INTCIntel Corporation
Industry AI semis Updated 24 Sep 2026
The idea
The only name in this slot whose base case sits well BELOW the traded price. ~$655bn of market value after the August equity sale, on FY2025 revenue of $52.9bn and no net income, is paying for an external foundry anchor customer that management would not name when asked directly — three weeks before selling $23bn of stock. Reported GAAP EPS is currently inversely geared to the share price through the $15.6bn Escrowed Shares derivative, so the headline loss and the price move together for reasons unrelated to the business.
Events to watch
- Intel Foundry third-party revenue in Note 2 of each 10-Q ($293m in Q2 2026 vs $22m a year earlier — the direct measure of the thesis)
- 14A PDK 0.9 confirmed complete at the October Q3 call, risk production H2 2027, volume 2028
- whether Q3 carries another multi-billion Escrowed Shares mark
- gross margin staying 'comfortably into the 40s'
- a third capital raise before an anchor customer signs
How we got the target
Dossier model table: FY2028 revenue $65bn/$81bn/$95bn at 40%/48%/53% gross margin, opex ~$18.5bn, net interest ~$2.5bn, 12% tax while the domestic valuation allowance persists, ~5.5bn shares including the escrow release; EPS $0.78/$2.85/$4.50 at 25x/25x/30x. Time frame: FY2028 (Dec 2028).
Target: from the research notes. Prices: market data get_latest_stock_price, close of 2026-09-22 (fetched 2026-09-23)
What would prove it wrong
7 warning signsIntel Foundry's external revenue does not leave the hundreds of millions.
Details
It was $293m in Q2 2026 against $22m a year earlier — real growth, and still ~1.8% of the quarter's $16,128m. The whole foundry case is that an outside anchor customer signs. The 10-Q discloses the number every quarter. If it is still under $500m a quarter when 14A reaches risk production in H2 2027, the external-foundry thesis has not happened, whatever the PDK milestones say.
The 14A schedule slips.
Details
The CEO put dates on the record: PDK 0.9 "on track for October" 2026, risk production H2 2027, committed volume production 2028. He also said capex follows customers rather than leading them. A slip in any of the three is the cleanest falsifier this name has, because management chose the milestones.
The Escrowed Shares mark keeps growing and nobody adjusts for it.
Details
The derivative liability went $2.7bn (2025-12-27) → $15.6bn (2026-06-27) and the loss is driven by Intel's own share price. Reported EPS is now inversely geared to the stock. If Q3 2026 carries another multi-billion mark and consensus keeps treating GAAP EPS as the number, the price and the reported loss will keep moving in opposite directions for reasons that have nothing to do with the business.
Gross margin falls back out of the 40s.
Details
The CFO staked the year on it: "our number one goal this year … was to get gross margins comfortably into the 40s in every quarter". Q2 was 40.4%. A quarter in the 30s, absent a named one-off, says the 18A mix is not earning its cost.
The annual spending commitments keep being re-set upward (added 2026-09-24 from S8).
Details
The FY2026 opex guide went $16.0bn → "likely to be higher" → $16.5bn and the FY2026 capex guide went "flat to down" → "more than $20 billion", both inside six months and both from the CFO. A third upward revision to either — or a 2027 opex guide above $16.5bn — says the cost discipline that the whole turnaround case rests on is not a constraint but a talking point. The figure is disclosed every quarter on the call and in the January release's reconciliation table.
Five years of capital destruction does not stop compounding (added 2026-09-24 from S2).
Details
Incremental return on the $27.4bn of invested capital added FY2021–FY2025 is about −70%. The testable version: FY2026 and FY2027 together must produce positive GAAP operating income and positive adjusted free cash flow before partner contributions and government incentives are netted off. If the only positive free-cash-flow figure Intel can print is the one struck after $6bn+ of third-party capital, the business has not started earning; it has started sharing.
Capital keeps being raised into flat product revenue.
Details
$6.5bn of senior notes in Q2 2026 to refinance the $14.2bn Apollo buy-in, then ~$23.0bn of equity at $95.00 in August, then a fresh shelf. On the 2026-07-23 call the CFO said Intel "may need to tap the capital markets"; eighteen days later it did. A third raise before Foundry has an external anchor is the pattern, not an event.
How far along
7 of 10 steps done · 3 done in a group review
Next step
read the DEF 14A filed 2026-03-23. This pass located it and did not read it, so insider ownership %, the compensation structure headline and what the bonus is paid on are all unfilled — and they matter more than usual here, because the U.S. government is a large holder that has agreed to vote as the board recommends, which makes the proxy the only place the governance arithmetic is written down. Second: the Q3 2026 call (guided for October) is the first read on whether the Escrowed Shares mark reverses.
Needs your decision
S6 product test / expert call, S7 conviction.
Failed checks
none. S0/S4/S7 are not closed by design (cluster stages, carried forward). S2's capital-allocation verdict is destroys and S8 carries two withdrawn spending commitments — neither is a failed gate on its own; both are kill criteria below.
Who runs it
The Front OfficeStep by step
- S0How it does as AI gets cheapDone in a group review
carry-forward (cluster: AI-capex complex — cluster pass, 2026-09-20)
that pass gave a cluster-level verdict, not a per-member score. Owner checks dropped 2026-09-21 (README §Stage 0 override).
- S1Where the idea came fromDone
watchlist (owner, Apple Stocks, 2026-09-20), coverage sec_domestic, cik 50863, cluster ai_semis; no Tier 0 promotion.
- S2Quick deal-breaker checkDone
FY2025 rev $52,853m (-0.5% on FY2024 $53,101m. FY2023 $54,228m), GM 34.8%, operating LOSS $2,214m, net loss attributable to Intel $267m.
Full notes
H1 2026 turns: rev $29,705m (+16.4%), GM 39.9%, and Q2 2026 posts operating INCOME of $1,796m — the first positive operating quarter in the series read here. Liquidity is not the question: $29,727m cash + short-term investments against $50,537m total debt, OCF $9,697m FY2025 and $8,102m in H1 2026 alone, capex down to $14,646m FY2025 from $23,944m FY2024.
⚠️ The share count is the trap. Diluted WA shares 4,212m (FY2023) → 4,280m (FY2024) → 4,530m (FY2025) → 5,104m (Q2 2026), and on 2026-08-10 Intel sold 242,105,262 more at $95.00 (~$23.0bn) — a five-year count up ~27% with 143m escrowed shares and a 241m-share DOC warrant still outside it.
⚠️ Q2 2026 reports a net loss attributable to Intel of $11,033m on operating INCOME of $1,796m. The whole gap is one non-cash line: a $12.5bn mark on the Escrowed Shares derivative, and it got bigger because the stock went up. · capital allocation (2026-09-24, dossier-2026-09-24.md): destroys. FY2021-25 capex $107,917m = 145% of $74,345m of operating cash flow, with $16,328m of dividends and $2,415m of buybacks paid out of that deficit, funded by $25,888m of gross debt, $6.5-14.6bn a year of partner and government capital, and asset sales. ROIC 12.7% (FY2021, operating income $19,456m at the 13% non-GAAP tax rate on $133,492m of invested capital) → -1.4% (FY2025, a $2,214m operating loss on $160,866m); incremental return on the $27,374m added ≈ -70%. Goodwill impairment $2,984m (FY2024) plus a $9,925m DTA valuation allowance. Shares outstanding +23.9% in five years to 2026-06-27 and ~+29.9% after the August sale, with no buyback against $14,237m of SBC. Dividend suspended Q4 2024, still $0.
- S3Reading the company's reportsDone
(gate-minimum)
FY2025 10-K risk factors + MD&A; Q2 2026 10-Q MD&A delta, Notes 3/4/10/11. DEF 14A 2026-03-23 located but not read (see.
⚠️); Q2 2026 transcript turns 11-57 of 57 read Q&A-first per SKILL §3.1; Form 4 cadence via 3spread (84 filings in 365 days). Three disclosed risks named with locators in dossier-2026-09-23.md. EQ: 4 flags (2026-09-24) — a new FY2025 add-back that removes the Escrowed Shares mark ($1,796m / $0.40, geared to Intel's own share price); restructuring in its third straight year ($6,970m FY2024, $2,191m FY2025) with $0.3bn budgeted into FY2026; SBC $2,434m (4.6% of revenue) against negative adjusted FCF of $(1,612)m; and that FCF measure is struck after $1,577m of government incentives and $4,891m of net partner contributions (FY2024: $14.6bn, over half of gross capex). Mild: DSO 22.9 → 26.5 days FY2023-25, reversing to ~22.8 in Q2 2026. Clean: accruals -4.9% of average assets (earnings worse than cash, not better); SBC add-back down 29%. Capitalised software / contract costs: not disclosed, not clean.
- S4Rivals and suppliersDone in a group review
carry-forward (cluster: AI-capex complex — cluster pass, 2026-09-20)
- S5Who owns the stockDone
13F register at 2026-06-30 (3,591 institutions, 3,867m shares), 13D/G, Form 4 cadence, FINRA short interest, and the August 2026 shelf + equity sale.
⚠️ NVIDIA is the 4th largest 13F holder of Intel — 214,776,632 shares, $29,989m, 5.55% of institutional shares — with SOFTBANK GROUP 9th at 86,956,522 shares. The U.S. government's stake does not appear on 13F at all; it is not a 13F filer, so the register understates the true holder list.
⚠️ Short interest rose from 120,963,181 shares (2026-07-15) to 152,248,752 (2026-08-31), +26%, across the equity offering.
⚠️
threespread.py holders INTCreturned the WRONG ISSUER (MariaDB plc). Root cause found and the script fixed in this slot — see the tool note. Post-fix: 2,556 filers, NVDA and SOFTBANK bothheld(+0 QoQ), Sixth Street / Schwab identical-share defect present here too, and ten large prior holders have no 2026-06-30 13F ingested yet — no exit is read from any of them. - S6What workers and customers sayDone
carry-forward (cluster: AI-capex complex — cluster pass 2: S6 for 41 names, S0/S4/S7 for three, 2026-09-21, §INTC row: 18A yields below profitable levels, Apple and Nvidia second-sourcing as "hedges, not migrations"). Product test / expert call open OPEN (user)
- S7The case for it, and pricesDone in a group review
carry-forward (cluster: AI-capex complex — cluster pass, 2026-09-20)
conviction open OPEN (user) · valuation (bear/base/bull; moved from S8 2026-09-23): $123.86 close 2026-09-22; ~5,286m shares after the August sale gives ~$655bn of market value on FY2025 revenue of $52.9bn and no net income.
Full notes
The out-year model in dossier-2026-09-23.md puts BASE at ~$71 and BULL at ~$135 on FY2028 earnings — i.e. the traded price sits above the base case and just under the bull case. No haircut applied (2026-09-24): S8 scores reliable, not over-promises. But the cost side of that base case is now taken from the revised figures, not the original commitments — FY2026 non-GAAP opex ~$16.5bn (not $16.0bn) and FY2026 capex "more than $20 billion" (not flat-to-down), both withdrawn and re-set upward inside six months.
- S8Do the bosses keep their word?Done
14 rows: 6 beat, 3 met, 3 missed, 2 withdrawn
reliable. Current team (Tan CEO from 2025-03-18, Zinsner CFO throughout) made 8 of 14: 4 beat, 1 met, 1 missed, 2 withdrawn; the other 5 are Gelsinger's (resigned 2024-12-01) and 1 is half Holthaus's (left 2026-03-01)
Full notes
Quarterly revenue/EPS guides beaten five in a row; both misses are EPS point estimates broken by impairments disclosed in the same release.
⚠️ Both withdrawn rows are the current CFO's, both annual spending commitments, and both moved up inside six months — FY2026 opex $16.0bn → "likely to be higher" (call 2026-04-23) → $16.5bn (call 2026-07-23); FY2026 capex "down" → "flat to down" → "flat" (2026-04-23) → "more than $20 billion" (2026-07-23) against FY2025's $17,672m. Dodge roll-up: 7 dodges over two calls, two topics dodged in both. dossier-2026-09-24.md
- S9What to watch nextDone
trigger written. Tier 0 EDGAR sweep covers the feed (cik 50863)
Sources and notes
Sources 10 documents
- Full notes, 24 Sep 2026
- Full notes, 23 Sep 2026
- AI-capex complex — cluster pass, 2026-09-20
- AI-capex complex — cluster pass 2: S6 for 41 names, S0/S4/S7 for three, 2026-09-21
- EDGAR filings CIK 50863
| Short name | Document | Where it came from | Read on |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10K-FY25 | Intel 10-K for FY ended 2025-12-27, filed 2026-01-23 | https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/50863/000005086326000011/intc-20251227.htm | 2026-09-23 |
| 10Q-Q2-26 | Intel 10-Q for the quarter ended 2026-06-27, filed 2026-07-24 | https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/50863/000005086326000157/intc-20260627.htm | 2026-09-23 |
| 8K-2026-08-12 | Intel 8-K filed 2026-08-12 — Items 7.01/8.01, the August 2026 common stock offering | https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/50863/000119312526346806/d117670d8k.htm | 2026-09-23 |
| 13F-Q2-26-EQ | Top institutional holders by manager, 13F report date 2026-06-30 (3,591 institutions, 3,867,398,113 shares) | Equibles GetTopHolders INTC — https://equibles.com/stocks/intc/holdings | 2026-09-23 |
| SI-FINRA-EQ | FINRA bi-monthly short interest, settlements 2026-05-15 to 2026-08-31 | Equibles GetShortInterest INTC — https://equibles.com/stocks/intc/short-interest | 2026-09-23 |
| CALL-Q2-26 | Q2 2026 Intel Corporation Earnings Conference Call, 2026-07-23 — turns 11-57 of 57 | Equibles GetEarningsCallTranscript INTC 2026 Q2 — https://equibles.com/stocks/intc/earnings-calls | 2026-09-23 |
| 3S-HOLDERS | 3spread 13F holders for ticker INTC — resolved to the WRONG ISSUER (MariaDB plc, CUSIP G5920M100), 0 filers | python ledger/research/tools/threespread.py holders INTC | 2026-09-23 |
| 3S-OWNERS | 3spread Schedule 13D/13G filings under cik 50863 — all 15 rows have INTEL CORP as the FILER, not the subject | python ledger/research/tools/threespread.py owners INTC | 2026-09-23 |
| 3S-INSIDERS | 3spread Form 4 filings for INTC since 2025-09-23 — 84 filings | python ledger/research/tools/threespread.py insiders INTC --days 365 | 2026-09-23 |
| EDGAR-INDEX | Intel EDGAR filing index (CIK 50863) — 10-K 2026-01-23, 10-Q 2026-07-24, DEF 14A 2026-03-23, S-3ASR 2026-08-10 | https://data.sec.gov/submissions/CIK0000050863.json | 2026-09-23 |
Links to other companies 26 links
| From | Link | To | Date | Where it says so |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. Department of Commerce | holds | INTC | 2026-06-27 | 10Q-Q2-26 — Note 4: Earnings (Loss) Per Share and Stockholders' Equity — 'Escrowed Shares Issued to the U.S. Government' |
| U.S. Department of Commerce | warrant holder | INTC | 2026-06-27 | 10Q-Q2-26 — Note 4: Earnings (Loss) Per Share and Stockholders' Equity |
| INTC | issuer of | U.S. Department of Commerce | 2026-06-27 | 10Q-Q2-26 — MD&A — 'Escrowed Shares Issued to the U.S. Government' |
| U.S. Department of Commerce | governance structure | INTC | 2025-12-27 | 10K-FY25 — Risk Factors — 'There are a number of risks and uncertainties associated with the U.S. government's acquisition of significant equity interests in us.' |
| INTC | litigation watch | U.S. Department of Commerce | 2026-06-27 | 10Q-Q2-26 — Note 15: Contingencies — 'Litigation Related to Warrant and Common Stock Agreement between Intel and the U.S. Department of Commerce' |
| INTC | context | U.S. Department of Commerce | 2025-12-27 | 10K-FY25 — MD&A — discussion of the U.S. Government Agreement accounting conclusion |
| NVIDIA Corporation | holds | INTC | 2026-06-30 | 13F-Q2-26-EQ — row 4 of the top-holders table, report date 2026-06-30 |
| SoftBank Group Corp. | holds | INTC | 2026-06-30 | 13F-Q2-26-EQ — row 9 of the top-holders table, report date 2026-06-30 |
| BlackRock, Inc. | holds | INTC | 2026-06-30 | 13F-Q2-26-EQ — rows 1, 2, 3 and 8 of the top-holders table |
| VANGUARD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLC | holds | INTC | 2026-06-30 | 13F-Q2-26-EQ — row 2 of the top-holders table |
| STATE STREET CORP | holds | INTC | 2026-06-30 | 13F-Q2-26-EQ — row 3 of the top-holders table |
| Invesco Ltd. | holds | INTC | 2026-06-30 | 13F-Q2-26-EQ — row 5 of the top-holders table |
| Apollo (Ireland SCIP 49% minority holder until 2026-04-08) | financing partner | INTC | 2026-04-08 | 10Q-Q2-26 — Note 3: Non-Controlling Interests — Ireland SCIP |
| Brookfield (Arizona SCIP co-investor) | financing partner | INTC | 2025-12-27 | 10K-FY25 — Risk Factors — 'Our alternative financing arrangements and pursuit of government grants involve risks and may not be successful.' |
| INTC | event | INTC | 2026-08-12 | 8K-2026-08-12 — Item 8.01, Other Events |
| Intel Foundry's external anchor customer (none named in any filing or on the Q2 2026 call) | customer of | INTC | 2026-06-27 | 10Q-Q2-26 — Note 2: Operating Segments — Intel Foundry segment revenue |
| Fortinet (security ASIC customer) | customer of | INTC | 2026-07-23 | CALL-Q2-26 — Q&A, Aaron Rakers (Wells Fargo) exchange, turns 52-57 |
| Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. | competitor | INTC | 2026-07-23 | CALL-Q2-26 — Q&A, Joe Moore (Morgan Stanley) exchange, turns 11-16 |
| Arm Holdings plc | partner and competitor | INTC | 2026-07-23 | CALL-Q2-26 — Q&A, Joe Moore (Morgan Stanley) exchange, turns 11-16 |
| SK hynix | context | INTC | 2026-07-23 | 10Q-Q2-26 — Note 9: Acquisitions and Divestitures |
| Mobileye (majority-owned, consolidated) | governance structure | INTC | 2026-06-27 | 10Q-Q2-26 — Note 10: Goodwill |
| Altera (51% sold, deconsolidated 2025-09-12) | acquired | INTC | 2025-09-12 | 10Q-Q2-26 — Note 2: Operating Segments — 'All Other' category |
| Lip-Bu Tan (CEO) | officer of | INTC | 2026-07-23 | CALL-Q2-26 — Q&A, Vivek Arya (BofA) exchange, turns 33-40 |
| David A. Zinsner (CFO) | officer of | INTC | 2026-07-23 | CALL-Q2-26 — Q&A, Vivek Arya and CJ Muse exchanges, turns 33-51 |
| INTC | context | INTC | 2026-08-31 | SI-FINRA-EQ — settlements 2026-07-15 through 2026-08-31 |
| INTC | context | INTC | 2026-09-23 | 3S-HOLDERS — header line of the holders table: '# MariaDB plc (INTC, CUSIP G5920M100)' |
History 3 entries
- 2026-09-23 — first pass, slot
names-ai-capex-4, model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine. S1, S2, S3 (gate-minimum), S5 and S9 closed; S0/S4/S7 carried forward from the 2026-09-20 cluster file and S6 from the 2026-09-21 one; S8 modelled and left open. Evidence and access limits in dossier-2026-09-23.md. Nothing here is human-verified. - 2026-09-23 — stage redefinition, owner decision (WATCHLIST_PLAN.md §25): S8 is now Management credibility and is not yet run for this name; the old S8 valuation figures moved to the
valuation:line under S7, and any proposed buy price or position size was removed (the pipeline no longer drafts either). No research was redone. S2 capital allocation and S3 earnings quality are also pending, in the same backfill slot. - 2026-09-24 — backfill, slot
backfill-2026-09-23-4, model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine. S8 closed ✅ reliable (14 scored rows, 8 by the current team, both locators on every row); S2 gained its capital-allocation table — verdict destroys; S3 gained its earnings-quality check — 4 flags, ✅ kept at gate-minimum. Glyphs on S2 and S3 unchanged: the kill test still passes on liquidity and the H1 2026 turn, and S3's three-disclosed-risks gate was already met. Two kill criteria added (upward re-setting of the annual spending guides; incremental return staying negative), the ⚠️ line rewritten to carry the two twice-dodged topics, and the S7 valuation line told to take its cost side from the revised figures. Evidence in dossier-2026-09-24.md; 0 Equibles calls, 0 market data calls, EDGAR and the transcript archive only. Nothing here is human-verified.
Full notes, 24 Sep 2026 18 min read
INTC — dossier, 2026-09-24 (backfill: S8, S2 capital allocation, S3 earnings quality)
Slot backfill-2026-09-23-4. Model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine; nothing here is human-verified. This file holds only the three checks added on 2026-09-23 (WATCHLIST_PLAN.md §25) plus the transcript section for the call read for them. Every other stage stands as written in dossier-2026-09-23.md. Anything from background knowledge is marked [background].
Sources this pass. EDGAR only, User-Agent ddboard-research gorkem@celebico.com (CIK 50863): the eight quarterly earnings releases (8-K Item 2.02, Ex. 99.1) filed 2024-08-01, 2024-10-31, 2025-01-30, 2025-04-24, 2025-07-24, 2025-10-23, 2026-01-22, 2026-04-23 and 2026-07-23; the six Item 5.02 8-Ks in the window (2024-12-03, 2025-03-14, 2025-09-08, 2025-11-12, 2026-04-03, 2026-04-24); XBRL companyfacts for CIK 50863. Transcript from the archive ledger/research/_transcripts/INTC/FY2026-Q1 (market data, call date 2026-04-23 per _transcripts/index.json); the FY2026-Q2 call was read in dossier-2026-09-23.md. Equibles: 0 calls (EDGAR answered every row). market data: 0 calls.
Quote discipline: transcript quotes were checked by exact substring against the archived JSON bytes; filing quotes against a whitespace-collapsed text extraction of the EDGAR HTML. Turn numbers [n] are line positions in the market data content string.
S8 — management credibility
How Intel guides. One quarter ahead, in the earnings release's Business Outlook table and read out by the CFO on the call: a $1.0bn revenue range (widened to $1.2bn once, Q2 2025), and point estimates — not ranges — for gross margin, tax rate and EPS, GAAP and non-GAAP, "based on the midpoint of the revenue range" (every release, the sentence under the table). No full-year revenue guide exists. The annual commitments are operating expenses and capital expenditure, given as full-year figures and revised on the calls. Scoring below is against the first guide for each period, with the revision path recorded.
Because gross margin and EPS are point estimates rather than ranges, "met" is reserved for revenue landing inside the guided range with EPS at or above the point; a revenue beat with EPS below the point is scored on the EPS, which is the harder promise.
Who promised, and who is still here. market data labels turns by name only; roles from EDGAR as of each date:
- Patrick Gelsinger, CEO — made the 2024-08-01 and 2024-10-31 guides and the whole $10bn cost-reduction plan. Resigned 2024-12-01, 8-K 0000050863-24-000173 Item 5.02: "On December 1, 2024, Patrick Gelsinger, Chief Executive Officer and director of Intel Corporation (the “ Company ”), resigned from the Company and the Board of Directors (the “ Board ”), effective immediately."
- Michelle Johnston Holthaus and David Zinsner, Interim Co-CEOs from 2024-12-01 (same 8-K) — made the 2025-01-30 guide. Holthaus resigned for Good Reason 2025-09-07 and left 2026-03-01 (8-K 0000050863-25-000149 Item 5.02).
- Lip-Bu Tan, CEO — appointed 2025-03-10, effective 2025-03-18 (8-K 0000050863-25-000036 Item 5.02). Made or co-owned every guide from 2025-04-24 on.
- David A. Zinsner, EVP and CFO across the entire window, and principal accounting officer in addition from 2026-04-24 (8-K 0000050863-26-000083 Item 5.02, after Scott Gawel resigned). He is the only person present for all fourteen rows.
The only other Item 5.02s in the window are a director election (2025-11-10, Craig H. Barratt) and the Chief Legal Officer's separation (2026-03-30, April Miller Boise). No CFO change.
Say vs do (guides for Q3 2024 → Q2 2026, plus the annual commitments)
Revenue and non-GAAP EPS actuals from each subsequent release's News Summary; annual opex and capex actuals from the 2026-01-22 release's reconciliation tables.
| # | Promise (period · metric · figure) | Made where · by whom | Result · locator | Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Q3 2024 · rev $12.5–13.5bn · non-GAAP EPS $(0.03) · non-GAAP GM 38.0% | release 2024-08-01, Business Outlook · Pat Gelsinger (CEO) / David Zinsner (CFO) | rev $13.3bn — inside; non-GAAP EPS $(0.46) — release 2024-10-31 NEWS SUMMARY, which attributes $(0.63) of it to "$3.1 billion of impairment charges" | missed (departed) |
| 2 | Q4 2024 · rev $13.3–14.3bn · non-GAAP EPS $0.12 · non-GAAP GM 39.5% | release 2024-10-31 · Pat Gelsinger (CEO) | rev $14.3bn, non-GAAP EPS $0.13 — release 2025-01-30, where the interim co-CEO calls it "revenue, gross margin and EPS above our guidance" | beat (departed) |
| 3 | Q1 2025 · rev $11.7–12.7bn · non-GAAP EPS $0.00 · non-GAAP GM 36.0% | release 2025-01-30 · Michelle Johnston Holthaus and David Zinsner (interim co-CEOs) | rev $12.7bn (top of range), non-GAAP EPS $0.13 — release 2025-04-24 | beat (promiser part-departed) |
| 4 | Q2 2025 · rev $11.2–12.4bn · non-GAAP EPS $0.00 · non-GAAP GM 36.5% | release 2025-04-24 · Lip-Bu Tan (CEO) / David Zinsner (CFO) | rev $12.9bn — above the top; non-GAAP EPS $(0.10), with $(0.20) of it from "$ 800 million of impairment charges and $ 200 million in one-time period costs" — release 2025-07-24 | missed (EPS) |
| 5 | Q3 2025 · rev $12.6–13.6bn · non-GAAP EPS $0.00 | release 2025-07-24 · Tan / Zinsner | rev $13.7bn, non-GAAP EPS $0.23 — release 2025-10-23 | beat |
| 6 | Q4 2025 · rev $12.8–13.8bn · non-GAAP EPS $0.08 · non-GAAP GM 36.5% | release 2025-10-23 · Tan / Zinsner | rev $13.7bn, non-GAAP EPS $0.15 — release 2026-01-22, "We exceeded Q4 expectations across revenue, gross margin, and EPS" | beat |
| 7 | Q1 2026 · rev $11.7–12.7bn · non-GAAP EPS $0.00 · non-GAAP GM 34.5% | release 2026-01-22 · Tan / Zinsner | rev $13.6bn ("$1.4 billion above the midpoint of our guide", call 2026-04-23 [3]), non-GAAP EPS $0.29, non-GAAP GM 41% — release 2026-04-23 | beat |
| 8 | Q2 2026 · rev $13.8–14.8bn · non-GAAP EPS $0.20 · non-GAAP GM 39.0% | release 2026-04-23 · Tan / Zinsner | rev $16.1bn, non-GAAP EPS $0.42, non-GAAP GM 41.8% — release 2026-07-23 | beat |
| 9 | FY2024 · gross capex $25–27bn | release 2024-08-01: "bringing gross capital expenditures in 2024 to between $25 billion and $27 billion" · Pat Gelsinger (CEO) | $25,122m — release 2026-01-22 cash-flow reconciliation, "Additions to property, plant, and equipment (gross capital expenditures)" FY2024 column. (Net capital spending, guided $11–13bn in the same sentence, came in at $10,515m — just below.) | met (departed) |
| 10 | FY2025 · non-GAAP R&D + MG&A ≈ $17.5bn | release 2024-08-01: "reducing non-GAAP R&D and marketing, general and administrative (MG&A) to approximately $20 billion in 2024 and approximately $17.5 billion in 2025" · Pat Gelsinger (CEO) | $16.5bn — release 2026-01-22, Supplemental Reconciliations of GAAP Operating Expenses to Non-GAAP Operating Expenses, Full-Year 2025 Actuals | beat (departed) |
| 11 | FY2025 · gross capex $20–23bn | release 2024-08-01: "In 2025, the company is targeting gross capital expenditures between $20 billion and $23 billion" · Pat Gelsinger (CEO). Cut to "$18 billion in gross capital expenditures for 2025" in the release of 2025-07-24 · Tan / Zinsner | $17,672m — release 2026-01-22, same table as row 9. Below the first range and below the cut one | missed (cut once, then undershot; the direction is favourable to cash and unfavourable to the foundry-capacity thesis) |
| 12 | FY2026 · non-GAAP opex ≈ $16.0bn | release 2026-01-22 opex reconciliation, "Full-Year 2026 … Approximately … Non-GAAP operating expenses $ 16.0"; the $16bn figure dates to the 2025-04-24 release ("expecting 2025 operating expenses of $17 billion and 2026 operating expenses of $16 billion") · Tan / Zinsner | walked back on the call of 2026-04-23 [3] by David Zinsner: "For OpEx in 2026, we have been directionally targeting $16 billion, but are likely to be higher due to inflationary pressures, variable compensation and targeted investments we are making to capture the opportunities ahead." Re-set on the call of 2026-07-23 [6]: "We continue to tightly manage non-GAAP operating expenses to roughly $16.5 billion for the year." FY2026 not yet reported | withdrawn |
| 13 | FY2026 · capex "flat to down" on FY2025 | the entering-the-year expectation, restated on the call of 2026-04-23 [11] by David Zinsner as the path: "So what we're now calling it is flat year-over-year. The initial thinking was that it was going to be down. I think we kind of moved it last quarter to flat to down. And now I think we're looking at flat." | raised again on the call of 2026-07-23 [6]: "Due to strong customer demand signals, we're raising our outlook for 2026 and now expect our CapEx to be more than $20 billion, which is up significantly versus our expectations entering the year." Against FY2025's $17,672m that is at least +13%. FY2026 not yet reported | withdrawn |
| 14 | Panther Lake · "first Panther Lake processor SKU remains on track to begin shipping later this year, with additional SKUs coming in the first half of 2026" | release 2025-07-24 · Tan / Zinsner (company, written) | release 2026-01-22: "Intel unveiled the Intel® Core™ Ultra Series 3 processor family, the company's first AI PC platform built on the Intel 18A process technology" and "Intel 18A ramped to high-volume manufacturing in Arizona and Oregon"; release 2026-04-23 has the additional SKUs, "Intel also launched Intel ® Core™ Series 3 processors, bringing Intel 18A and the latest IP … to the mainstream for the first time" | met — with the caveat that the 2025 half is evidenced by "unveiled" and a ramp statement, not by a shipping statement |
Not scored (open). Q3 2026 guide: rev $15.8–16.8bn, non-GAAP GM 42.0%, non-GAAP EPS $0.38 (release 2026-07-23, Business Outlook), reports late October 2026. "Excluding the buyout of the Fab 34 joint investment, we still expect positive adjusted free cash flow for the full year" and "We remain committed to retiring all $2.5 billion of maturities as they come due this year and all $3.8 billion in 2027" (call 2026-04-23 [3], David Zinsner). The 14A milestones the CEO put on the record on the 2026-07-23 call (PDK 0.9 in October 2026, risk production H2 2027, volume 2028) are already kill criteria in scorecard.md and are scored when they come due. The dividend, suspended "starting in the fourth quarter of 2024" with a reiterated "long-term commitment to a competitive dividend as cash flows improve to sustainably higher levels" (release 2024-08-01), has not been resumed — FY2025 PaymentsOfDividendsCommonStock is $0 — but it carries no date and so is not a scorable row.
Tally: 14 rows — 6 beat, 3 met, 3 missed, 2 withdrawn. By team: the current team (Tan CEO since 2025-03-18, Zinsner CFO throughout) owns rows 4–8 and 12–14 — 4 beat, 1 met, 1 missed, 2 withdrawn. The five departed-promiser rows (1, 2, 9, 10, 11) are Gelsinger's, and row 3 is half Holthaus's.
Dodge-log roll-up (§3.1; calls FY2026-Q1 and FY2026-Q2). Seven dodges across two calls, and two topics dodged in both quarters running:
- When external foundry commitment becomes concrete, and what it costs. Q1 2026: Ross Seymore asked whether scaling supply means capex must structurally rise and whether that "call[s] into question that you're not going to spend on 14A until you actually get customers" [17]; Lip-Bu Tan answered with management-layer efficiency, yield and cycle-time improvement and the PDK ladder [18] — nothing about the spend rule. Same call, Timothy Arcuri asked whether the Terafab arrangement is "going to be a typical foundry arrangement" or "possibly turn the keys over" [26]; the answer was 14A yield progress, "as usually my style is under promise, over delivering", "no plan to announce the customer unless a customer want to announce it" and "Stay tuned" [27]. Q2 2026: Vivek Arya asked when the stated confidence "will be backed by actual customer announcements" and got the PDK and yield roadmap (
dossier-2026-09-23.md§Transcript). This is the name's central question and it has now been answered with process, twice. It is promoted from a note to a finding. - Server CPU share. Q1 2026: Vivek Arya asked whether Intel is gaining share against AMD and how the Arm threat develops [35]; Tan answered with the product roadmap (Granite Rapids → Diamond Rapids → Coral Rapids), multithreading, hiring and the SambaNova partnership [36] — no share figure or direction. Q2 2026: Joe Moore asked the same question over five years and got the same roadmap answer (
dossier-2026-09-23.md§Transcript).
Also this quarter, and not dodges — stated refusals, logged as notes: how much revenue supply constraint is costing ("I probably not want to put a specific number. Let's just say it starts with a B." — Zinsner [30], to Arcuri) and the precise server TAM growth rate ("I'll probably leave it to the industry analysts to come up pinpoint the exact number." — Zinsner [33], to Arya). A third, softer one: C.J. Muse asked for the advanced-packaging backlog number, revenue targets and customer count [43]; Zinsner gave an order of magnitude ("their demand is more in the billions of dollars per year kind of level") and margin commentary, no figure and no count [44].
Verdict — reliable. The quarterly guide, which is what this team controls quarter to quarter, has been beaten five times running and beaten on the whole across the window; both misses are EPS point estimates broken by impairment charges disclosed in the same release, and both sit in the 2024–mid-2025 trough. But the two withdrawn rows are the informative ones and they are both the current CFO's, both annual spending commitments, and both moved the same way — opex $16.0bn → "likely to be higher" → $16.5bn, and capex "down" → "flat to down" → "flat" → "more than $20 billion" — inside six months. Read together with the guide-beating record, the pattern is a management that under-promises on the number the market scores it on and over-promises on the discipline that decides whether the cash flow ever arrives. That is not enough to score over-promises (3 of 8 current-team rows), so the S7 base case is not haircut on revenue; it is a reason to take the cost and capital side of any base case from the revised figures, never from the original commitment.
S2 — capital allocation
All figures $m, calendar fiscal years, from XBRL companyfacts (CIK 50863): OCF NetCashProvidedByUsedInOperatingActivities, capex PaymentsToAcquirePropertyPlantAndEquipment, buybacks PaymentsForRepurchaseOfCommonStock, dividends PaymentsOfDividendsCommonStock, acquisitions PaymentsToAcquireBusinessesNetOfCashAcquired, SBC ShareBasedCompensation, debt ProceedsFromIssuanceOfLongTermDebt / RepaymentsOfLongTermDebt.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | 5y total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating cash flow | 29,456 | 15,433 | 11,471 | 8,288 | 9,697 | 74,345 |
| Capex (PP&E payments) | 18,733 | 24,844 | 25,750 | 23,944 | 14,646 | 107,917 |
| Acquisitions (cash) | 209 | 681 | 13 | 82 | not tagged | ~985 |
| Buybacks | 2,415 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,415 |
| Dividends | 5,644 | 5,997 | 3,088 | 1,599 | 0 | 16,328 |
| Debt raised | 4,974 | 6,548 | 11,391 | 2,975 | 0 | 25,888 |
| Debt repaid | 2,500 | 4,984 | 423 | 2,288 | 3,750 | 13,945 |
| Stock-based comp | 2,036 | 3,128 | 3,229 | 3,410 | 2,434 | 14,237 |
| SBC as % of revenue | 2.6% | 5.0% | 6.0% | 6.4% | 4.6% |
Where the cash went. Capex alone was 145% of five years of operating cash flow — a $33.6bn hole before a dollar of dividends. On top of that, $16.3bn of dividends and $2.4bn of buybacks were paid out of that same deficit. The gap was funded by $25.9bn of gross debt issuance, by partner and government money, and by selling pieces of the company: the 2026-01-22 release's cash-flow reconciliation shows FY2025 gross capex of $17,672m reduced to $11,204m of "net capital expenditures" by $1,577m of "Proceeds from capital-related government incentives" and $4,891m of "Partner contributions, net" (FY2024: $25,122m reduced to $10,515m by $1,936m and $12,671m). The asset sales are in the non-GAAP bridge as a $5,323m FY2025 "(Gains) losses from divestiture" (Altera 51%, per the Q2 2026 release's deconsolidation note).
Buybacks at what price: not applicable. PaymentsForRepurchaseOfCommonStock is $0 in every year from FY2022 on; the only repurchase in the window is $2,415m in FY2021. There is nothing to price.
Share count: diluted weighted-average 4,090m (FY2021) → 4,530m (FY2025), +10.8%; shares outstanding 4,070m (2021-12-25) → 5,043m (2026-06-27), +23.9%, and the 2026-08-10 sale of 242,105,262 shares at $95.00 takes it to ~5,285m, +29.9% on five years — before the 143m escrowed shares and the 241m-share DOC warrant recorded in scorecard.md S2. No buyback offset any of it, and SBC of $14.2bn over the window was issued into a rising count.
Dividend: suspended from Q4 2024 (release 2024-08-01) and $0 in FY2025. The company still calls it a long-term commitment; it has not been resumed.
What the acquisitions were worth: GoodwillImpairmentLoss $2,984m in FY2024, $0 in FY2025. Alongside it, the FY2024 non-GAAP bridge carries a $9,925m "Deferred tax assets valuation allowances" add-back (release 2026-01-22 reconciliation, FY2024 column) — the accounting admission that the future profits the invested capital was supposed to produce are no longer probable.
Returns. Invested capital (equity attributable to parent + long-term debt + current maturities, XBRL): $133,492m at FY2021 → $160,866m at FY2025. NOPAT: FY2021 operating income $19,456m at the 13% non-GAAP tax rate ≈ $16,927m, i.e. ROIC ≈ 12.7%; FY2025 operating income is a loss of $2,214m, ROIC ≈ −1.4%. Incremental return on the $27,374m of invested capital added over the window is ≈ −70% — ΔNOPAT ≈ −$19,141m over ΔIC $27,374m. FY2023 and FY2024 were also operating losses or near-zero ($93m and −$11,678m), so this is not one bad year.
Verdict: destroys. Five years, $108bn of capex, $16bn of dividends paid while the operating result went from $19.5bn of income to a loss, a $3.0bn goodwill write-off, a $9.9bn DTA valuation allowance, a suspended dividend, and a share count up ~30% with no buyback against it. The H1 2026 turn (operating income positive in Q2 2026, gross margin 41.8%) is real and is scored in S2's kill test; it does not change the five-year record, and it arrived only after the capex that produced it was cut by 39% year on year. [background] The bull answer — that this is the trough of a deliberate, state-supported rebuild and the invested capital has not had time to earn — is exactly what the 14A kill criteria in scorecard.md are written to test; this verdict does not pre-judge it, it records what the last five years actually returned.
S3 addendum — earnings quality
Sources: the Supplemental Reconciliations of GAAP Actuals to Non-GAAP Actuals tables in the releases of 2026-01-22 (FY2025 and FY2024 columns) and 2025-01-30 (FY2024 and FY2023 columns); XBRL companyfacts.
- The non-GAAP bridge, three years. GAAP → non-GAAP net income attributable to Intel: FY2023 $1,689m → $4,423m; FY2024 $(18,756)m → $(566)m; FY2025 $(267)m → $1,929m. The add-back stack (release 2026-01-22 / 2025-01-30 columns):
| Add-back | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share-based compensation | 3,229 | 3,410 | 2,434 |
| Restructuring and other charges | (62) | 6,970 | 2,191 |
| Acquisition-related adjustments | 1,407 | 1,044 | 505 |
| Deferred tax assets valuation allowances | — | 9,925 | — |
| (Gains) losses from divestiture | (153) | (156) | (5,323) |
| (Gains) losses on mark-to-market of Escrowed Shares | — | — | 1,796 |
Flag 1 — a new add-back that removes the cost of Intel's own share price. "(Gains) losses on mark-to-market of Escrowed Shares" appears for the first time in FY2025 at $1,796m, $0.40 of non-GAAP EPS. It is the same derivative that produced the $12.5bn Q2 2026 mark already flagged in scorecard.md S2, and it moves against the company when the stock rises. Adjusting it out is defensible; the consequence is that the gap between GAAP and non-GAAP EPS is now geared to the share price, in a year when GAAP EPS was $(0.06) and non-GAAP was $0.42. Flag 2 — restructuring is not one-off. $6,970m in FY2024 and $2,191m in FY2025, after a $(62)m credit in FY2023; adding FY2022 [background] the company has been restructuring continuously since the 2024-08-01 plan. Two of the last three years is not yet the "three of three" the rule names, but the FY2026 guide keeps $0.3bn of it in the plan (release 2026-01-22 opex reconciliation, Full-Year 2026 column), which makes it four years of a "one-off" line. Clean part: SBC as an add-back fell 29% in FY2025 on flat revenue, and acquisition-related adjustments are shrinking on schedule. Neither grows faster than revenue.
- Stock-based compensation against cash flow. Flag 3. FY2025 SBC $2,434m = 4.6% of revenue. Adjusted free cash flow, the company's own measure, was $(1,612)m for FY2025 (release 2026-01-22 cash-flow reconciliation) — and that figure is struck after adding back $1,577m of government incentives and $4,891m of net partner contributions. FCF after SBC is therefore not "below half of reported FCF"; there is no positive FCF for it to be half of. SBC of $2.4bn was paid in stock, in a year with negative free cash flow and no buyback.
- Cash conversion. OCF/net income is not meaningful in three of the last three years (FY2023 6.8x on a $1,689m profit; FY2024 and FY2025 are net losses). Accruals ((net income − OCF) / average total assets): −5.2% (FY2023), −13.9% (FY2024), −4.9% (FY2025). All strongly negative, i.e. reported earnings are worse than cash — the opposite of the drift this test is looking for, and the FY2024 figure is a write-off year, not an accrual build. Clean.
- Working capital. Flag 4 (mild). Days sales outstanding on year-end
AccountsReceivableNetCurrentover revenue: 23.9 (FY2022) → 22.9 (FY2023) → 23.9 (FY2024) → 26.5 (FY2025) — up two periods running, but on falling revenue, so the rule's "while revenue grows" condition is not met. It reverses in 2026: AR $4,033m at 2026-06-27 against Q2 2026 revenue of $16,128m is ~22.8 days. Days inventory on cost of sales is flat, 124.5 (FY2024) → 123.0 (FY2025), and inventory at 2026-06-27 ($12,492m) is up only 7.5% on a revenue line up 25% year on year — supply-constrained, as the calls say. Logged as mild and watched, not a finding.
- Costs moved onto the balance sheet. Flag 5 — the real one, and it is not capitalised software. Intel's headline cash measure is "adjusted free cash flow", and the path to it runs gross capex → minus government incentives → minus net partner contributions → net capex. FY2024: $12,671m of partner contributions and $1,936m of incentives, i.e. $14.6bn, more than half the year's gross capex, removed from the spending line. FY2025: $6,468m. These are real cash, but they are third-party and state capital carried inside a free-cash-flow measure, and they make Intel's capital intensity look like a mid-cap's. Even after all of it, adjusted FCF was $(1,612)m in FY2025 and $(2,228)m in FY2024. No capitalised-software or contract-cost line is separately tagged in XBRL and none is broken out in the releases; that part of the test is recorded as not disclosed rather than clean.
- Sector equivalents: n/a (not an insurer, bank or mortgage REIT).
EQ summary: 4 flags — a new share-price-geared add-back (Escrowed Shares, $1,796m / $0.40 in FY2025), restructuring in its third consecutive year and budgeted into a fourth, SBC of $2.4bn against negative free cash flow, and a free-cash-flow measure struck after $6.5bn of partner and government capital. One mild flag on DSO. Cash conversion is clean and the SBC add-back is shrinking.
Full notes, 23 Sep 2026 18 min read
INTC — dossier, 2026-09-23
Slot names-ai-capex-4. Drafted by Claude in an unattended cloud routine. Nothing here is human-verified. Every figure carries the document it was read from; anything from background knowledge is marked [background]. Quotes were located by substring search in the source and copied, never re-typed. Never edited after today.
Price reference: $123.86 close, 2026-09-22, volume 107,946,745 (market data NASDAQ:INTC).
The one-line version
Intel's operating business turned in Q2 2026 — first positive operating income in the series read here, gross margin back over 40%, data-centre demand ahead of supply — and its reported earnings got worse, by $12.5 billion, because its own share price went up. Both facts come out of the same 10-Q, and the second is a consequence of how the U.S. government's stake is accounted for. Meanwhile the thing the equity is actually priced for — an external foundry anchor customer — is still $293 million a quarter and still unnamed.
S1 — Source
watchlist (owner, Apple Stocks, 2026-09-20), row: {ticker: "INTC", label: "Intel Corporation", coverage: sec_domestic, cluster: ai_semis, cik: 50863}. No Tier 0 promotion; INTC is not in queue.json promoted.
S2 — Kill test
Read from XBRL company facts (data.sec.gov/api/xbrl/companyfacts/CIK0000050863.json, User-Agent sent) and confirmed against the filings.
| $m | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | H1 2025 | H1 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 54,228 | 53,101 | 52,853 | 25,526 | 29,705 |
| Gross profit | 21,711 | 17,345 | 18,375 | 8,214 | 11,856 |
| Gross margin | 40.0% | 32.7% | 34.8% | 32.2% | 39.9% |
| Operating income (loss) | 93 | (11,678) | (2,214) | (3,477) | (1,340) |
| Net income (loss) attributable to Intel | 1,689 | (18,756) | (267) | (3,739) | (14,761) |
| Operating cash flow | 11,471 | 8,288 | 9,697 | 2,863 | 8,102 |
| Capex (PP&E) | 25,750 | 23,944 | 14,646 | 8,733 | 6,192 |
| Diluted WA shares (m) | 4,212 | 4,280 | 4,530 | 4,356 | 5,108 |
| Stockholders' equity | 105,590 | 99,270 | 114,281 | — | 87,542 |
Quarterly, Q2 2026 against Q2 2025 (10-Q Consolidated Condensed Statements of Operations): revenue 16,128 vs 12,859 (+25.4%), gross profit 6,509 vs 3,542 (GM 40.4% vs 27.5%), operating income 1,796 vs (3,176), and net loss attributable to Intel (11,033) vs (2,918).
Survives-or-dies. Intel does not die on liquidity and does not die on the product business. Cash and short-term investments are $29,727m against total debt of $50,537m — net debt ~$20.8bn on $9.7bn of annual operating cash flow — plus a $7.0bn revolver available to February 2029, a $3.0bn facility to January 2029, $10.0bn of commercial paper authorisation undrawn, and roughly $23.0bn of fresh equity raised in August 2026. Capex has been cut 43% from the FY2023 peak while operating cash flow has held. H1 2026 revenue is up 16.4% with gross margin up 770bp. What can kill this equity is not solvency; it is that ~$655bn of market value is being paid for an outcome — Intel Foundry winning external customers at scale — that has $293m of quarterly evidence behind it, while the share count has risen 27% in five years and two more claims (143m escrowed shares, a 241m-share warrant struck at $20.00) sit outside that count.
The share-count trap, in order. 4,212m (FY2023) → 4,280m (FY2024) → 4,530m (FY2025) → 5,104m diluted weighted-average in Q2 2026 → 5,044m actually outstanding at 2026-07-17 (10-Q cover) → +242,105,262 sold at $95.00 on 2026-08-10/11 → ~5,286m. Add the 143m escrowed shares not yet released and the 241m DOC warrant shares and the fully-loaded number is ~5,670m.
S3 — Filings, gate-minimum
Read: FY2025 10-K (filed 2026-01-23) risk factors and MD&A; Q2 2026 10-Q (filed 2026-07-24) MD&A delta and Notes 2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 15; the 2026-08-12 8-K; the Q2 2026 earnings call transcript (turns 11–57 of 57). Not read: the DEF 14A filed 2026-03-23 (located, not opened — see the scorecard's next action), the second 10-K, the Q1 2026 10-Q, any transcript before Q2 2026, and the efts.sec.gov auditor-change / restatement full-text sweep.
The three biggest risks management itself discloses
- "We are making significant, long-term and inherently risky investments in R&D and manufacturing facilities that may not realize a favorable return." — 10-K FY2025, Risk Factors, heading. This is the foundry bet stated as a risk by the company making it.
- "There are a number of risks and uncertainties associated with the U.S. government's acquisition of significant equity interests in us." — 10-K FY2025, Risk Factors, heading. Its first bullet is the one that has no analogue anywhere else on this watchlist: "The legislative, judicial or executive branches of the U.S. government could determine in the future that all or a portion of the transactions were unauthorized, void or voidable." A later bullet is simply "The transactions are dilutive to existing stockholders."
- "Our alternative financing arrangements and pursuit of government grants involve risks and may not be successful." — 10-K FY2025, Risk Factors, heading. The body says both SCIP arrangements "are expected to significantly and increasingly impact our net income (loss) attributable to Intel and earnings (loss) per share attributable to Intel in future periods". Intel paid $14.2bn on 2026-04-08 to end one of them.
The Escrowed Shares mechanism — why the loss and the share price move together
- The derivative liability for the Escrowed Shares was $2.7bn at 2025-12-27 and $15.6bn at 2026-06-27 (10-Q Note 4).
- Q2 2026 carried a $12.5bn loss and H1 2026 $13.6bn, inside "Interest and other, net", which was $(12,576)m for the quarter against $(95)m a year earlier.
- The 10-Q's MD&A says it plainly: "we recognized a $12.5 billion loss related to the net change in the fair value of shares of our common stock released from escrow during the quarter and remaining in escrow at the end of Q2 2026, driven by an increase in our stock price."
So: for as long as escrowed shares remain unreleased, a rising Intel share price produces a larger reported GAAP loss. At 2026-09-22 the stock is $123.86. Unless it fell back between 2026-06-27 and the Q3 close, Q3 2026 carries another mark of the same kind. Anyone reading Intel's GAAP EPS as a business signal right now is reading a price chart upside down.
Two structural consequences, both from Note 4:
- 143 million Escrowed Shares were not yet released at 2026-06-27; 71m are in basic EPS as not contingently issuable, 71m are excluded until the DOC disburses under Secure Enclave.
- Warrants over 241 million shares at $20.00 become exercisable "if we cease to directly or indirectly own at least 51 % of our foundry business". A Foundry spin-off — the structural fix most bulls and bears both reach for — triggers a ~241m-share claim struck 84% below the current price. That is a disclosed, quantified toll on the strategic option.
Accounting the SEC staff touched
The FY2025 10-K discloses that Intel's accounting conclusion for the U.S. Government Agreement, as presented in the Q3 2025 10-Q, "was subsequently adjusted based upon our consultation with the staff of the SEC on this matter, which concluded in our fourth quarter of fiscal 2025" — i.e. after that 10-Q was filed. Intel concluded the adjustments were immaterial. This is not a restatement and is not an auditor change; it is the staff moving the number on the single largest and newest item on the balance sheet, and it is the reason the FY2025 figures are the first clean read of it.
Ireland SCIP: off-balance-sheet financing bought back at a price
Apollo took 49% of the Fab 34 VIE in 2024. On 2026-04-08 Intel reacquired the whole minority interest for $14.2bn cash, funded from cash, short-term investments and a $6.5bn term loan, which was then repaid with $6.5bn of new senior notes — $1.0bn 4.65% 2031, $1.0bn 5.00% 2033, $2.2bn 5.30% 2036, $1.8bn 6.13% 2056, $500m 6.20% 2066. Total debt went $46,585m → $50,537m in the half. Read together with the risk factor above, this is Intel paying to undo a financing structure whose cost was about to show up in EPS.
Transcript — Q2 2026 call, 2026-07-23 (read Q&A-first, SKILL §3.1)
Turns 11–57 of 57. Turns 1–10 (safe-harbor, CEO and CFO prepared remarks) were not read — one transcript call at this depth, and §3.1 puts the Q&A first. The CFO's guidance below is what he restated inside the Q&A.
Guidance and changes.
- Q3 2026 client revenue "flattish"; CCPG up a bit, driven by edge. The end market is softer — "that market is struggling with the memory dynamics in the marketplace".
- Gross margin guided flat quarter over quarter. The CFO's framing of the year: "our number one goal this year … was to get gross margins comfortably into the 40s in every quarter."
- Q4 2026 revenue up, as supply unlocks — "we start to see some of the log jam break towards the end of the third quarter". He also says Intel will still be behind demand in Q4.
- Capex: 2026 tooling +40% on 2025. 2027 will be up; no number — "I purposely didn't mention a number for 27".
- ASIC business "approaching a $2 billion run rate", with "$4 billion run rate" named as the next step, against a stated "$100 billion TAM".
- Data centre: "well north of a double digit CAGR for us in terms of growth rate over the next few years."
- 14A: PDK 0.5 complete, PDK 0.9 "on track for October", risk production H2 2027, committed volume production 2028.
- Liquidity as management frames it: "We have over $30 billion of cash. We have a $10 billion revolver. So we've got $40 billion of liquidity", plus "roughly call it $10 billion of what are called non-core assets".
What the analysts asked about — six questioners, and four of the six went at the same thing from different sides: can you fund this, and for whom are you building it. Joe Moore (Morgan Stanley) on server share and on gross-vs-net capex; Stacy Raskin (Bernstein) on whether client strength was just price; Timothy Curry (UBS) on the Q4 step-up and on gross-margin drop-through; Vivek Arya (BofA) on when foundry confidence becomes announced customers and then on the balance sheet; CJ Muse (Cantor) on a capex framework against free-cash-flow goals; Aaron Rakers (Wells Fargo) on ASIC diversity and margin, and on memory.
Dodges.
- External foundry customers. Arya: "when will that confidence be backed by actual customer announcements". Lip-Bu Tan answered with 18A/18AP/14A milestones, PDK dates, SRAM yield and defect density, and said "the engagement, the customer, the feedback have been very positive". No external customer was named and no date was given. The question was about announcements; the answer was about process.
- ASIC margins. Rakers asked for "the margin profile of ASICs as they expand". Tan answered TAM; Zinsner answered run rate. Neither addressed margin.
- Server share. Moore asked what happens to server share over five years against AMD and Arm. Tan answered roadmap, and recast Arm as "a great partner and customer". No share direction.
- Deferral, not a dodge: the 2027 capex number, explicitly refused.
The sequence worth keeping. Arya's follow-up was whether the product business funds the plan or "will something else be required". Zinsner: "if we're super successful, which we're driving to, you know, we may need to tap the capital markets to drive some more investment. And, you know, we'll stay tuned if we if we need to do that." Eighteen days later, on 2026-08-10, Intel priced 210,526,315 shares at $95.00, and the underwriters took the full 31,578,947-share option the next day — ~$23.0bn, off a shelf registered the same day. Nothing improper: it is an accurate reading of a CFO who told analysts the answer three weeks early and was not pressed on it.
S5 — Ownership
13F register at 2026-06-30 (Equibles GetTopHolders; 3,591 institutions, 3,867,398,113 shares, $539.6bn):
| # | Holder | Shares | $m |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | BlackRock, Inc. | 426,478,962 | 59,549.3 |
| 2 | Vanguard Capital Management LLC | 285,230,183 | 39,826.7 |
| 3 | State Street Corp | 216,849,675 | 30,278.7 |
| 4 | NVIDIA Corp | 214,776,632 | 29,989.3 |
| 5 | Invesco Ltd. | 157,902,890 | 22,048.0 |
| 6 | Geode Capital Management | 110,339,857 | 15,406.8 |
| 7 | FMR LLC | 94,431,754 | 13,185.5 |
| 8 | Vanguard Portfolio Management LLC | 89,395,975 | 12,482.4 |
| 9 | SoftBank Group Corp. | 86,956,522 | 12,141.7 |
| 10 | PRIMECAP Management | 75,250,958 | 10,507.3 |
Two things this register says that the usual index-fund top ten does not.
NVIDIA is Intel's fourth largest institutional holder. The routine's standing cross-cutting finding — first written at names-ai-capex-1, extended at names-ai-capex-2 and inverted at CBRS — is that in this complex the strong balance sheet underwrites the weak one: sellers finance buyers (NVDA/SB Energy, AMD's OpenAI warrants, AVGO/XPV), then buyers finance sellers (OpenAI lending CoreWeave $1.0bn). Intel is a third shape again: the complex's strongest balance sheet has bought a strategic stake in its oldest competitor, alongside the U.S. government and SoftBank. Intel's register is now a policy object.
The largest holder of all is missing from the table. The U.S. government is not a 13F filer, so its Escrowed-Share position appears nowhere in the institutional register. Any ownership screen run on INTC understates the real holder list by the single most consequential name on it. The evidence for that stake is in the 10-Q, not the 13F.
Corrected 3spread register, post-fix (CUSIP 458140100, 2,556 filers, 2,428,586,342 shares at 2026-06-30, change vs 2026-03-31; every row carries its SEC filing URL):
- BlackRock 426,478,962 (−21,315,170, trimmed) · State Street 216,849,675 (+2,528,657) · NVIDIA 214,776,632 (+0, held) · Invesco 157,902,890 (+3,942,408) · Susquehanna 107,877,059 (+6,988,545) · SoftBank 86,956,522 (+0, held) · Jane Street 85,597,640 (+17,135,431) · PRIMECAP 75,250,958 (−511,010) · Citadel 59,638,211 (+4,452,665) · T. Rowe 53,547,772 (+1,486,726).
- NVIDIA and SoftBank both show +0 QoQ — the stakes were already in place at 2026-03-31 and neither moved through the quarter. Neither is trading the position.
- The buyers in the quarter are market-makers and multi-strats (Jane Street +17.1m, Susquehanna +7.0m, Citadel +4.5m, Assenagon +21.2m, BofA +8.3m, Goldman +4.8m); the sellers are index and long-only (BlackRock −21.3m, Van Eck −12.4m, Barclays −14.5m, L&G −3.8m). That is a register rotating from holders toward traders, which is what a name about to issue $23bn of stock looks like.
- The Sixth Street / Schwab defect recurs here. Sixth Street Partners Management Company shows 33,298,214 shares as NEW and Charles Schwab Investment Management shows the identical 33,298,214. That is the same defective-filing pattern
names-insurance-1documented on 2026-09-22 for ACGL, KNSL, AX and QCOM (accession0001752724-26-000051carrying Schwab's information table). INTC is the fifth issuer it has appeared in. The script warns on it automatically; the row is not carried. - Ten large prior holders have no 2026-06-30 13F ingested yet — Vanguard Capital Management (564,022,570 prior), Geode (109,534,637), Vanguard Portfolio Management (85,427,273), Capital World (79,877,133), Capital Research Global (77,301,863), FMR (57,515,133), Morgan Stanley (53,989,387), UBS AM (52,771,052), UBS Group (45,274,954), Northern Trust (44,887,372). No exit is read from any of them. Note the consequence: Equibles' table above shows Vanguard Capital at 285,230,183 for the same date. The two vendors disagree on that manager by ~279m shares, which is another reason to treat any single-quarter 13F delta on this name as provisional.
- 13D/G: the fifteen rows 3spread returns under cik 50863 are all filings where Intel is the filer, on other issuers. No 13D/G on Intel appears in this source.
- Form 4: 84 filings in the 365 days to 2026-09-23, clustered at 2026-05-15 (eleven filings in a day — the annual grant/vest window) and again 2026-08-03/14. No individual transaction sizes were pulled; the cadence is routine-compensation-shaped, not signal-shaped.
- Short interest (FINRA, via Equibles): 141,034,491 (2026-05-15) → 127,787,110 (2026-06-30) → 120,963,181 (2026-07-15) → 125,100,834 (2026-07-31) → 135,685,200 (2026-08-14) → 152,248,752 (2026-08-31), days to cover 1.0 → 1.7. The position grew 25.9% from mid-July through the equity offering. On ~5.3bn shares this is under 3% of the float; the direction is the point, not the size. Equibles also returns a model estimate for the 2026-09-15 settlement (~150.4m, P10–P90 131.8–168.7m) which is an estimate, not a FINRA figure, and is not used here.
- Shelf / ATM / buyback: a new automatic shelf (S-3ASR, 333-298165) was filed 2026-08-10 and immediately drawn on for the ~$23.0bn equity sale; a second S-3ASR was filed 2026-01-23. The commercial paper authorisation is $10.0bn, undrawn at 2026-06-27. No ATM programme and no buyback activity were identified; Intel is issuing, not retiring. Absence of an ATM in what was read is not proof there is none —
GetAtmProgramswas not called, to stay inside the Equibles budget.
Tool defect found in this slot
python ledger/research/tools/threespread.py holders INTC prints # MariaDB plc (INTC, CUSIP G5920M100) — 13F holders as of 2026-06-30 / filers: 0. It does not error. coverage INTC returns INTEL CORP, cik 50863, with 843 insider filings and populated institutional_holdings, so the API has the issuer. The CUSIP resolution is the fault: per ledger/research/README.md, "The 13F stream is keyed by CUSIP, resolved from the issuer's 13D/G rows", and owners INTC shows all fifteen 13D/G rows under cik 50863 have INTEL CORP as the filer. The CUSIP therefore belongs to one of Intel's venture holdings.
The raw response makes it unambiguous. /v1/beneficial-ownership?ticker=INTC returns, in order: MariaDB plc / G5920M100 / filer INTEL CORP, then Intel Corp / 458140100 / filer INTEL CORP, then Mobileye Global Inc. / 60741F104, then Joby Aviation, Inc. / G65163100, then Kaltura. The endpoint keys on the filer, the old code took limit=5 and the first row with a CUSIP, and Intel's own CUSIP was row two.
Prior runs recorded 3spread returning near-empty tables for ADR CUSIPs (ARM, OMAB at names-ai-capex-2; ASML at names-ai-capex-3). This is a different and worse failure mode: a confidently-labelled table for a different company. Any name that files 13D/Gs on others — every corporate venture arm on this watchlist — was exposed to it.
Fix applied in this slot (ledger/research/tools/threespread.py, cusip_for()): pull 50 rows rather than 5; ask /v1/coverage/by-issuer/<ticker> what issuer the ticker is; take the CUSIP from the row whose issuer_name normalises to that issuer; and, when no row matches, exit with the explanation rather than printing another company's holder table. Normalisation strips punctuation and corporate suffixes and also strips the embedded spaces some CUSIPs carry (98980G 102 on ZS). Verified on INTC (now Intel Corp / 458140100 / 2,556 filers) and it leaves the ZS and MRVL paths unchanged.
S8 — Valuation and sizing ⏳ OPEN (user)
Today. $123.86 (2026-09-22). Shares ~5,286m after the August sale → ~$655bn of market value, against FY2025 revenue of $52,853m and no net income. Adding net debt of ~$20.8bn and the $15.6bn escrow derivative gives an enterprise value near $691bn on ~$60bn of run-rate revenue. There is no meaningful trailing earnings multiple; the P/E is undefined.
Out-year model. Assumptions, all stated, none of them management's: FY2026 revenue ~$64bn (H1 actual $29.7bn, H2 guided flattish-then-up); +12% in each of FY2027 and FY2028, which is inside the "well north of a double digit CAGR" the CFO claimed for data centre and generous to a flat-to- down client market; gross margin climbing from 40% toward the high 40s as 18A/18AP yields mature; operating expense held near $18.5bn; net interest ~$2.5bn; a 12% effective tax rate while the domestic valuation allowance persists; ~5.5bn shares including escrow release.
| FY2028 case | Revenue | GM | Op income | Net | EPS | Multiple | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear — no external anchor, client keeps sliding, GM stalls at 40% | $65bn | 40% | $7.4bn | $4.3bn | $0.78 | 25x | ~$20 |
| Base — data centre compounds, GM 48%, foundry stays internal | $81bn | 48% | $20.3bn | $15.7bn | $2.85 | 25x | ~$71 |
| Bull — 14A lands an anchor, GM 53%, ASIC at $4bn+ | $95bn | 53% | $31.4bn | $25.0bn | $4.50 | 30x | ~$135 |
What that says. The traded price sits above the base case and roughly 9% below the bull case. To justify $123.86 on FY2028 earnings you have to underwrite the bull column — which is to say, you have to underwrite the external foundry customer that management would not name when asked directly three weeks before it sold $23bn of stock. That is the same shape names-ai-capex-2 found at MRVL and ARM, where base cases modelled below the traded price, and it is now true of the third name in a row in this cluster.
Buy price and size are owner-only (skill §5). Liquidity is not a constraint: 107.9m shares traded on 2026-09-22, ~$13.4bn of value, so any plausible position clears in minutes.
S9 — Monitoring
- Next earnings: Q3 2026, guided on the call for October 2026 — "provide additional update in October". A precise date was not pulled (market data's calendar needs a paid plan); the filing cadence puts it in the last ten days of October.
- Feed: the Tier 0 EDGAR sweep already covers cik 50863 (
watch_edgar.py, 06:40 UTC daily). - Leading indicator between quarters: Intel Foundry third-party revenue, disclosed in Note 2 of every 10-Q — $22m → $293m in a year. It is the only published series that measures the external foundry thesis directly, and it moves quarterly rather than annually.
- Trigger that converts this to a buy: a named external foundry anchor customer with committed 14A volume, disclosed in an 8-K or on a call — plus Foundry third-party revenue crossing ~$500m in a quarter, so the announcement is corroborated by the segment note rather than by a press release. Absent that, the base case is below the price and the name stays a watch.
- Second trigger, in the other direction: PDK 0.9 not confirmed complete by the Q3 2026 call, or the H2 2027 risk-production date moving. Management put the dates on the record; a slip is theirs.
Access and evidence limits, this run
- DEF 14A not read. Insider ownership %, compensation structure and what the bonus is paid on are all missing from S3. This is the largest single gap and it is the scorecard's next action.
- One transcript, not two. Q2 2026 only, turns 11–57 of 57; prepared remarks not read. Equibles budget.
- No
efts.sec.govfull-text sweep for auditor changes, "changes in accountants", restatement language or NT 10-K. The SEC-consultation item in the 10-K was found by reading the 10-K, not by a sweep, so a second such item could exist unfound. - No
GetAtmPrograms/GetBuybackPrograms/GetGoingConcernStatus/GetExecutiveChangescalls — budget. The shelf and offering came from EDGAR directly, which is the better source anyway; going concern is plainly not in question here. - Form 4 detail not extracted. Only the filing cadence (84 in 365 days) was read, not the transaction sizes or the buy/sell split.
- 3spread
holdersunusable for this name — see above. S5's register is Equibles'. - No analyst-coverage count.
- The out-year model is the routine's own, built on stated assumptions, not on company guidance beyond one quarter. Treat the three cases as a frame, not a forecast.