OMABGrupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte

OMAB — dossier, 2026-09-21

Slot names-ai-capex-2, taken as a Tier 0 promotion: queue.json promoted OMAB on the 6-K filed 2026-09-21, and under the skill's promotion rule a promoted name with no scorecard.md replaces the last member of the batch — so it displaced QCOM, which moved to a new slot names-ai-capex-2b. Model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine; nothing here is human-verified. Sources and locators are in relationships.yaml.

Price reference: $97.45 close, 2026-09-18 (ROIC.ai get_latest_stock_price NASDAQ:OMAB; volume 252,609 ADS). Each ADS represents eight Series B shares (stated in the 2Q26 results release), so the 385.3m shares outstanding are 48.16m ADS-equivalents → roughly $4.7bn market capitalisation. ROIC puts FY2025 enterprise value at MXN 105.9bn. Peso/dollar rate used below is 17.47, derived from the company's own pairing of Ps.3.80 EPS with US$1.74 per ADS in the 2Q26 release.

S1 — Source

watchlist (owner, Apple Stocks, 2026-09-20), cluster latam_infra, coverage sec_fpi, cik

1. Promoted by Tier 0 on 2026-09-21 (queue.json: "6-K filed 2026-09-21 (episodic report

(foreign private issuer))", priority 3). The promotion has been removed from queue.json.

S2 — Kill test

OMA reports under IFRS in Mexican pesos. The XBRL company-facts feed is not usable here — its series stops at 2024-12-31 and mixes MXN and USD unit labels across tags (Borrowings in MXN, LongtermBorrowings in USD for the same year), so every figure below is read from the filings themselves instead.

"Total revenues" includes construction-services revenue recognised under the concession accounting (Ps.2,313,436k in 2025) — a non-cash pass-through against an equal expense. The line that matters is aeronautical plus non-aeronautical, Ps.13,650,978k, and net income of Ps.5,365,288k against it is a 39.3% net margin. Aeronautical services — the regulated, price-capped part — were 63.8% of 2025 total revenues (60.6% in 2024, 61.8% in 2023).

Most recent quarter (2Q26, results released 2026-07-27):

• Passenger traffic +0.4% to 7.2m, on 0.3% fewer seats offered. Full-year 2025 was +8.5%.
• Aeronautical plus non-aeronautical revenue +5.4%; Adjusted EBITDA +6.2% to Ps.2,722m.
• Consolidated net income Ps.1,478m, +10.2%; EPS Ps.3.80, US$1.74 per ADS.
• Operating cash flow Ps.1,759m; MDP and strategic investment Ps.949m; financing used Ps.2,059m.
• Cash and equivalents Ps.2,577m at 2026-06-30.

Leverage. Total indebtedness Ps.10,676,708k (2023) → Ps.11,281,880k (2024) → Ps.13,428,359k (2025), +19% in the last year. Against Ps.2,577m of cash and roughly Ps.10.5-10.9bn of annualised adjusted EBITDA, net debt is about 1.0x — comfortable, and the maturity profile was pushed out on 2026-07-16 with a Ps.3.0bn long-term note issue that prepaid Ps.1.7bn of short-term bank debt and repaid the Ps.640m OMA 23L notes due 2026-07-24. No derivatives outstanding. The 1.0x figure pairs 2025 debt with 2026 cash and annualised 2026 EBITDA; the dates do not match and it is an approximation, not a reported ratio.

Survives comfortably. This is a regulated concession with a ~39% net margin, ~1x leverage and a five-year tariff framework already approved. The risk is not survival; it is the regulator, the three airlines, and the one airport.

• Share count / dilution: 48,163,222 ADS-equivalents, unchanged across 2024 and 2025 in ROIC's series. A buyback programme exists (the 2026-09-18 release notes it "did not operate during this period"). No dilution issue.
• Analyst coverage count: not obtained.

S3 — Filings, gate-minimum

Read: the 2025 20-F (Item 3.D risk factors in full for regulation, operations and shareholders; Item 4 business and Monterrey; the indebtedness table; the concession and Master Development Program framework), the 2Q26 results 6-K, the 2026-09-21 6-K that promoted the name, and the EDGAR form census. No proxy exists (FPI) and no Form 4s are filed — the census since 2023 shows 20-F, 6-K, Form 3 and two Schedule 13 filings only, which is why the insider-pattern row of the gate-minimum table is skipped rather than failed. No transcript was read.

The three biggest risks management itself discloses

1. The regulator sets most of the revenue, and has moved it before. Aeronautical services were 63.8% of 2025 revenues. "Following the announcement by the Mexican Federal Civil Aviation Agency of the amendment on October 4, 2023 our stock price on the Mexican Stock Exchange declined by 26%" (20-F, Item 3.D). Maximum tariffs are now fixed through 2030 — "On December 18, 2025, the Ministry of Infrastructure, Communications and Transportation approved the maximum tariffs we can charge at our airports for the five-year period from January 1, 2026, through December 31, 2030" — but tariffs are also cut every year by an efficiency adjustment the Ministry determines, and the framework beyond 2030 is unknown. The concession itself can be terminated if sanctions are imposed more than twice for the same violation within ten years.
2. Three airlines are four-fifths of the regulated revenue, with no obligation to stay. "Of the total aeronautical revenues generated at our airports in 2025, VivaAerobus represented 41.4%, Volaris represented 21.5% and Aeroméxico and its affiliates represented 18.6%" — 81.5% between them — and the filing continues "None of our contracts with our airline customers require them to con[tinue]". A single carrier's fleet or network decision is a company-level event.
3. One airport is the company. "In 2025, our Monterrey airport accounted for approximately 54.3% of our terminal passenger traffic, 39.3% of our total revenues and 46.0% of the sum of our aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues" (20-F, Item 4). Thirteen concessions, one that matters. Mexico-specific risks the 20-F also names — crime and extortion, demonstrations, minority shareholder protections weaker than in the US — attach disproportionately to that one asset.

Red-flag sweep

• Going concern: not applicable — ~39% net margin, ~1x leverage.
• Related party: the Technical Assistance Agreement with SETA/VINCI is the standing related-party arrangement and is disclosed as such; no transaction outside it surfaced in the sections read.
• Restatement / auditor change: none in the form census since 2023 (20-F, 6-K, Form 3, two Schedule 13 filings). Form census, not a full-text sweep — see "Evidence that was thin".
• Unexplained market activity: see the promoting event below. This is the one open red flag.

The promoting event

The 6-K filed 2026-09-21 (dated 2026-09-18) answers a Mexican Stock Exchange request about that day's trading volume. OMA "informs that it currently has no knowledge of any event that could be causing the breach of the traded volume parameter of Mexico's Stock Exchanges", adds that it is not aware that any director or relevant executive officer participated in the trading, and states that the repurchase programme did not operate during the period.

Corroboration from the other side of the listing: the ADR traded 252,609 shares on 2026-09-18 against a FINRA-reported average daily volume of 75,452 at the 2026-08-31 settlement — about 3.3x normal, so whatever happened was visible on Nasdaq as well as on the BMV. Short interest is negligible (228,738 ADS, 0.47% of ADS outstanding), so this is not a squeeze. No explanation exists in the public record as of 2026-09-21. The obvious hypothesis given the register — a block moving among the VINCI entities or out of them — is a hypothesis, not a finding, and would surface as a Schedule 13 amendment or a further 6-K.

S5 — Ownership

Control is a share class, not a majority. SETA holds all of the Series BB shares, 12.9% of capital stock, and with them the right to nominate, appoint and remove certain directors and officers plus veto rights — rights that persist "As long as SETA retains at least 7.65% of our capital stock in the form of Series BB". The VINCI Entities own 100% of SETA and also hold, directly, Series B and BB representing 14.8% of capital stock, with CONCESSOC holding Series B representing a further 15.1%. So roughly 29.9% of the economics carries effective control, and the 20-F says outright that those interests "may differ from those of our other shareholders and can be contrary to the preferences and expectations of our other shareholders". Termination of the Technical Assistance Agreement converts the BB shares and ends the special rights.

Institutional ADS register (threespread.py holders OMAB returned zero 13F filers for CUSIP P49530101, so this is the Equibles fallback, 13F date 2026-06-30): BlackRock 1,452,940 ADS (24.40% of institutional 13F ADS); Nuveen 625,447; State Street 415,077; Itaú Unibanco 291,193; Morgan Stanley 277,272; Russell 199,390; American Century 192,829; CPPIB 149,370. The entire 13F register is 5,955,211 ADS across 166 institutions — about 12% of the 48.16m ADS-equivalents. US institutional ownership is a minority of this stock; the rest trades on the BMV.

Schedule 13 history: one SC 13G filed 2026-01-08 for the 2025-12-31 period (by the filer whose CIK also files BlackRock's filings), and a 13D/13D-A chain in 2022-2023. Nothing filed around the 2026-09-18 volume event as of this run.

Insider pattern: skipped — an FPI files no Form 4. The census carries 17 Form 3s and no Form 4.

Short interest: 228,738 ADS at 2026-08-31, +20,924, 0.47% of ADS outstanding, 3.0 days to cover on 75,452 average daily volume. Nobody is short this.

What hangs over it: no US shelf — the EDGAR census since 2023 is 20-F, 6-K, Form 3 and Schedule 13 filings only, with no F-3. Debt is raised in the Mexican market instead (the July 2026 Ps.3.0bn notes). The overhang is the 29.9% VINCI position, not a registration statement.

S8 — Valuation and sizing ⏳ OPEN (user)

No structured guidance exists for this issuer in the rungs used, so the model is built from reported results: 2025 actuals, the 2Q26 trajectory, and the tariff framework fixed to 2030.

For cross-reference, ROIC's FY2025 multiples on the same listing: P/E 17.65x, EV/EBITDA 10.79x, EV/EBIT 11.85x, P/FCF 19.88x, P/B 8.38x. Price-to-tangible-book is negative because the balance sheet is concession intangibles — that ratio is meaningless here and should not be used.

Bear / base / bull on the 2027 line: bear — traffic stays flat, the annual efficiency adjustment bites, EPS ~$6.50 per ADS and an 11x multiple on a concession with 2030 reset risk gives ~$72; base — the table, $7.51 at 14x gives ~$105; bull — traffic reverts to the 6-8% of 2023-2025 as capacity returns, EPS ~$8.30 at 17x gives ~$141.

The contrast with the other two names in this slot is the point worth recording. MRVL and ARM both model to a base case below the traded price; OMAB models to a base case slightly above it. It is a regulated monopoly at ~14x earnings with ~1x leverage, five years of tariff visibility and a traffic line that has just stalled. Whether that stall is cyclical or structural is the whole question, and this run does not answer it.

Proposed buy price and proposed size are owner-only and are not stated here. Sizing note: liquidity is the binding constraint, not valuation. FINRA-reported average daily ADR volume is 75,452 shares — roughly $7.4m a day. That is three orders of magnitude below MRVL's turnover and it caps any position long before conviction does.

S9 — Monitoring

• Next earnings: 3Q26 results, expected late October 2026 — derived from filing cadence (3Q25 results 6-K filed 2025-10-24), not from a calendar feed.
• Filing feed: the Tier 0 EDGAR sweep covers cik 1378239, and OMA's 6-K stream is unusually dense — 125 6-Ks since 2023, including monthly passenger-traffic reports. This is the best-instrumented name in the slot.
• Leading indicator between quarters: the monthly traffic 6-K. Traffic went from +8.5% for 2025 to +0.4% in 2Q26 on 0.3% fewer seats; one monthly print either confirms the stall or ends it, and it arrives eleven times a year between results.
• Trigger that converts this to a buy: two consecutive monthly traffic prints at or above +4% year on year, and the 2030 tariff framework unamended, and a price at or below ~12x the model 2027 EPS per ADS — about $90, roughly 8% below the 2026-09-18 close. Failing that, the cheaper trigger is the opposite one: a tariff-amendment announcement of the 2023 kind, which took 26% off the price in a day and would be the moment to look rather than to leave.
• Also watch, immediately: any Schedule 13D/G amendment or follow-up 6-K explaining the 2026-09-18 volume breach.

Evidence that was thin, and why

• The XBRL company-facts feed is unusable for this issuer — the series ends at 2024-12-31 and unit labels are inconsistent between MXN and USD within the same fiscal year. Every financial figure above therefore comes from the filing text, which means 2023 and 2024 comparatives are incomplete in the S2 table rather than wrong.
• No earnings-call transcript was read and no structured guidance exists for this issuer in the rungs used, so the S8 model rests entirely on reported results and my own growth assumptions. They are labelled as assumptions in the table.
• The institutional register came from the Equibles fallback, not 3spread — threespread.py holders OMAB returned zero filers for CUSIP P49530101.
• No efts.sec.gov full-text sweep for restatement or auditor-change language; the red-flag read is a form census.
• The peso/dollar rate of 17.47 is derived from the company's own pairing of Ps.3.80 EPS with US$1.74 per ADS in the 2Q26 release, not from an FX source. Every dollar figure in S8 inherits whatever error that carries, and none of it is hedged for the peso.
• No analyst coverage count.
• S0, S4, S6 and S7 are not attempted. OMAB belongs to the financials-global cluster, whose cluster pass has not run; the skill forbids improvising cluster stages per name.