → net cash ≈ $23.2bn, before crediting $93.9bn of marketable equity and non-marketable securities. That investment book is now 29% of total assets and did not exist at this scale a year ago.


S3 — Filings, at gate-minimum depth

Read this pass: FY26 10-K (Item 1A risk factors and Item 7 MD&A only), Q2 FY27 10-Q (Item 2 MD&A delta), DEF 14A 2026-05-12 (ownership and 5% holders), the June-2026 424(b)(5), and the Q2 FY27 earnings call. Thin against the skill's own bar: one transcript, not two — the Equibles budget for this run was 25 calls across three names and 22 were spent; Q1 FY27's call was the item dropped. Not read: the second 10-K, older 10-Qs, comment letters, critical audit matters, auditor tenure and fees.

The three biggest risks management itself discloses

All three are management's own words, located by exact substring in the filing text and copied with their locator. They are not this run's ranking of what matters — they are what the company puts first, quantified.

1. Customer concentration — two customers are 36% of revenue. 10-K FY26, Item 1A, "We receive a significant amount of our revenue from a limited number of partners and distributors…":

For fiscal year 2026, sales to one direct customer represented 22% of total revenue and sales to another direct customer represented 14% of total revenue, all of which were primarily attributable to the Compute & Networking segment.

The cluster pass read the Q1 FY27 10-Q and found four direct customers at 60% of H1 FY27 revenue and five at 70% of receivables. The FY26 10-K figure is the audited annual version of the same fact.

2. Export control and the loss of China. 10-K FY26, Item 7 MD&A, "Recent Developments, Future Objectives and Challenges":

In April 2025, the USG informed us that a license is required for exports of our H20 product into the China market. As a result of these requirements, we incurred a $4.5 billion charge in the first quarter of fiscal year 2026 associated with H20 for excess inventory and purchase obligations, as the demand for H20 diminished.

Updated in the Q2 FY27 10-Q: a further $0.4bn charge on H200 in H1 FY27, shipments under the H200 licences "account for less than 1% of Data Center revenue in our most recent quarter," and a 25% US import tariff that the company states it has been unable to pass on. On the Q2 FY27 call the CFO said there is no China data center compute revenue in the forward outlook at all. China has been written to zero in the guide — which removes it as a downside and as an upside.

3. The customers cannot fund what they want to buy. 10-Q Q2 FY27, Item 2 MD&A:

We believe AI clouds and AI model makers have significant demand for training and inference compute and currently lack the ability to secure long-term infrastructure contracts and investment-grade financing capacity to secure the AI infrastructure necessary to grow.

This is the company stating, in a filing, the precise condition the cluster pass identified from the outside — and then describing what it is doing about it, which is the next section.

Proxy skim (DEF 14A filed 2026-05-12, table as of 2026-03-23)

  • Directors and executive officers as a group (14 persons): 957,313,517 shares, 3.94%.
  • 5% holders: BlackRock 7.43%, Vanguard Capital Management 7.31%.
  • Individual director lines are small by comparison (Mark A. Stevens 34.1m, A. Brooke Seawell 2.5m, both marked "*" = less than 1%), so the 3.94% is overwhelmingly the founder-CEO.
  • Compensation structure and what the bonus is paid on: not extracted this pass — thin.

Insider pattern (12 months to 2026-09-21)

Zero open-market purchases by any insider (Equibles GetInsiderTransactions NVDA, transactionType: Buy, fromDate: 2025-09-21 → "No insider transactions found"). The Form 4 feed is busy — 556 Form 4s on the current EDGAR submissions page, newest 2026-09-18 — but none of it is conviction buying. Sales and award mechanics were not itemised this pass.

Red-flag sweep

  • Going concern: no flag. Newest examined filing is the 10-Q filed 2026-08-26 (Equibles GetGoingConcernStatus); coverage there starts 2026-05-20, so earlier filings are unexamined.
  • Executive changes (8-K Item 5.02, via Equibles): Chief Accounting Officer handover — Donald Robertson retired effective 2026-05-04, Scott Gawel appointed from the same date. EVP Worldwide Field Operations Ajay K. Puri retiring, Nicholas Parker starting ~2026-08-24. Director Persis Drell resigned mid-term, effective immediately, 2026-01-20, including from the Compensation Committee; the 8-K gives no reason. Suzanne Nora Johnson added to the Board and Audit Committee 2026-07-13, board size ten → eleven. None of this is an accusation. A CAO change and a mid-term director resignation inside the same year that the balance sheet transformed are simply worth knowing.
  • Auditor change / restatement / NT 10-K: not run this pass — the efts.sec.gov full-text sweep was dropped for time. Thin; flagged for the next pass.
  • Customer concentration: carried from the 10-K (above) and the cluster file.

The finding this pass exists to report: NVIDIA is now financing its own demand

The cluster pass of 2026-09-20 split the complex into sellers of the shortage, which self-fund, and debt-funded buyers, which do not. That split no longer holds cleanly at the top. Four things, all from NVIDIA's own filings or its own call, dated within the last four months:

1. $25.0bn of notes, June 2026. Seven tranches maturing 2028 through 2056 — $3.5bn 4.250% 2028, $3.5bn 4.350% 2029, $4.0bn 4.500% 2031, $3.5bn 4.750% 2033, $4.0bn 4.950% 2036, $3.0bn 5.550% 2046, $3.5bn 5.625% 2056 — off the S-3ASR shelf filed 2025-05-28.

We estimate that the net proceeds from this offering will be approximately $24.9 billion, after deducting underwriting

…for "general corporate purposes, including the repayment and refinancing of outstanding notes." Long-term debt went $7.5bn → $32.4bn. And:

The indenture does not limit the amount of debt we may incur.

Baker's stated bubble sequence is "issue debt → cancel dividends → stop buybacks." NVIDIA has now done the first while doing the opposite of the third — $39.0bn of buybacks in H1 FY27 with $99.3bn of authorisation remaining as of 2026-07-26, plus a $0.25 quarterly dividend. That is a different shape from Oracle's, and the cluster file's Oracle framing should not be transplanted onto it. It is also not the shape of a company funding everything from cash flow.

2. A $105bn guarantee cap behind one customer. From the Q2 FY27 10-Q:

In August 2026, we entered into guarantees with SB Energy Corp. to provide credit support on the land, power, and shell buildout at SB Energy's PORTS Technology Campus in Pike County, Ohio, covering leases for approximately 4.25 gigawatts of IT load.
The campus will exclusively host our compute under 20-year leases to OpenAI, subject to limited exceptions, with our obligation capped at $105 billion in the aggregate

Obligations begin as each of nine data centers is placed in service, expected from fiscal year 2029, and terminate if OpenAI reaches a satisfactory credit rating. NVIDIA holds an option on roughly 3.8 GW more. The exposure is capped, staged and conditional — and it is NVIDIA carrying OpenAI's lease credit.

3. A $36bn take-or-pay back to the AI clouds.

Our commitments, which are typically six years in duration, totaled $36 billion as of July 26, 2026, and decrease as capacity is used by third-party customers or by us for our research and development efforts.

The clouds buy NVIDIA hardware; NVIDIA commits to buy cloud services back. The 10-Q states the clouds "can unilaterally stop providing to us and sell to third-party customers at more advantageous rates" — the optionality runs against NVIDIA.

4. >$500bn of third-party capital being organised.

In August 2026, we entered into memorandums of understanding with several large capital providers to establish independent financing platforms designed to mobilize more than $500 billion of third-party capital over time to support the deployment of AI infrastructure.

The call named six: Apollo, BlackRock, Blackstone, Brookfield, Goldman Sachs, KKR. The 10-Q names none and says these "may not lead to definitive agreements."

Management's own size for the circularity. From the Q2 FY27 call, the CFO said NVIDIA has invested nearly $50bn in the frontier AI labs, addressed the objection directly — "we know some will call this circular financing. We see it differently" — and then quantified it: demand from the AI labs for which NVIDIA expects to leverage its balance sheet contributes toward roughly a quarter of the business next year. (Machine transcript; the wording above is what the transcript renders, and that transcript mangles proper nouns elsewhere — "SB Energy" as "SoftBank Energy", "Groq" as "Grok", "Jensen Huang" as "Jensen Wong". The quantum — a quarter of next year's business — is the load-bearing fact and it is not corroborated by a filing read this pass. Treat it as management commentary, not as a filed figure.)

Private — owner reasoning, not evidence

Private note (owner reasoning, not an edge). Three facts sit together and the arrangement looks self-reinforcing even if every individual piece is prudent: accounts receivable grew 64% in two quarters on "extended payment terms," the investment book grew $59bn, and $25bn of debt was raised. Revenue quality is the thing to watch — not because anything disclosed is improper, but because a seller that finances its buyers books the same dollar as revenue, as a receivable, and as an investment, and only one of those is cash.


S5 — Ownership

Insider ownership3.94%, directors and executive officers as a group (14), DEF 14A as of 2026-03-23
Largest holders (proxy, 5% block)BlackRock 7.43%, Vanguard Capital Management 7.31%
Largest 13F holders, 2026-06-30BlackRock 1.942bn sh (10.99% of institutional total), Vanguard Capital Mgmt 1.541bn (8.72%), FMR 1.026bn (5.81%), State Street 1.010bn (5.72%), Geode 0.606bn (3.43%)
13F breadth6,393 rows across 5,966 institutions, 17.67bn shares total
Short interest (FINRA)298,301,619 shares at 2026-08-31 settlement, ≈1.2% of shares outstanding, 2.1 days to cover
Short trend310.1m (06-30) → 324.1m (07-15) → 292.7m (07-31) → 286.0m (08-14) → 298.3m (08-31) — range-bound, no build
Buyback$99.3bn remaining as of 2026-07-26; $39.0bn / 203m shares repurchased in H1 FY27; $40.1bn in FY26; $33.7bn in FY25
Dividend$0.25/quarter; $6.0bn paid in Q2 FY27
ShelfS-3ASR filed 2025-05-28 is live and was drawn for $25.0bn of notes in June 2026 (424B5 2026-06-15 and 2026-06-17). This is the answer to "does a shelf hang over it" — yes, and it has already been used.
ATMNo ATM program captured in ~13 months of 10-K/10-Q/8-K (Equibles). Absence there is not proof the company runs none.

Who is on the other side: essentially nobody. Short interest is ~1.2% of the float with 2 days to cover, and there is no visible activist or concentrated skeptic. The register is index money and the founder. The absence of a short case in the tape is not evidence the thesis is safe — it means the market is not offering a second opinion at this price.


S8 — Valuation and sizing (model; both decisions are ⏳ OPEN (user))

Out-year model. Revenue and margin inputs are management's own guidance where it exists, so the exercise is "what is priced against what management says", not an independent forecast.

Model, $bn except per shareFY2027EFY2028E
Revenue~405~689
basisH1 actual 177.8 + Q3 guide 108 + Q4 modelled ~118management's "approximately 70%" growth guide
Gross margin~73%72–73% (guided)
Operating expenses~34~46
Operating income~262~454
Net income~244~385
Diluted shares (bn)~24.3~23.5
EPS~$10.0~$16.4
P/E at $222.27~22x~13.6x

EV: market cap ~$5.36tn less ~$23.2bn net cash → EV ≈ $5.33tn, ≈ 13.2x FY2027E revenue and ≈ 7.7x FY2028E revenue. The $93.9bn investment book is excluded from EV; crediting it would take EV to ~$5.24tn.

  • Bear: FY28 growth comes in at 30% rather than 70% (supply eases but demand does not follow, or one of the two 20%+ customers slows), gross margin holds at the 71–72% trough rather than recovering. Revenue ~$525bn, EPS ~$11.5, and the multiple de-rates because the growth story is what supports it. A 40–50% drawdown is arithmetically ordinary from here.
  • Base: management's guide is met. ~$16.4 FY28 EPS, and the stock is at 13.6x that today.
  • Bull: the ~100% demand growth management says it sees converts as supply unlocks. Revenue ~$800bn+, EPS ~$19–20.

The honest summary of the valuation: on management's own numbers this is not an expensive stock — it is a cheap one. That is precisely the tell worth thinking about. The market is pricing meaningful probability that the FY28 guide does not happen, and the reason is visible in S3: a rising share of the demand is being underwritten by the seller.

Liquidity: average daily volume 139,118,326 shares (FINRA, 2026-08-31 settlement) at ~$222 ≈ $31bn traded per day. No sizing constraint at any plausible personal-account size.

⏳ Buy price: OPEN (user). Size: OPEN (user). Both are owner-only under the skill.


S9 — Monitoring

  • Next earnings: Q3 FY2027 ends ~2026-10-25; the results call has historically landed in the second half of November. Derived from the reporting cadence, not from a sourced calendar — market data's earnings calendar requires a paid plan and returned an upgrade notice. Thin.
  • Filing feed: the Tier 0 EDGAR sweep (watch_edgar.py, 06:40 UTC) covers cik 1045810 and will surface the 10-Q, any 8-K and any further 424B5 takedown without a model call.
  • Leading indicator between quarters: the supply and capacity commitments line in Note 10 of each 10-Q — $119bn at Q1 FY27, $279bn at Q2 FY27. It moves a quarter ahead of revenue and it is a filed number rather than commentary. Second: days sales outstanding, now 60 days on extended terms.
  • Trigger that converts this to a buy: the owner's, not this routine's. What this routine can say is the condition that would remove the central objection — two consecutive quarters in which revenue grows at or above guide while receivables, the investment book and the guarantee cap stop growing faster than revenue. That would establish the demand is being paid for rather than financed. Until then the FY28 multiple is cheap for a reason that is disclosed.

Access and connector notes for this run

  • SEC EDGAR: reachable, with the required User-Agent: ddboard-research gorkem@celebico.com. data.sec.gov XBRL, data.sec.gov/submissions and www.sec.gov/Archives all returned 200 via plain curl, so filings were read directly rather than through WebFetch.
  • Equibles: reachable. 22 calls across the three names of this slot, against the 25-call cap.
  • market data: reachable for prices; list_earnings_calendar is gated behind a paid plan.
  • EDINET DB / eu_data: not needed for three sec_domestic names; not called.
  • Not called, per the skill: Alpha Vantage, Bigdata.com, FMP.

Process support, not investment advice.