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OMABGrupo Aeroportuario del Centro Norte

Industry LatAm concessions Updated 25 Sep 2026

The idea

A concession with a tariff framework fixed to 2030 at ~14x earnings; the bull case is passenger traffic reverting to the 2023-25 6-8% growth as airline capacity returns.

Events to watch

  • Monthly traffic prints (the dossier's buy trigger: two at +4% y/y or better)
  • the 2030 tariff framework staying unamended
  • the 2026-09-18 unexplained volume spike
How we got the target

Dossier: base $7.51 EPS per ADS × 14x. Time frame: 2027.

Target: from the research notes. Prices: market data get_latest_stock_price, close of 2026-09-22 (fetched 2026-09-23)

What would prove it wrong

7 warning signs
  1. Passenger traffic goes negative for two consecutive quarters.

    Details

    2Q26 was +0.4% against +8.5% for full-year 2025, on 0.3% fewer seats offered. OMA reports traffic monthly in a 6-K, so this is the fastest-updating number in the file.

  2. The tariff framework is reopened before 2030.

    Details

    Maximum tariffs were set on 2025-12-18 for 2026-2030. The 2023 precedent is explicit: when the agency amended the bases, the stock fell 26% in a day. Any new amendment is the same event.

  3. VivaAerobus above ~45% of aeronautical revenues, or any of the three cutting Monterrey capacity.

    Details

    Three airlines are 81.5% of aeronautical revenue and no contract obliges them to stay.

  4. Monterrey disrupted.

    Details

    One airport is 54.3% of passengers and 39.3% of revenue; a security, labour or capacity event there is a company-level event.

  5. SETA drops below 7.65% in Series BB, or the Technical Assistance Agreement is terminated.

    Details

    Either converts the BB shares to ordinary B and ends VINCI's appointment and veto rights. That is a re-rating in both directions and it is disclosed when it happens.

  6. The Monterrey commercial areas are not fully operational by 2027-12-31, or the commercial revenue per passenger guide is given as "stable" for a fourth consecutive year.

    Details

    The opening has moved from early 2026 to end-2027 and the per-pax guide has been Ps.60, Ps.62 and Ps.66 — each year "similar to current levels". A fourth such year means the Ps.66 level, not the 10-15% real step-up management sizes (2026-02-24 [28]), is the business.

  7. A second consecutive Master Development Program ends with investment postponed beyond its term.

    Details

    7.2% of the 2021-2025 programme (Ps.1,271,546k) was pushed into 2026-2027. The 2026-2030 programme starts carrying those arrears; a further postponement disclosed in a 20-F footnote would make deferral the method rather than the exception, and it is the concession obligation on which the tariff is set.

How far along

6 of 10 steps done · 4 not started

Next step

find out what moved the stock on 2026-09-18. The Mexican exchange queried a breach of its traded-volume parameter; OMA answered that it knows of no cause, that no director or relevant officer traded, and that the buyback was not operating. The ADR traded 252,609 shares that day against a FINRA average of 75,452 — about 3.3x normal. A 29.9% shareholder group (VINCI, via SETA and CONCESSOC) sits behind a 12.9% control block; block movement is the obvious hypothesis and the public record does not confirm it. Watch for a 13D/G amendment or a follow-up 6-K.

Needs your decision

S6 product test / expert call, S7 conviction.

Failed checks

none. S0/S4/S6/S7 are not closed because this name's cluster pass has not run — it was taken as a Tier 0 promotion into an ai-capex slot, and it now belongs to latam_concessions (re-clustered 2026-09-22). S8 closed closed reliable on 2026-09-25 (7 rows, 2 withdrawn), S2 capital allocation compounds, S3 earnings quality 2 flags and its zero-transcripts deviation is resolved. Two things are recorded as not assessable rather than as passing: the §25 bonus-metric check (an FPI files no proxy) and the 1Q26 call, which is missing from the transcript archive.

Who runs it

The Front Office

Step by step

  1. S0How it does as AI gets cheapNot started

    awaiting cluster pass cluster-latam-concessions

    do not improvise per name (skill §2). Owner checks dropped 2026-09-21.

  2. S1Where the idea came fromDone

    watchlist (owner, Apple Stocks, 2026-09-20), plus the Tier 0 promotion on the 6-K filed 2026-09-21 (Mexican exchange trading-volume inquiry)

  3. S2Quick deal-breaker checkDone

    2025 revenue Ps.15,964,414k (aero + non-aero Ps.13,650,978k), net income Ps.5,365,288k, 28.8m passengers +8.5%. Debt Ps.13,428,359k against Ps.2,577m cash at 2026-06-30, roughly 1x EBITDA. Survives.

    ⚠️ traffic growth collapsed to +0.4% in 2Q26 — see S9. · capital allocation (2026-09-25, dossier-2026-09-25.md): compounds. 2021-25 operating cash flow Ps.29,409,544k; capex Ps.13,324,375k (of which Ps.12,097,926k is concession-asset improvement) leaves free cash flow Ps.16,085,169k before interest and Ps.11,587,462k after the Ps.4,497,707k of interest IFRS puts in financing. Returned Ps.21,497,814k — Ps.21.0bn of dividends plus one Ps.474,852k buyback in 2021 — = 134% of pre-interest and 185% of post-interest free cash flow, funded with Ps.8,936,033k of net new debt.

    ⚠️ that reads worse than it is: long-term debt Ps.10,676,708k (2023) to Ps.11,788,359k (2025) against cash rising to Ps.3,098,092k is under 1x EBITDA and flat, and equity still grew Ps.9,838,502k to Ps.11,426,632k. ROIC 28.0% (2023) to 27.1% (2025), incremental ~20% — a regulated business earning 27% on capital the regulator obliges it to deploy. No acquisitions, no goodwill, no impairments.

    ⚠️ the Ps.1,500,000k buyback fund authorised in each of 2023, 2024 and 2025 has gone entirely unused (last repurchase 2021), so the dividend is the whole return.

    ⚠️ the bonus-metric check is NOT ASSESSABLE for this name: an FPI files no DEF 14A and no Form 4, and 20-F Item 6.B gives aggregate compensation with no incentive-plan metrics. Recorded as not assessable, not as "no flag".

  4. S3Reading the company's reportsDone

    (gate-minimum, partial)

    2025 20-F Item 3.D risk factors + Item 4/5, the 2Q26 results 6-K, the promoting 6-K, EDGAR form census. No proxy (FPI), no Form 4s filed.

    ⚠️ RESOLVED 2026-09-25: the "zero transcripts read" deviation is closed — six market data calls (2025-02-25 through 2026-07-28) are in _transcripts/OMAB/ and were read; the dodge log below is opened from them.

    ⚠️ the 1Q26 call is MISSING from the archive and sits exactly where the 2026 traffic guide came under pressure; transcripts.py should retry it. EQ: 2 flags (2026-09-25, dossier-2026-09-25.md), both reading rules rather than accusations — (1) 14.5% of headline 2025 revenue is a zero-margin IFRIC-12 construction pass-through (cost of construction Ps.2,313,436k in 2025 vs Ps.2,860,190k and Ps.2,898,000k, -19.1% then -1.3%), booked at exactly cost, so total-revenue growth tracks the capex schedule and not the airports — use aeronautical + non-aeronautical (Ps.13,650,978k in 2025); (2) the major maintenance provision charges far more than it pays and its size is set by a long-term discount rate — Ps.348,285k provision plus Ps.244,200k present-value unwind = Ps.592,485k charged against Ps.203,860k of cash payments in 2025, a non-cash excess of Ps.388,625k against Ps.164,883k (2024) and Ps.128,563k (2023), with the CFO naming the driver ("it will depend on both construction costs as well as the interest rate — long-term interest rates used to discount that provision", 2026-02-24 [35]) and ~Ps.400m guided for 2026. Direction is conservative — reported profit sits BELOW cash — but a move in Mexican long rates changes reported profit with nothing happening in the airports. Clean: OCF / net income 1.26x / 1.26x / 1.39x; receivables absorbed Ps.565,187k in 2024 but only Ps.169,132k in 2025, average payment term 55 days inside the 30-60 day contractual range; no SBC of any size, no goodwill, no acquisitions, no impairment, no restatement; the 5%-to-9% concession-tax rise is recoverable through the tariff reference value and the CFO confirmed it is being recovered from 2026-01-01 (2026-02-24 [24]).

  5. S4Rivals and suppliersNot started

    awaiting cluster pass cluster-latam-concessions.

  6. S5Who owns the stockDone

    SETA/VINCI control structure, 13F ADS register, 13D/G history, FINRA short interest, no shelf on file.

    ⚠️ 3spread returned zero 13F filers for the CUSIP, so the register came from the Equibles fallback.

  7. S6What workers and customers sayNot started

    awaiting cluster pass cluster-latam-concessions. Product test / expert call open OPEN (user)

  8. S7The case for it, and pricesNot started

    awaiting cluster pass cluster-latam-concessions

    conviction open OPEN (user) · valuation (bear/base/bull; moved from S8 2026-09-23): ~14x model 2026 and ~13x model 2027 EPS per ADS at $97.45 (2026-09-18)

    Full notes

    market data puts FY2025 at 17.7x earnings and 10.8x EV/EBITDA. Unlike the ai-capex names in this slot, the price does not already contain the bull case. · valuation, base case re-read 2026-09-25 against S8: the verdict is reliable, so no guidance haircut — and there is almost no guidance to haircut, since OMA publishes no revenue, EBITDA or EPS outlook at all. Two changes to the ASSUMPTIONS instead. (a) Do not carry a 2026 commercial- revenue step-up. The Monterrey commercial areas were guided to open in "early 2026" with 2026 getting "a huge pickup"; they are now guided fully operational end-2027 with the revenue effect in 2028, and commercial revenue per passenger has been guided "stable" at Ps.60, then Ps.62, then Ps.66 across three consecutive years. Management's own sizing of the eventual step is "10% to 15% increase in spending per pax in Monterrey in real terms on an annualized basis" (2026-02-24 [28]) — put it in 2028, not 2026. (b) The 2026-2030 capex line is the new MDP PLUS the old one's arrears. Ps.16,633,614k committed for 2026-2030 plus Ps.1,271,546k postponed out of 2021-2025 ≈ Ps.17.9bn, which is why 2026 alone is guided at Ps.3.5-4.0bn (2026-07-28 [8]) against a straight-line MDP year of ~Ps.3.3bn.

  9. S8Do the bosses keep their word?Done

    7 rows (2026-09-25, dossier-2026-09-25.md): 1 beat, 4 met, 2 withdrawn

    reliable on what it forecasts, late on what it builds. Both officers (Ricardo Dueñas Espriu CEO, Ruffo Pérez Pliego del Castillo CFO) held their roles throughout, so no row is departed and the verdict is about the people in the chairs.

    Full notes

    OMA publishes no revenue, EBITDA or EPS guidance at all, so the stage runs on dated delivery commitments. What it does forecast it hits: 2025 traffic guided "around a mid single digit growth" came in at +8.5%; commercial revenue per passenger held; the 6.9% tariff pass-through landed on the promised 10 April.

    ⚠️ BOTH WITHDRAWN ROWS ARE DATED DELIVERY COMMITMENTS AND NEITHER SLIP WAS EVER CALLED A DELAY. (1) The Monterrey commercial areas were to open "early 2026" and give 2026 "a huge pickup" (2025-02-25 [11]); they are now "fully operational by the end of, next year" with the pickup "until 2028" (2026-07-28 [25]) — a ~2-year slip in the largest identified driver of non-aero revenue per passenger, restated three times as though each new date had always been the date. (2) Ps.1,271,546k — 7.2% of the 2021-2025 investment programme — was authorised to be postponed out of the term (Ps.866,304k into 2026, Ps.405,243k into 2027), disclosed only in a 20-F footnote; the CFO confirmed the mechanics on 2026-07-28 [8] only after an analyst noticed the arithmetic.

    ⚠️ AND ONE CLAIM THE COMPANY'S OWN 20-F DOES NOT SUPPORT LIKE FOR LIKE. On 2026-02-24 [2] the CEO called the 2026-2030 commitment "comparable in real terms to the investment considered in the 2021-2025 cycle". In December-2025 pesos the 20-F puts 2026-2030 at Ps.16,633,614k against a 2021-2025 total — the 20-F's own words — of Ps.17,583,375k: -5.4%. "Comparable" (+2.0%) holds only against the Ps.16,311,829k table total that EXCLUDES the arrears, which OMA must still spend inside the same 2026-2030 window.

    ⚠️ Not scored, recorded: the 2026 traffic guide was cut mid-year, from "low to mid-single-digit" (2026-02-24 [43]) to "around flat to low, single digits" (2026-07-28 [13]) on the jet-fuel spike — stated with a reason, so not a withdrawal, but the first guide of the year is already down once. 2Q26 was +0.4%; August 2026 was +4.0% (6-K 2026-09-08).

  10. S9What to watch nextDone

    trigger written. Tier 0 EDGAR sweep covers the feed (cik 1378239)

Sources and notes

Sources 6 documents
Short nameDocumentWhere it came fromRead on
20F-2025OMA 20-F for the year ended 2025-12-31, filed 2026-04-30https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1378239/000110465926051987/omab-20251231x20f.htm2026-09-21
6K-2Q26OMA 6-K, Second Quarter 2026 operating and financial results, dated 2026-07-27, filed 2026-07-28https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1378239/000199937126016264/oma-6k_072726.htm2026-09-21
6K-VOLUME-0918OMA 6-K, response to the Mexican Stock Exchange's request regarding trading volume, dated 2026-09-18, filed 2026-09-21https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1378239/000199937126020900/oma-6k_091826.htm2026-09-21
13F-Q2-26Institutional ADS holders, 13F report date 2026-06-30Equibles GetTopHolders OMAB2026-09-21
SI-AUG26FINRA short interest and average daily volume, settlement 2026-08-31Equibles GetShortInterest OMAB2026-09-21
MKT-PXClosing price and volume, NASDAQ:OMAB, 2026-09-18market data get_latest_stock_price2026-09-21
Links to other companies 13 links
customer of 3holds 2issuer of 2regulator of 2governance structure 1channel concentration 1event 1officer of 1
FromLinkToDateWhere it says so
Servicios de Tecnología Aeroportuaria, S.A. de C.V. ("SETA")governance structureOMAB2025-12-3120F-2025 — Item 3.D / Item 7, Series BB discussion — 'SETA currently owns all of the outstanding Series BB shares...'
VINCI SA and its concession subsidiaries (the "VINCI Entities")holdsServicios de Tecnología Aeroportuaria, S.A. de C.V. ("SETA")2025-12-3120F-2025 — Item 7.A, VINCI Entities paragraph — 'shares and Series BB shares that represent 14.8% of our capital stock. CONCESSOC owns Series B shares that represent 15.1% of our capital stock.'
Servicios de Tecnología Aeroportuaria, S.A. de C.V. ("SETA")issuer ofOMA Series BB shares — 12.9% of capital stock, all held by SETA, carrying director and officer nomination rights2025-12-3120F-2025 — Item 3.D, Risks Related to Our Shareholders
Mexican Federal Civil Aviation Agency (Agencia Federal de Aviación Civil)regulator ofOMAB2025-12-3120F-2025 — Item 3.D, Risks Related to the Regulation of Our Business — first risk factor
Ministry of Infrastructure, Communications and Transportationregulator ofOMA Master Development Program and maximum tariffs for 2026-2030, approved 2025-12-182025-12-1820F-2025 — Item 3.D, 'The regulations pursuant to which the maximum tariffs... are established do not guarantee...'
VivaAerobuscustomer ofOMAB2025-12-3120F-2025 — Item 3.D, Risks Related to Our Operations — airline concentration paragraph
Volariscustomer ofOMAB2025-12-3120F-2025 — Item 3.D, Risks Related to Our Operations — airline concentration paragraph
Aeroméxico and its affiliatescustomer ofOMAB2025-12-3120F-2025 — Item 3.D, Risks Related to Our Operations — airline concentration paragraph
OMABchannel concentrationVivaAerobus2025-12-3120F-2025 — Item 4, business overview — Monterrey paragraph
Mexican Stock Exchange (Bolsa Mexicana de Valores)eventOMAB2026-09-186K-VOLUME-0918 — body of the 6-K, 'OMA responds to Mexican Stock Exchange's request regarding today's trading volume'
OMABissuer ofOMA long-term notes, Ps.3.0 billion, issued in the Mexican market 2026-07-162026-07-166K-2Q26 — Relevant Events, 'OMA issues Ps.3.0 billion in Long-Term Notes'
BlackRock, Inc.holdsOMAB2026-06-3013F-Q2-26 — row 1, 'BlackRock, Inc. | Common | 1,452,940'
Ruffo Pérez Pliegoofficer ofOMAB2026-09-186K-VOLUME-0918 — signature block, 'Chief Financial Officer / Ruffo Pérez Pliego'
History 4 entries
  • 2026-09-21 — first pass, slot names-ai-capex-2, taken as the Tier 0 promotion that replaced QCOM in this batch (QCOM moved to names-ai-capex-2b). Model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine. S1, S2, S3 (gate-minimum), S5 and S9 closed; S8 modelled and left open; S0/S4/S6/S7 wait on cluster-latam-concessions. Evidence and access limits in dossier-2026-09-21.md. Nothing here is human-verified.
  • 2026-09-22 — re-clustered. OMAB was a member of cluster-financials-global, a ten-name slot holding four banks, an asset manager, an Argentine energy company, this airport group and an ETF. That slot is split (WATCHLIST_PLAN.md §22) and OMAB now sits in latam_concessions with PAM, whose pass is cluster-latam-concessions. The waiting stages above point at it. Nothing else in this scorecard changed: no stage was re-scored and no evidence was revisited.
  • 2026-09-23 — stage redefinition, owner decision (WATCHLIST_PLAN.md §25): S8 is now Management credibility and is not yet run for this name; the old S8 valuation figures moved to the valuation: line under S7, and any proposed buy price or position size was removed (the pipeline no longer drafts either). No research was redone. S2 capital allocation and S3 earnings quality are also pending, in the same backfill slot.
  • 2026-09-25 — backfill, slot backfill-2026-09-23-7, model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine. Wrote the three checks added on 2026-09-23 (WATCHLIST_PLAN.md §25) into dossier-2026-09-25.md and updated this file: S8 management credibility (7 rows, 1 beat / 4 met / 2 withdrawn — reliable), S2 capital allocation (compounds) and S3 earnings quality (2 flags). No other stage was redone. Sources: the 2025, 2024 and 2023 20-Fs (the cash-flow statement carries only three years, so three filings were read to get five), the 4Q25 results 6-K, the August-2026 traffic 6-K, and all six archived market data transcripts. Run finding 1: OMA hits the numbers it forecasts and is late on the things it builds. 2025 traffic beat its "mid single digit" guide at +8.5% and the tariff landed on the promised date, but the Monterrey commercial areas have slipped from "early 2026, a huge pickup" to "fully operational end-2027, pickup in 2028" across three calls, none of which described it as a delay, and Ps.1,271,546k — 7.2% of the 2021-2025 investment programme — was formally postponed out of the term, disclosed in a 20-F footnote and explained on a call only when an analyst noticed the arithmetic. Run finding 2: the CEO's "comparable in real terms" framing of the new 2026-2030 programme is -5.4%, not comparable, once the arrears are counted the way the 20-F itself totals them — and those arrears must still be spent inside the new window. Run finding 3: capital allocation is strong on the returns (ROIC 27-28%, ~20% incremental, no acquisitions, no impairments, leverage under 1x EBITDA) and stretched on the distribution — 185% of post-interest free cash flow returned over five years, funded with Ps.8.9bn of net new debt, while the Ps.1.5bn buyback authorisation has gone unused since 2021. Also closed: the 2026-09-21 S3 deviation "zero transcripts read". Two tooling notes: the 1Q26 call is missing from _transcripts/OMAB/, and market data renders the CFO's name three different ways across the six files. Nothing here is human-verified.
Full notes, 25 Sep 2026 15 min read

OMAB — backfill dossier, 2026-09-25

Slot backfill-2026-09-23-7, model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine. Nothing here is human-verified. Figures are thousands of Mexican pesos unless marked.

Scope. Only the three checks added on 2026-09-23 (WATCHLIST_PLAN.md §25): S8 management credibility, S2 capital allocation and S3 earnings quality. No other stage was redone; dossier-2026-09-21.md stands. This pass also closes that dossier's S3 deviation — it recorded "Zero transcripts read", and six calls are now in the archive and were read.

Sources used, all primary.

TagDocumentHow it was read
20F-202520-F for the year ended 2025-12-31, filed 2026-04-30accession 0001104659-26-051987, omab-20251231x20f.htm, sec.gov
20F-202420-F for 2024, filed 2025-04-29accession 0001558370-25-005842 — cash-flow statement, for 2022
20F-202320-F for 2023, filed 2024-04-29accession 0001558370-24-006069 — cash-flow statement, for 2021
6K-2602246-K filed 2026-02-24, 4Q25 and full-year 2025 resultsaccession 0001999371-26-003985
6K-2609086-K filed 2026-09-08, August 2026 trafficaccession 0001999371-26-019999
ARCHIVE_transcripts/OMAB/FY2024-Q4 … FY2026-Q2 (6 calls, market data)read in the §3.1 order; [n] is the line index in the archived content

Two notes on the archive before anything is quoted from it.

  1. One quarter is missing. The archive holds the calls of 2025-02-25, 2025-04-29, 2025-07-29, 2025-10-24, 2026-02-24 and 2026-07-28. The 1Q26 call (late April 2026) is absent — so the only 2026 calls available are the February one and the July one, and the gap sits exactly where the 2026 traffic guide was first put under pressure. transcripts.py should retry it.
  2. market data renders the CFO's name three different ways across the six files — "Ruffo Pérez Pliego" (2025-02-25), "Ruffo Pérez del Castillo" (2026-02-24) and "Ruffo Perez Pliego del Castillo" (2026-07-28). All three are the same person; 20F-2025 is the authority for the name and the role. This is the same class of defect as the AX mislabel found on 2026-09-24 and it is recorded here so a later pass does not treat them as different speakers. Speaker labels below are quoted as the archive renders them, with the role taken from EDGAR.

S8 — management credibility

Who made the promises. Ricardo Dueñas Espriu, CEO, and Ruffo Pérez Pliego del Castillo, CFO, across the whole window. No officer change in the period, so no row is departed and the verdict rests on the people still in the chairs.

The shape of the problem. OMA publishes no revenue, EBITDA or EPS guidance at all — the results 6-Ks carry no outlook table. What it commits to is a short list: passenger traffic, commercial revenue per passenger, the maximum-tariff pass-through, the buyback fund, and the five-year investment programme its concession obliges it to deliver. That is a thin promise set by the standards of the US names in this repository, and the stage has to be run on the dated delivery commitments rather than on numbers.

The say-vs-do table

#PromiseMadeByFirst guidePathResultVerdict
12025 passenger traffic2025-02-25 [6]Pérez Pliego (CFO)"around a mid single digit growth year-over-year"—+8.5%, 28.8m passengers (6K-260224)beat
2Monterrey new commercial areas open2025-02-25 [11]Pérez Pliego (CFO)"we expect that to occur in early 2026. So 2026 will have a huge pickup because of the new areas to be inaugurated at the time"2026-02-24 [18] "by mid-next year" and [28] "starting the second half of next year… full year effect being reflected in full in 2028"; 2026-07-28 [25] "fully operational by the end of, next year… a pickup in commercial revenue per passenger until 2028"not open; now guided to be fully operational end-2027 with the revenue effect in 2028WITHDRAWN
32021–2025 Master Development Program investmentconcession commitment, 20F-2025companyPs.17,583,375 for the five years (Dec-2025 pesos)Ps.665,419 of the 2024 commitment and Ps.606,127 of the 2025 commitment authorised to be postponedPs.1,271,546 — 7.2% of the programme — pushed out of the term: Ps.866,304 into 2026, Ps.405,243 into 2027WITHDRAWN
4Commercial revenue per passenger2025-02-25 [11]Pérez Pliego"a similar amount… around the Ps.60 mark"2026-02-24 [59] "ended 2025 around MXN 62 per pax. We expect similar amounts"; 2026-07-28 [25] "around Ps. 66 per pax… reasonable to assume"held and drifted up roughly with inflationmet
52026 tariff pass-through on the date2026-02-24 [50]Dueñas (CEO)"The increase that we're going to pass through this year is 6.9% starting in 10th of April"—2026-07-28 [3], CFO: aeronautical revenues "increased 3.9%… mainly reflecting the tariff adjustments that took effect in April 2026"met
6Buyback fund20F-2025AGM / boardPs.1,500,000 authorised in each of 2023, 2024 and 2025—Ps.0 repurchased in 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025; the last repurchase was Ps.474,852 in 2021, and the 6-K of 2026-09-21 confirms the fund was not operatingmet — but see below
72025 capital investment delivered2026-02-24, 6K-260224companyPs.2,516,723 committed for 2025 after the postponementoriginal 2025 commitment Ps.3,122,850"MDPs plus strategic investments in 2025 reached Ps.2,709 million"met against the reduced figure, 13% short of the original

Open, not yet scoreable (recorded so the next pass can close them):

  • 2026 passenger traffic. Guided "low to mid-single-digit growth" (2026-02-24 [43], Dueñas), then cut on 2026-07-28 [13] to "around flat to low, single digits" on the jet-fuel spike. 2Q26 was +0.4% on 0.3% fewer seats; August 2026 was +4.0% (6K-260908). The cut was stated on the call with a reason, so it is not a withdrawn row — but the first guide of the year has already been lowered once and the year is not closed.
  • 2026 maximum-tariff compliance ~93% (2026-02-24 [14]), reaffirmed and widened to "93% to 95%" on 2026-07-28 [7] and [20], with full compliance pushed to "the end of 2027, mid-2028".
  • 2026 major maintenance provision ~Ps.400m (2026-02-24 [8], [35]).
  • 2026 total investment Ps.3.5–4.0bn (2026-07-28 [8]).

7 scored rows: 1 beat, 4 met, 2 withdrawn.

Verdict: ✅ reliable on what it forecasts, late on what it builds

Two thirds of the scored rows were met or beaten and nothing was missed outright, which under §25 is reliable. The finding is which rows failed.

Both withdrawn rows are dated delivery commitments, and neither slip was ever announced as a delay.

  • The Monterrey commercial areas were going to open in early 2026 and give 2026 "a huge pickup". They are now guided to be fully operational at the end of 2027 with the revenue effect in 2028. That is roughly a two-year slip in the single largest identified driver of non-aeronautical revenue per passenger, and it was never presented as a delay on any of the three calls that moved it — each call simply restated a later date as though it had always been the date. The commercial-revenue-per-passenger guide is the tell: "around the Ps.60 mark" in February 2025, "around MXN 62" in February 2026, "around Ps. 66" in July 2026 — three consecutive years of "stable at roughly inflation", with the step-up rescheduled each time.
  • The 2021–2025 investment programme ended with Ps.1,271,546 thousand, 7.2% of it, formally postponed into 2026 and 2027 — disclosed, but in a footnote to a 20-F table rather than on a call. The CFO confirmed the mechanics only when an analyst noticed the arithmetic: Jens Spiess asked on 2026-07-28 [6] why first-half capex of Ps.1.4bn exceeded first-half MDP investment of Ps.1.2bn, and the answer [8] was "we had some, carryover investments that were, from the previous MDP that were going to be completing 2026 and 2027. So that has to be added to the actual 2026 commitment. So for this year, we are expecting around Ps. 3.5 billion to Ps. 4 billion total investment for the year."

⚠️ And a statement that the company's own 20-F does not support on a like-for-like basis. On 2026-02-24 [2] the CEO said the new programme is "comparable in real terms to the investment considered in the 2021-2025 cycle", immediately followed by "this implies an improvement in capital efficiency per passenger". 20F-2025, filed nine weeks later, puts both figures in December-2025 pesos:

ProgrammeCommitted (Dec-2025 pesos)
2021–2025, as presented in the 20-F tablePs.16,311,829
2021–2025, including the postponed amounts — the 20-F's own "total amount of investments… for the period 2021-2025"Ps.17,583,375
2026–2030Ps.16,633,614

Against the presented total the new programme is +2.0% and "comparable" is fair. Against the total the 20-F itself calls the period's investment, it is −5.4%. The whole difference is the Ps.1,271,546 that was deferred — money OMA must still spend, inside the 2026–2030 window, and which is not counted in the 2026–2030 commitment. So the honest statement is: the next five years' total spend is the new programme plus the old programme's arrears, roughly Ps.17.9bn, and the "comparable, more efficient" framing rests on not counting the arrears. Both numbers come from the same filing; nothing here requires a view.

Buyback, row 6 — why it is met and not a miss. The Ps.1.5bn a year is a standing fondo de recompra authorisation, a ceiling the board may use, not an announced intention to buy. Scoring it as a broken promise would be wrong. It is worth writing down anyway: four consecutive years of authorising Ps.1.5bn and spending nothing, while paying out more than free cash flow in dividends (S2 below). This is a capital-structure preference, not a failure.

Dodge log

Opened this pass from the two most recent calls. OMA's Q&A is, on the whole, answered — the analysts get numbers more often than not, and the two questions that most needed an answer (the working-capital swing and the capex-versus-MDP gap) got real ones. Two dodges:

  • FY2025-Q4 (call 2026-02-24) · the Viva–Volaris consolidation · Gabriel Himelfarb Mustri · asked for OMA's view on the consolidation "in terms of routes and seat allocation"; answered "we're still assessing the potential impact. So it's still an analysis" — dossier-2026-09-25.md, turns [26]/[27]. ⚠️ It was not asked again, and not volunteered, on the July 2026 call. This is the single largest customer-concentration event in the file: three airlines are 81.5% of aeronautical revenue (dossier-2026-09-21.md) and Viva and Volaris together were 71% of traffic (2025-02-25 [2]). A merger of two carriers at that weight, with no contract obliging either to stay, is the thing the whole S0 concession variant's test 3 is about.
  • FY2025-Q4 (call 2026-02-24) · demand elasticity under the new tariffs · Enrique Cantú · asked how elasticity is being assessed on routes like Monterrey and the tourist destinations; answered with a belief — "we believe that the pass-through that we're implementing this year is not going to have a major impact in terms of elasticity" — with no measure, no method and no number — turns [52]/[54]/[55].

No topic was dodged in two consecutive quarters, so §3.1's thread-to-pull rule does not fire on this name yet. The Viva–Volaris answer is a note today; it becomes a finding if the next call returns "still assessing".


S2 — capital allocation and returns (2021–2025)

20F-2025 for 2023–2025, 20F-2024 for 2022, 20F-2023 for 2021. Thousands of pesos.

Where five years of operating cash flow went

202120222023202420255-yr
Operating cash flow4,446,8444,985,3366,334,7476,196,6697,445,94829,409,544
Property and equipment(101,333)(236,468)(403,985)(321,338)(163,325)(1,226,449)
Improvements in concession assets(1,824,557)(2,669,018)(2,659,596)(2,405,482)(2,539,273)(12,097,926)
Free cash flow before interest2,520,9542,079,8503,271,1663,469,8494,743,35016,085,169
Interest paid (financing, under IFRS)(364,324)(731,915)(1,092,918)(1,100,443)(1,208,107)(4,497,707)
Free cash flow after interest2,156,6301,347,9352,178,2482,369,4063,535,24311,587,462
Dividends paid(1,979,790)(6,615,798)(3,738,054)(4,220,653)(4,468,667)(21,022,962)
Share repurchases(474,852)0000(474,852)
Total returned2,454,6426,615,7983,738,0544,220,6534,468,66721,497,814
Net debt raised+3,186,033+2,500,000+500,000+600,000+2,150,000+8,936,033

Total returned is 134% of free cash flow before interest and 185% of free cash flow after interest. Even excluding 2022's Ps.6.6bn special dividend the four remaining years returned 161% of post-interest free cash flow. The gap was funded with Ps.8.9bn of net new debt.

⚠️ That reads worse than it is, and the reason is in the leverage. Long-term debt went Ps.10,676,708 (2023) → Ps.10,681,880 (2024) → Ps.11,788,359 (2025) while cash went Ps.2,576,256 → Ps.1,656,365 → Ps.3,098,092. Against 2025 operating income of Ps.8,940,999 plus depreciation of Ps.877,625, net debt is under 1× EBITDA and stable. Shareholders' equity still grew, Ps.9,838,502 (2023) → Ps.10,544,237 → Ps.11,426,632 (2025). This is a regulated concession levering modestly against a tariff-protected asset base, not a company distributing its substance.

What it earned

20232025
Operating income8,066,9098,940,999
Effective tax rate (from income before tax and consolidated net income)28.9%29.7%
NOPAT5,735,5726,285,522
Equity + long-term debt20,515,21023,214,991
ROIC28.0%27.1%

Incremental return, 2023 → 2025: ΔNOPAT Ps.549,950 ÷ ΔIC Ps.2,699,781 ≈ 20%. That is a regulated business earning roughly 27% on the capital the regulator obliges it to deploy, with new capital coming in at about 20%. The five-year ROIC series is not given because the 20-F carries only three years of income statement and the earlier filings were read for cash flow only — stated rather than estimated.

No acquisitions, no goodwill, no impairments in the window. The only inorganic activity discussed is prospective: two hotels and an industrial-park expansion (2026-02-24 [30], 2026-07-28 [32]).

What the bonus is paid on

Not disclosed at the level the §25 check needs. OMA is a foreign private issuer: it files no DEF 14A and no Form 4, and 20F-2025 Item 6.B gives aggregate director and officer compensation without the metric design of any incentive plan. The check cannot be performed on this name from the public record, so the §25 EPS-pay-plus-buybacks flag is recorded as not assessable rather than as not firing. (It is also moot in practice: there have been no buybacks since 2021.)

Verdict: compounds

27% ROIC on a regulated asset base, ~20% on incremental capital, capex fully funded from operations, leverage under 1× EBITDA and flat, equity growing, no acquisitions and no impairments. The two things that hold it short of an unqualified verdict are both worth watching rather than worrying about: distributions have exceeded free cash flow after interest in every year of the window, which is a policy that works only while the tariff framework keeps funding the capex; and the Ps.1.5bn buyback authorisation has gone unused for four years while the dividend has been the entire return.


Earnings quality

EQ: 2 flags. Neither is an accusation. Both are "a reader of this income statement will be misled unless they know" — which, for a concession, is where the earnings-quality risk actually lives.

1. Reported total revenue contains a zero-margin construction pass-through, and it is shrinking. Under IFRIC 12, OMA books construction revenue equal to construction cost. 20F-2025 shows cost of construction Ps.2,313,436 in 2025 against Ps.2,860,190 in 2024 and Ps.2,898,000 in 2023 (−19.1% then −1.3%), and total 2025 revenue of Ps.15,964,414 against aeronautical plus non-aeronautical revenue of Ps.13,650,978 — the difference is exactly the construction cost. So 14.5% of headline 2025 revenue carried no profit at all, and the line fell 19.1% in the year. Anyone reading a revenue growth rate off the top line is reading the capex schedule. Use aeronautical + non-aeronautical revenue; the 20-F itself does, and reports aeronautical services as 63.8% of total revenue but 74.7% of the sum of the two real lines. Flag — as a reading rule.

2. The major maintenance provision charges far more than it pays, and its size is set by a long-term interest rate. From the 2025 cash-flow statement: the provision charge was Ps.348,285 plus Ps.244,200 of present-value unwind, Ps.592,485 in total, against Ps.203,860 of cash major-maintenance payments — a non-cash excess of Ps.388,625, against Ps.164,883 in 2024 and Ps.128,563 in 2023. The direction is conservative: reported profit is being held below cash. But the CFO was explicit about what sets it (2026-02-24 [35]): the full-year figure "will depend on both construction costs as well as the interest rate — long-term interest rates used to discount that provision", and (2026-02-24 [21]) major maintenance is "approximately 17% of the total MDP for the next 5 years", provisioned at present value from today to execution. So a move in Mexican long rates changes reported profit with nothing happening in the airports, and the new five-year programme has just re-based the charge upward — Ps.260m was taken in 4Q25 alone and ~Ps.400m is guided for 2026. Flag.

Clean, with the locator:

  • Cash conversion. Operating cash flow ÷ consolidated net income: 1.26× (2023, 6,334,747 / 5,020,426), 1.26× (2024, 6,196,669 / 4,936,224), 1.39× (2025, 7,445,948 / 5,365,288). Improving, and comfortably above 1 in every year.
  • Receivables. The cash-flow statement's working-capital lines show trade receivables absorbing Ps.38,056 (2023), Ps.565,187 (2024) and only Ps.169,132 (2025) — the 2024 build reversed rather than compounding. The 20-F states the 2025 weighted average payment term at 55 days, inside the 30–60 day contractual range.
  • No stock-based compensation of any size, no goodwill, no acquisitions, no impairments, no restatement.
  • The concession-tax increase is recoverable and was recovered. The rate went from 5% to 9%; under the 2023 tariff regulation the excess is added to the reference value for the next revision, and the CFO confirmed on 2026-02-24 [24] that "that excess is already being recovered through a maximum tariff starting January 1 of this year". It is a timing item, not a margin loss.

What this changes on the scorecard

  • S8 ⬜ → ✅ reliable, 7 rows, 1 beat / 4 met / 2 withdrawn, with the two withdrawn rows named as the finding and the MDP arrears quantified.
  • S2 stays ✅; gains the capital-allocation table and the verdict compounds, with the pay check recorded as not assessable (FPI, no proxy).
  • S3 stays ✅ (gate-minimum); gains EQ: 2 flags, and its "Zero transcripts read" deviation is closed — six market data calls are on disk and were read.
  • Kill criteria: two added, both from this pass's evidence.
  • S7 valuation: no guidance haircut — there is almost no guidance to haircut — but the base case must not carry a 2026 commercial-revenue step-up. See the scorecard's · valuation line.
Full notes, 21 Sep 2026 11 min read

OMAB — dossier, 2026-09-21

Slot names-ai-capex-2, taken as a Tier 0 promotion: queue.json promoted OMAB on the 6-K filed 2026-09-21, and under the skill's promotion rule a promoted name with no scorecard.md replaces the last member of the batch — so it displaced QCOM, which moved to a new slot names-ai-capex-2b. Model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine; nothing here is human-verified. Sources and locators are in relationships.yaml.

Price reference: $97.45 close, 2026-09-18 (market data get_latest_stock_price NASDAQ:OMAB; volume 252,609 ADS). Each ADS represents eight Series B shares (stated in the 2Q26 results release), so the 385.3m shares outstanding are 48.16m ADS-equivalents → roughly $4.7bn market capitalisation. market data puts FY2025 enterprise value at MXN 105.9bn. Peso/dollar rate used below is 17.47, derived from the company's own pairing of Ps.3.80 EPS with US$1.74 per ADS in the 2Q26 release.

S1 — Source

watchlist (owner, Apple Stocks, 2026-09-20), cluster latam_infra, coverage sec_fpi, cik

  1. Promoted by Tier 0 on 2026-09-21 (queue.json: "6-K filed 2026-09-21 (episodic report

(foreign private issuer))", priority 3). The promotion has been removed from queue.json.

S2 — Kill test

OMA reports under IFRS in Mexican pesos. The XBRL company-facts feed is not usable here — its series stops at 2024-12-31 and mixes MXN and USD unit labels across tags (Borrowings in MXN, LongtermBorrowings in USD for the same year), so every figure below is read from the filings themselves instead.

YearTotal revenues Ps.kAero + non-aero Ps.kNet income Ps.kPassengers m
2023————
2024———26.5
202515,964,414 (US$886,912k)13,650,978 (US$758,388k)5,365,288 (US$298,072k)28.8 (+8.5%)

"Total revenues" includes construction-services revenue recognised under the concession accounting (Ps.2,313,436k in 2025) — a non-cash pass-through against an equal expense. The line that matters is aeronautical plus non-aeronautical, Ps.13,650,978k, and net income of Ps.5,365,288k against it is a 39.3% net margin. Aeronautical services — the regulated, price-capped part — were 63.8% of 2025 total revenues (60.6% in 2024, 61.8% in 2023).

Most recent quarter (2Q26, results released 2026-07-27):

  • Passenger traffic +0.4% to 7.2m, on 0.3% fewer seats offered. Full-year 2025 was +8.5%.
  • Aeronautical plus non-aeronautical revenue +5.4%; Adjusted EBITDA +6.2% to Ps.2,722m.
  • Consolidated net income Ps.1,478m, +10.2%; EPS Ps.3.80, US$1.74 per ADS.
  • Operating cash flow Ps.1,759m; MDP and strategic investment Ps.949m; financing used Ps.2,059m.
  • Cash and equivalents Ps.2,577m at 2026-06-30.

Leverage. Total indebtedness Ps.10,676,708k (2023) → Ps.11,281,880k (2024) → Ps.13,428,359k (2025), +19% in the last year. Against Ps.2,577m of cash and roughly Ps.10.5-10.9bn of annualised adjusted EBITDA, net debt is about 1.0x — comfortable, and the maturity profile was pushed out on 2026-07-16 with a Ps.3.0bn long-term note issue that prepaid Ps.1.7bn of short-term bank debt and repaid the Ps.640m OMA 23L notes due 2026-07-24. No derivatives outstanding. The 1.0x figure pairs 2025 debt with 2026 cash and annualised 2026 EBITDA; the dates do not match and it is an approximation, not a reported ratio.

Survives comfortably. This is a regulated concession with a ~39% net margin, ~1x leverage and a five-year tariff framework already approved. The risk is not survival; it is the regulator, the three airlines, and the one airport.

  • Share count / dilution: 48,163,222 ADS-equivalents, unchanged across 2024 and 2025 in market data's series. A buyback programme exists (the 2026-09-18 release notes it "did not operate during this period"). No dilution issue.
  • Analyst coverage count: not obtained.

S3 — Filings, gate-minimum

Read: the 2025 20-F (Item 3.D risk factors in full for regulation, operations and shareholders; Item 4 business and Monterrey; the indebtedness table; the concession and Master Development Program framework), the 2Q26 results 6-K, the 2026-09-21 6-K that promoted the name, and the EDGAR form census. No proxy exists (FPI) and no Form 4s are filed — the census since 2023 shows 20-F, 6-K, Form 3 and two Schedule 13 filings only, which is why the insider-pattern row of the gate-minimum table is skipped rather than failed. No transcript was read.

The three biggest risks management itself discloses

  1. The regulator sets most of the revenue, and has moved it before. Aeronautical services were 63.8% of 2025 revenues. "Following the announcement by the Mexican Federal Civil Aviation Agency of the amendment on October 4, 2023 our stock price on the Mexican Stock Exchange declined by 26%" (20-F, Item 3.D). Maximum tariffs are now fixed through 2030 — "On December 18, 2025, the Ministry of Infrastructure, Communications and Transportation approved the maximum tariffs we can charge at our airports for the five-year period from January 1, 2026, through December 31, 2030" — but tariffs are also cut every year by an efficiency adjustment the Ministry determines, and the framework beyond 2030 is unknown. The concession itself can be terminated if sanctions are imposed more than twice for the same violation within ten years.
  2. Three airlines are four-fifths of the regulated revenue, with no obligation to stay. "Of the total aeronautical revenues generated at our airports in 2025, VivaAerobus represented 41.4%, Volaris represented 21.5% and Aeroméxico and its affiliates represented 18.6%" — 81.5% between them — and the filing continues "None of our contracts with our airline customers require them to con[tinue]". A single carrier's fleet or network decision is a company-level event.
  3. One airport is the company. "In 2025, our Monterrey airport accounted for approximately 54.3% of our terminal passenger traffic, 39.3% of our total revenues and 46.0% of the sum of our aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues" (20-F, Item 4). Thirteen concessions, one that matters. Mexico-specific risks the 20-F also names — crime and extortion, demonstrations, minority shareholder protections weaker than in the US — attach disproportionately to that one asset.

Red-flag sweep

  • Going concern: not applicable — ~39% net margin, ~1x leverage.
  • Related party: the Technical Assistance Agreement with SETA/VINCI is the standing related-party arrangement and is disclosed as such; no transaction outside it surfaced in the sections read.
  • Restatement / auditor change: none in the form census since 2023 (20-F, 6-K, Form 3, two Schedule 13 filings). Form census, not a full-text sweep — see "Evidence that was thin".
  • Unexplained market activity: see the promoting event below. This is the one open red flag.

The promoting event

The 6-K filed 2026-09-21 (dated 2026-09-18) answers a Mexican Stock Exchange request about that day's trading volume. OMA "informs that it currently has no knowledge of any event that could be causing the breach of the traded volume parameter of Mexico's Stock Exchanges", adds that it is not aware that any director or relevant executive officer participated in the trading, and states that the repurchase programme did not operate during the period.

Corroboration from the other side of the listing: the ADR traded 252,609 shares on 2026-09-18 against a FINRA-reported average daily volume of 75,452 at the 2026-08-31 settlement — about 3.3x normal, so whatever happened was visible on Nasdaq as well as on the BMV. Short interest is negligible (228,738 ADS, 0.47% of ADS outstanding), so this is not a squeeze. No explanation exists in the public record as of 2026-09-21. The obvious hypothesis given the register — a block moving among the VINCI entities or out of them — is a hypothesis, not a finding, and would surface as a Schedule 13 amendment or a further 6-K.

S5 — Ownership

Control is a share class, not a majority. SETA holds all of the Series BB shares, 12.9% of capital stock, and with them the right to nominate, appoint and remove certain directors and officers plus veto rights — rights that persist "As long as SETA retains at least 7.65% of our capital stock in the form of Series BB". The VINCI Entities own 100% of SETA and also hold, directly, Series B and BB representing 14.8% of capital stock, with CONCESSOC holding Series B representing a further 15.1%. So roughly 29.9% of the economics carries effective control, and the 20-F says outright that those interests "may differ from those of our other shareholders and can be contrary to the preferences and expectations of our other shareholders". Termination of the Technical Assistance Agreement converts the BB shares and ends the special rights.

Institutional ADS register (threespread.py holders OMAB returned zero 13F filers for CUSIP P49530101, so this is the Equibles fallback, 13F date 2026-06-30): BlackRock 1,452,940 ADS (24.40% of institutional 13F ADS); Nuveen 625,447; State Street 415,077; Itaú Unibanco 291,193; Morgan Stanley 277,272; Russell 199,390; American Century 192,829; CPPIB 149,370. The entire 13F register is 5,955,211 ADS across 166 institutions — about 12% of the 48.16m ADS-equivalents. US institutional ownership is a minority of this stock; the rest trades on the BMV.

Schedule 13 history: one SC 13G filed 2026-01-08 for the 2025-12-31 period (by the filer whose CIK also files BlackRock's filings), and a 13D/13D-A chain in 2022-2023. Nothing filed around the 2026-09-18 volume event as of this run.

Insider pattern: skipped — an FPI files no Form 4. The census carries 17 Form 3s and no Form 4.

Short interest: 228,738 ADS at 2026-08-31, +20,924, 0.47% of ADS outstanding, 3.0 days to cover on 75,452 average daily volume. Nobody is short this.

What hangs over it: no US shelf — the EDGAR census since 2023 is 20-F, 6-K, Form 3 and Schedule 13 filings only, with no F-3. Debt is raised in the Mexican market instead (the July 2026 Ps.3.0bn notes). The overhang is the 29.9% VINCI position, not a registration statement.

S8 — Valuation and sizing ⏳ OPEN (user)

No structured guidance exists for this issuer in the rungs used, so the model is built from reported results: 2025 actuals, the 2Q26 trajectory, and the tariff framework fixed to 2030.

Model line2026E2027E
Aero + non-aero revenue Ps.m~14,470 (+6%, tracking 2Q26's +5.4%)~15,630 (+8%)
Net income Ps.m~5,794 (+8%, below 2Q26's +10.2%)~6,315 (+9%)
EPS, Ps. per share (385.3m shares)~15.04~16.39
EPS, US$ per ADS (×8 ÷ 17.47)~$6.89~$7.51
Multiple at $97.45~14.1x~13.0x

For cross-reference, market data's FY2025 multiples on the same listing: P/E 17.65x, EV/EBITDA 10.79x, EV/EBIT 11.85x, P/FCF 19.88x, P/B 8.38x. Price-to-tangible-book is negative because the balance sheet is concession intangibles — that ratio is meaningless here and should not be used.

Bear / base / bull on the 2027 line: bear — traffic stays flat, the annual efficiency adjustment bites, EPS ~$6.50 per ADS and an 11x multiple on a concession with 2030 reset risk gives ~$72; base — the table, $7.51 at 14x gives ~$105; bull — traffic reverts to the 6-8% of 2023-2025 as capacity returns, EPS ~$8.30 at 17x gives ~$141.

The contrast with the other two names in this slot is the point worth recording. MRVL and ARM both model to a base case below the traded price; OMAB models to a base case slightly above it. It is a regulated monopoly at ~14x earnings with ~1x leverage, five years of tariff visibility and a traffic line that has just stalled. Whether that stall is cyclical or structural is the whole question, and this run does not answer it.

Proposed buy price and proposed size are owner-only and are not stated here. Sizing note: liquidity is the binding constraint, not valuation. FINRA-reported average daily ADR volume is 75,452 shares — roughly $7.4m a day. That is three orders of magnitude below MRVL's turnover and it caps any position long before conviction does.

S9 — Monitoring

  • Next earnings: 3Q26 results, expected late October 2026 — derived from filing cadence (3Q25 results 6-K filed 2025-10-24), not from a calendar feed.
  • Filing feed: the Tier 0 EDGAR sweep covers cik 1378239, and OMA's 6-K stream is unusually dense — 125 6-Ks since 2023, including monthly passenger-traffic reports. This is the best-instrumented name in the slot.
  • Leading indicator between quarters: the monthly traffic 6-K. Traffic went from +8.5% for 2025 to +0.4% in 2Q26 on 0.3% fewer seats; one monthly print either confirms the stall or ends it, and it arrives eleven times a year between results.
  • Trigger that converts this to a buy: two consecutive monthly traffic prints at or above +4% year on year, and the 2030 tariff framework unamended, and a price at or below ~12x the model 2027 EPS per ADS — about $90, roughly 8% below the 2026-09-18 close. Failing that, the cheaper trigger is the opposite one: a tariff-amendment announcement of the 2023 kind, which took 26% off the price in a day and would be the moment to look rather than to leave.
  • Also watch, immediately: any Schedule 13D/G amendment or follow-up 6-K explaining the 2026-09-18 volume breach.

Evidence that was thin, and why

  • The XBRL company-facts feed is unusable for this issuer — the series ends at 2024-12-31 and unit labels are inconsistent between MXN and USD within the same fiscal year. Every financial figure above therefore comes from the filing text, which means 2023 and 2024 comparatives are incomplete in the S2 table rather than wrong.
  • No earnings-call transcript was read and no structured guidance exists for this issuer in the rungs used, so the S8 model rests entirely on reported results and my own growth assumptions. They are labelled as assumptions in the table.
  • The institutional register came from the Equibles fallback, not 3spread — threespread.py holders OMAB returned zero filers for CUSIP P49530101.
  • No efts.sec.gov full-text sweep for restatement or auditor-change language; the red-flag read is a form census.
  • The peso/dollar rate of 17.47 is derived from the company's own pairing of Ps.3.80 EPS with US$1.74 per ADS in the 2Q26 release, not from an FX source. Every dollar figure in S8 inherits whatever error that carries, and none of it is hedged for the peso.
  • No analyst coverage count.
  • S0, S4, S6 and S7 are not attempted. OMAB belongs to the financials-global cluster, whose cluster pass has not run; the skill forbids improvising cluster stages per name.