LNCLincoln National Corporation
Industry Life annuity Updated 24 Sep 2026
The idea
0.76x its own book including AOCI and ~4.7x annualised H1 2026 adjusted operating EPS; the $23.71-a-share gap to book ex-AOCI is an $8.5bn unrealised bond loss that accretes back at par. The base case is LNC getting back to its own book, not a re-rating. The constraint nobody models: Bain's $44.00 floor sits above the market price and encumbers four-fifths of the $714m buyback authority.
Events to watch
- Q3 results ~2026-10-29 — the annual assumption review (charged net income in two of the last three years) and the leverage ratio against the 25% target now that $437m of preferred left the stack and $500m of 2056 subordinated notes stayed in it
- any Schedule 13D/A showing LNC buying Bain's stock at $44
- the permanent CFO hire
- the 2026-09-15 short-interest settlement published 2026-09-24 after +33% at 2026-08-31
How we got the target
Scorecard model table: 2028E adjusted operating EPS bear $6.45 / base $8.80 / bull $10.71 at 4.5x / 6.0x / 7.5x. Price is the 2026-09-22 close from market data get_stock_prices (NYSE:LNC), not get_latest_stock_price. Time frame: 2028 model line.
Target: from the research notes. Prices: market data get_latest_stock_price, close of 2026-09-22 (fetched 2026-09-23)
What would prove it wrong
8 warning signsReinsurance recoverable net of collateral above $8bn, or the collateralised share below 75%.
Details
It was ~$4.5bn and 84% at 2025-12-31. This is the honest version of the cluster's test and it is disclosed annually in the MD&A's Reinsurance section.
An annual assumption review charge above $200m to net income, or a charge in a third year of four.
Details
The series is −$50m (2025), +$216m (2024), −$167m (2023), plus the "substantial charge" of 3Q 2022 the 10-K's own risk factors point back to. Lands with Q3 results.
LNC buys Bain's shares at any price above that month's buyback VWAP, or amends Section 6.2 / the standstill to make room for Bain.
Details
The agreement prices the sell-back at market; a premium would be the anchor shareholder being taken out at the common's expense, and it would show up in a 13D/A or 8-K. (Replaced 2026-09-24: the first version read "LNC repurchases from Bain at $44.00 while the market is below it", which the agreement does not allow.)
Net investment income ÷ interest credited below 1.50x (2.09x in 2021, 1.62x in 2025) — the only spread measure the filings support, and the one the Stage 0 lens scored on.
Leverage ratio above 27% (25.1% at 2026-06-30 against a stated 25% target), now that $437.3m of preferred has left the stack and $500m of 2056 subordinated notes has entered it.
The FY2026 free-cash-flow conversion ratio comes in inside 45–60% only on the redefined basis.
Details
Management redefined net investment income inside operating income for 2026 and agreed on the record that it helps the ratio ("yes... that is just, call it, optics", call 2026-02-12 [24]). The FY2026 10-K in February 2027 should be read for the restated-basis comparison; a target met only because its denominator moved is a miss for this purpose, and the executive who made both the target and the change has left.
The 2026 proxy certifies the AIP per-share goal on a figure more than 5% above the reported one for a second year.
Details
FY2025 was $8.72 against $8.26 reported, at a 154.1% payout, on an exclusion list that adds back only reductions in earnings from reinsurance deals, assumption changes and strategic projects — the three things management says it will keep doing.
Annuity DAC deferrals above 4.5% of sales/deposits, or deferrable commissions growing faster than deposits for a third year.
Details
The 10-K discloses the ratio: 3.2% → 3.6% → 4.0%, with deferrable commissions up 71% in two years against amortisation up 9%.
How far along
7 of 10 steps done · 3 done in a group review
Next step
watch the Q3 2026 annual assumption review, reported with Q3 results around 2026-10-29, against the leverage ratio in the same release. The assumption review has charged net income in two of the last three years and is the single biggest unmodelled item on this name. The leverage ratio was 25.1% against a 25% target at 2026-06-30 — before $437.3m of preferred equity came out of the stack on 2026-09-10 and $500m of subordinated notes stayed in it. Those two numbers, in one release, decide whether the capital rebuild of June-September was an arbitrage or a step down.
Needs your decision
S6 product test / expert call, S7 conviction.
Failed checks
none. S0/S4/S7 are not closed and S6 closed by carry-forward. S3 is closed with the one-transcript deviation named above. S8 closed closed (partial) on 2026-09-24 — reliable on the rows (3 beat, 2 met, 0 missed), partial because the CFO who made four of the five and the whole 2026 outlook resigned on 2026-08-06 and the interim has no record. The open warnings, all ⚠️: the 439%-vs-460% RBC wedge between the investor number and the pay number; the free-cash-flow conversion denominator redefined in the target year; the buyback question deferred twice; three earnings measures for one year with the pay version the highest; operating cash flow negative in three of four years; and annuity DAC deferrals at 4.0% of sales/deposits from 3.2%. Transcript coverage is still seven quarters, FY2024-Q3 to FY2026-Q1 — there is no FY2026-Q2 call in the archive, so nothing in this file reflects a call held after the CFO's resignation.
Who runs it
The Front OfficeStep by step
- S0How it does as AI gets cheapDone in a group review
carry-forward (cluster: Insurance — Stage 0 re-score, 2026-09-22 §6)
lens 0/4 under the SKILL.md §4.3 risk-carrying variant, spread branches, which supersedes the failed 1/4 the AI-surplus four gave it in Insurance & reinsurance — cluster pass, 2026-09-22.
Full notes
Re-tagged
life_annuity2026-09-22: it is not in the P&C cycle. Reserve honesty 0 (assumption-review impact on net income −$50m 2025, +$216m 2024, −$167m 2023 — charges in two of three); edge survives the cycle 0 (no published earned-yield-minus-credited-rate series; the labelled proxy, net investment income ÷ interest credited, 2.09x 2021 → 1.62x 2025); capital theirs 0 (recoverables $28,012m on $10,906m equity, 2.57x, plus recapture triggers); growth that does not dilute 0 (diluted shares 170.7m 2023 → 186.1m 2025, zero buybacks 2023-24). Liquidity: ADV $85.6m/day, 21 sessions to 2026-09-22. ⚠️ THIS PASS QUALIFIES TEST 3 — the same 10-K says 84% of the recoverable is collateralised, so the honest net figure is ~$4.5bn on $10,906m, 0.41x not 2.57x; see S3 and the finding below. It does not change the score (the gross leverage to reinsurer solvency is real), it changes the kill criterion built on it. Glyph records the lens ran, not its verdict. - S1Where the idea came fromDone
watchlist (owner, Apple Stocks, 2026-09-20)
Full notes
No Tier 0 promotion: names-insurance-2 spent the third of three promotions allowed in five consecutive name slots, so SNDK stays queued and LNC was worked alone after PUMP displaced it from that slot.
- S2Quick deal-breaker checkDone
FY2025 revenues $18,212m, net income $1,177m, equity $10,906m. H1 2026 revenues $9,848m, net income $1,160m, equity $11,349m, total debt $6,465m, leverage 25.1% against a 25% target.
Full notes
RBC ">420%" every quarter in the release and 433% → 460% during 2025 in the proxy. Holding company liquidity $1,803m gross, $903m net of the $400m debt and $500m preferred prefundings. Survives; solvency is not the question here. Three flags: (1) operating cash flow negative in three of four years (−$2,074m / −$2,007m / −$167m, and −$420m in H1 2026 against +$741m) — softened by deposit flows sitting in financing, but the direction is wrong while preferred is being bought with borrowed money. (2) share count 169.7m (2023) → 191,425,371 (2026-06-30), +12.8%, of which 18,759,497 is one issue to Bain. (3) adjusted operating EPS is falling while GAAP EPS looks spectacular — Q2 2026 $2.24 against $2.36, H1 $3.89 against $3.97, on adjusted operating income to common that ROSE $427m → $439m. The per-share line fell purely on the extra shares. GAAP Q2 EPS of $6.72 is $1,497m pre-tax of market risk benefit marks the company itself calls "the non-economic impact of changes in market risk benefits". · capital allocation (2026-09-24, dossier-2026-09-24.md): neutral — and neutral as the average of two opposite records, not as a steady middle. FY2021-25 operating cash flow +$1,144m cumulative (negative in three of five years) against $3,221m returned to common ($1,655m of buybacks in 2021-22, $1,566m of dividends) = 282% of five years of operating cash flow. The difference came from the balance sheet: Fortitude Re and Resolution Life, the wealth-management and Elephant sales, debt, and finally $825m of new stock issued to Bain at $44.00 in June 2025 — i.e. LNC bought its own shares when they were expensive and sold them when they were cheap ($41.01 at 2026-09-22). Goodwill impairment $634m in 2022, the only one in five years; no acquisitions. No buyback since Q3 2022; $714m of the 2021 authorisation untouched, so there is no average price to compute for the window. SBC $315m over five years = 0.43% of FY2025 revenue. Returns, on the only defensible series: segment income from operations $990m (2023) → $1,315m → $1,628m (+69% in two years), available to common $908m → $1,224m → $1,537m, adjusted operating EPS $5.32 → $7.07 → $8.26 (+55%) — the 14-point gap between earnings and earnings-per-share growth is the Bain issue, and the per-share line has already turned (H1 2026 $3.89 vs $3.97 on operating income to common that ROSE). BVPS computed here (equity less $986m of preferred / common shares): incl. AOCI $34.81 → $42.74 → $52.20; excl. AOCI $55.30 → $72.30 → $73.55 — both flattered by MRB marks running through retained earnings. GAAP ROE (17.7/10.9/-12.5/43.2/12.3%) is noise.
⚠️ WHAT THE BONUS IS PAID ON (DEF 14A 2026-04-16, read this pass): Income from Operations per Share at a 45% weighting. The §25 EPS-pay-plus-buybacks flag does not fire in its usual form — there have been no buybacks — it fires in reverse: the Bain issue diluted the 45%-weighted per-share metric while its unspent proceeds lifted the RBC ratio used to certify the DE Actions goal at 175% of target. One transaction, two incentive measures, opposite directions. And the pay metric is not the published one — Exhibit 2 defines it as income from operations plus a one-directional list of reductions (D: reinsurance/sale of a block; G: actuarial assumption and model changes; H: strategic-project costs). FY2025 AIP result: $8.72 a share, 154.1% payout, against $8.26 reported.
- S3Reading the company's reportsDone
(gate-minimum)
FY2025 10-K Item 1A (three risks below, in management's ordering), MD&A Executive Summary / Significant Operational Matters / Reinsurance, and the EY report.
Full notes
Q2 2026 10-Q MD&A, segment tables, equity note and liquidity; 2026-04-16 DEF 14A ownership and compensation. Q2 2026 release and earnings supplement; the June 424B2; the 2026-08-10 8-K; Schedule TO and its results amendment; both Bain 13Ds; four Form 4s; and a full efts.sec.gov sweep — zero "changes in accountants", no NT 10-K, all 30 "material weakness" hits 2023 or older. Auditor Ernst & Young, PCAOB 42, two CAMs: the $42.1bn future contract benefits liability and market risk benefits ($4.8bn asset / $1.1bn liability).
⚠️ The one non-reliance event on the record is about reinsurance accounting — the 2023-03-27 Item 4.02 8-K restated ~$498m of gain on the 2021 Resolution Life coinsurance deal — and reinsurance transactions are the lever management says it will pull next. Deviation: one transcript, not two (no Q2 FY2026 transcript exists on Equibles or fool.com). EQ: 3 flags (2026-09-24, dossier-2026-09-24.md) — (1) three earnings numbers for one year: GAAP $1,177m, income from operations to common $1,537m / $8.26 a share, and the AIP's version at $8.72 (154.1% payout) on a one-directional exclusion list; and the annual assumption review has been routed around the measure the company is scored on — its impact on income FROM OPERATIONS was -$131m (2023), +$8m (2024), +$2m (2025) while its impact on NET INCOME was -$167m, +$216m, -$50m; (2) operating cash flow negative in three of the last four years (-$2,074m, -$2,007m, -$167m; -$420m in H1 2026) with positive accruals in all three years (+0.36%, +1.38%, +0.33% of average assets) — partly structural, since deposit flows sit in financing, and partly not, because the dividend across those years came from the balance sheet; (3) annuity DAC deferrals at 4.0% of sales/deposits, from 3.6% and 3.2% (the 10-K discloses the ratio itself), deferrable commissions $354m → $425m → $605m (+71% in two years) and deferrals +69% against amortisation +9%. Clean: SBC 0.43% of revenue; reinsurance recoverables $28,750m → $28,012m, falling, 84% collateralised; consolidated DAC/VOBA/DSI up only 2.3% on revenue down 1.2%.
⚠️ The one Item 4.02 non-reliance event (2023-03-27, ~$498m of gain on the 2021 Resolution Life coinsurance deal) sits beside flag 1 because the lever is live: "another external risk transfer deal" is named on the call of 2026-02-12 [37].
- S4Rivals and suppliersDone in a group review
carry-forward (cluster: Insurance & reinsurance — cluster pass, 2026-09-22 §2)
life/retirement, absorbs long-tail risk, paid on spread plus fees, "not a P&C cycle at all". The cluster located this name's concentration on the reinsurer side rather than the customer side.
- S5Who owns the stockDone
13F at 2026-06-30: Bain Capital Prairie 18,759,497 sh (9.80%), unchanged, the largest holder, ahead of BlackRock 18,561,962 (+63,858)
Full notes
MFS 6.37m (+491,735, largest active add), State Street 6.11m, T. Rowe 4.99m (+565,854), Balyasny −701,627 and Wells Fargo −600,393 the largest cuts. Insider ownership 0.64% — all 20 directors and executive officers hold 1,233,827 shares (1.03% with phantom units), 666,064 of that options; no individual at 1%. Short interest 13,811,317 shares at the 2026-08-31 settlement, +3,460,455 (+33%) in one fortnight, 7.2% of shares out, 7.6 days to cover — across the window holding the CFO's notice, the tender launch and Bain's sell-back election. No ATM; a live shelf (333-292076) just drawn for $500m; buyback $714m remaining on the 2021 authorisation, untouched since Q3 2022.
⚠️ Q2-26 13F incompletely ingested (413 filers vs 609) — both Vanguard entities, Dimensional, Morgan Stanley, Geode, Northern Trust absent, no exit read from an absence; the proxy confirms the Vanguard realignment for a third issuer.
⚠️
⚠️ Sixth Street / Schwab 13F defect, eighth issuer (2,193,476 sh), row discarded.
⚠️
⚠️
⚠️ 3spread resolved LNC to the Series D preferred CUSIP — see the log.
- S6What workers and customers sayDone
carry-forward (cluster: Insurance & reinsurance — cluster pass, 2026-09-22 §4)
and it is the weakest carry in this repo: [search-summary] only, Morgan Stanley Equal Weight with a PT raised to $42 against a then-$41.68 close, RBC above 420%, a ~$5.8bn GUL reinsurance transaction.
Full notes
It pre-dates the 2026-08-06 CFO departure, the 2026-08-10 tender and the 2026-08-12 Bain election, and reflects none of them. No Glassdoor, no agent or customer channel check, no board claim row mentions LNC. Product test / expert call open OPEN (user)
- S7The case for it, and pricesDone in a group review
carry-forward (cluster: Insurance & reinsurance — cluster pass, 2026-09-22 §5)
"a credit position on its reinsurers dressed as an equity in a life insurer", kill criterion "any reinsurer counterparty downgrade, or recoverables/equity rising above 3.0x". That criterion cannot fire for the reason intended — the ratio is falling (2.57x → 2.40x) and 84% of the exposure is collateralised.
Full notes
Replaced below. Conviction open OPEN (user) · valuation (bear/base/bull; moved from S8 2026-09-23): P/B 0.76x on the company's own BVPS including AOCI ($53.68 at 2026-06-30), 0.53x ex-AOCI, 0.52x on adjusted book, at $41.01 (2026-09-22).
⚠️ the cluster files' P/B of 0.70-0.71 uses $59.29, which is total equity including the $1bn of preferred divided by common shares; the honest common figure is 0.76x. 2028E adjusted operating EPS bear $6.45 / base $8.80 / bull $10.71 at 4.5x / 6.0x / 7.5x → bear ~$29, base ~$53, bull ~$80. · valuation, base case re-read 2026-09-24 against S8: no haircut — the S7 table below is built on segment run-rates, not on management guidance, so there is no guide in it to discount, and the record is 3 beat / 2 met / 0 missed. Two assumption notes instead: (a) the free-cash-flow conversion underpinning the medium-term remittance path is measured on a definition changed in 2026 (the NII redefinition, S8); (b) the bull column's falling share count still depends on a buyback management has now deferred in two consecutive quarters (dodge log).
- S8Do the bosses keep their word?Done
(partial)
5 rows (2026-09-24, dossier-2026-09-24.md): 3 beat, 2 met, 0 missed, 0 withdrawn — reliable under the team that set the targets, but the record belongs to a CFO who has left. LNC is the most checkable S8 in the insurance group: it publishes a dated multi-year outlook and reports against it.
Full notes
RBC goal 420% → 430%+ (2024) and 439% (2025). Group Protection 8% margin by end-2026 → achieved in each of the last two years. FY2024 dividend ~$300m → $307m. FY2026 leverage 25-26.5% (revised down from 25-28%) → 25.0% at 2026-03-31, two years early; alternative-investment 10% annual target → FY2025 ~10%, in line.
⚠️ WHY PARTIAL: Christopher Neczypor, EVP & CFO, resigned 2026-08-06 (8-K 0001193125-26-341190, Item 5.02; Adam M. Cohen, CAO, is interim). He made four of the five scored rows and the entire open 2026 outlook. The interim CFO has no record, and there is no post-departure call in the archive, so nobody has been asked whether the 2026 outlook survives him.
⚠️ THE 21-POINT WEDGE: the RBC figure given to investors for 2025 is 439% and management said what it excludes — "that excludes the remaining Bain proceeds" (call 2026-02-12 [15]). The figure used to pay the bonus is 460%, "inclusive of the remaining proceeds from the Bain Capital transaction earmarked for future deployment" (DEF 14A 2026-04-16), and that goal was certified at 175% of target.
⚠️ OPEN AND MOST IMPORTANT: the FY2026 free-cash-flow conversion target of 45-55%, widened at the top to 45-60% in Feb 2025 (announced, so not a withdrawal). Path: 35% (2023) → 39% (2024) → 45% (2025). But the denominator was redefined in the target year — Gallagher: "since you are redefining earnings a bit lower... that would, at the margin, make your cash flow conversion better"; Neczypor: "yes, but ... that is just, call it, optics" (call 2026-02-12 [23]/[24]). Read the 2026 result against the 2024 definition before calling it met.
- S9What to watch nextDone
trigger written; next earnings ~2026-10-29 (DERIVED from filing cadence: Q3 calls 2024-10-31 and 2025-10-30.
Full notes
market data's calendar needs a paid plan and Equibles lists no scheduled Q3 event yet). Tier 0 EDGAR sweep covers the feed (cik 59558), and on this name Schedule 13D/A and Item 5.02 are the forms to watch, not the 10-Q.
Sources and notes
Sources 14 documents
- Full notes, 24 Sep 2026
- Full notes, 23 Sep 2026
- Insurance — Stage 0 re-score, 2026-09-22
- Insurance & reinsurance — cluster pass, 2026-09-22
- EDGAR filings CIK 59558
| Short name | Document | Where it came from | Read on |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10K-FY2025 | Lincoln National Corporation Form 10-K for the year ended 2025-12-31 (accession 0000059558-26-000016) | SEC EDGAR, www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59558/000005955826000016/lnc-20251231.htm | 2026-09-23 |
| 10Q-Q2-2026 | Lincoln National Corporation Form 10-Q for the quarter ended 2026-06-30 (accession 0000059558-26-000060) | SEC EDGAR, www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59558/000005955826000060/lnc-20260630.htm | 2026-09-23 |
| DEF14A-2026 | Lincoln National Corporation definitive proxy statement filed 2026-04-16 (accession 0001193125-26-157983) | SEC EDGAR, www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59558/000119312526157983/d66808ddef14a.htm | 2026-09-23 |
| 13D-BAIN-2025 | Schedule 13D of Bain Capital Prairie, LLC on Lincoln National Corporation, filed 2025-06-12 (accession 0000950170-25-085594) | SEC EDGAR, www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59558/000095017025085594/primary_doc.xml | 2026-09-23 |
| SPA-BAIN-2025 | Stock Purchase Agreement between Bain Capital Prairie, LLC and Lincoln National Corporation dated 2025-04-09, Exhibit 99.2 to the 2025-06-12 Schedule 13D (accession 0000950170-25-085594) | SEC EDGAR, www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59558/000095017025085594/ck0000000000-ex99_2.pdf | 2026-09-24 |
| 13DA1-BAIN-2026 | Schedule 13D/A Amendment No. 1 of Bain Capital Prairie, LLC, event date 2026-08-10, filed 2026-08-12 (accession 0001193125-26-347363) | SEC EDGAR, www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59558/000119312526347363/primary_doc.xml | 2026-09-23 |
| 424B2-2026-06 | Prospectus supplement, $500,000,000 6.800% Fixed-to-Fixed Reset Rate Subordinated Notes due 2056, filed 2026-06-26 (accession 0001193125-26-285466) | SEC EDGAR, www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59558/000119312526285466/d138025d424b2.htm | 2026-09-23 |
| SCTOI-2026 | Schedule TO issuer tender offer for Series C and Series D depositary shares, filed 2026-08-10 (accession 0001193125-26-341416) | SEC EDGAR, www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59558/000119312526341416/d118793dsctoi.htm | 2026-09-23 |
| SCTOIA-RESULTS-2026 | Schedule TO/A Amendment No. 1, exhibit (a)(5)(ii) press release of tender results, filed 2026-09-09 (accession 0001193125-26-385942) | SEC EDGAR, www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59558/000119312526385942/d42038dex99a5ii.htm | 2026-09-23 |
| 8K-2026-08-10 | Form 8-K, Items 5.02/7.01/9.01, event date 2026-08-06, filed 2026-08-10 (accession 0001193125-26-341190) | SEC EDGAR, www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59558/000119312526341190/d104957d8k.htm | 2026-09-23 |
| 8K-402-2023 | Form 8-K, Item 4.02 non-reliance on previously issued financial statements, filed 2023-03-27 (accession 0001193125-23-080586) | SEC EDGAR full-text search, www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59558/000119312523080586/d421416d8k.htm | 2026-09-23 |
| FORM4-KELLY-2026 | Form 4 of Gary C. Kelly, transaction date 2026-08-12, filed 2026-08-14 (accession 0001214659-26-010421) | SEC EDGAR, www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59558/000121465926010421/marketforms-73773.xml | 2026-09-23 |
| PR-Q2-2026 | Second quarter 2026 earnings press release, exhibit 99.1 to the Form 8-K filed 2026-07-30 (accession 0000059558-26-000058) | SEC EDGAR, www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/59558/000005955826000058/a2q2026lncearningspr.htm | 2026-09-23 |
| THREESPREAD-2026-09-23 | 3spread 13F holders table for CUSIP 534187109 as of 2026-06-30 (tools/threespread.py holders LNC --cusip 534187109) | api.3spread.com, run 2026-09-23 | 2026-09-23 |
Links to other companies 21 links
| From | Link | To | Date | Where it says so |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ellen G. Cooper | officer of | LNC | 2026-08-10 | SCTOI-2026 — Item 3(a), executive officers table |
| Christopher Neczypor | key person risk | LNC | 2026-08-06 | 8K-2026-08-10 — Item 5.02, first paragraph |
| Adam M. Cohen | officer of | LNC | 2026-08-06 | 8K-2026-08-10 — Item 5.02, third paragraph |
| Bain Capital Prairie, LLC | holds | LNC | 2026-06-30 | THREESPREAD-2026-09-23 — 13F holders table, first row (Bain Capital Prairie, LLC, 18,759,497 sh, +0) |
| Bain Capital Prairie, LLC | governance structure | LNC | 2025-06-05 | 13D-BAIN-2025 — Item 4 |
| Bain Capital Prairie, LLC | shareholder proposal | LNC | 2026-08-10 | 13DA1-BAIN-2026 — Item 4, as amended and supplemented |
| Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation | financing partner | Bain Capital Prairie, LLC | 2025-06-05 | 13D-BAIN-2025 — Item 4, source of funds paragraph |
| LNC | holds | Lincoln Bain Capital Total Credit Fund | 2025-10-14 | 13D-BAIN-2025 — cross-reference; the fund 13Ds are accessions 0001193125-26-163674 and 0001193125-26-228280 filed by LNC as reporting person |
| LNC | issuer of | LNC 6.800% Fixed-to-Fixed Reset Rate Subordinated Notes due 2056 | 2026-06-26 | 424B2-2026-06 — Use of Proceeds, S-12 |
| LNC | event | LNC 9.250% Fixed Rate Reset Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, Series C | 2026-09-09 | SCTOIA-RESULTS-2026 — results table and the paragraph above it |
| LNC | event | LNC 9.000% Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, Series D (LNC PRD) | 2026-09-09 | SCTOIA-RESULTS-2026 — results table, Series D row |
| Gary C. Kelly | insider transaction | LNC 9.000% Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, Series D (LNC PRD) | 2026-08-12 | FORM4-KELLY-2026 — Table I, single non-derivative sale, footnote 2 |
| LNC | supplier dependency | Fortitude Reinsurance Company Ltd. | 2025-12-31 | 10K-FY2025 — Part I Item 1 Business, Reinsurance paragraph |
| LNC | supplier dependency | Athene Holding Ltd. | 2025-12-31 | 10K-FY2025 — Part I Item 1 Business, Reinsurance paragraph |
| LNC | litigation watch | Security Life of Denver Insurance Company (Resolution Life) | 2023-03-27 | 8K-402-2023 — Item 4.02 |
| LNC | governance structure | Lincoln Pinehurst Reinsurance Company (Bermuda) Limited | 2025-12-31 | 10K-FY2025 — MD&A, Significant Operational Matters, fourth bullet |
| LNC | governance structure | Lincoln National Reinsurance Company (Barbados) Limited | 2026-06-30 | 10Q-Q2-2026 — Liquidity and Capital Resources, Subsidiaries' Capital |
| Ernst & Young LLP (PCAOB ID 42) | auditor of | LNC | 2026-02-19 | 10K-FY2025 — Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm, Critical Audit Matters |
| Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz | counsel to | LNC | 2026-08-10 | SCTOI-2026 — cover page, Copies to |
| BlackRock, Inc. | holds | LNC | 2026-06-30 | THREESPREAD-2026-09-23 — 13F holders table, second row |
| LNC | context | LNC | 2026-03-20 | DEF14A-2026 — Security Ownership of Directors, Nominees and Executive Officers as of March 20, 2026 — the group row (1,233,827 shares / 0.64% / 1,974,460 with units / 1.03%). No quote: it is a table row, not a sentence. |
History 4 entries
- 2026-09-23 — first pass, slot
names-insurance-2b, model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine. S1, S2, S3 (gate-minimum), S5 and S9 closed; S0 carried forward fromInsurance — Stage 0 re-score, 2026-09-22§6 and S4/S6/S7 fromInsurance & reinsurance — cluster pass, 2026-09-22; S8 modelled and left open. Run finding: the Bain floor on the buyback — see the paragraph above, corrected 2026-09-24 (it is Bain's floor on its own exit, not LNC's cost). Second: the capital structure was rebuilt in three months — $500m of 6.800% deferrable subordinated notes due 2056 issued in June explicitly to retire preferred, then $437.3m of 9.25% and 9.00% preferred taken in for ~$461.8m of cash on 2026-09-10 at a 5.2-5.5% premium to par, worth about $13m a year net to the common and a step down in capital quality. Third: the cluster's LNC kill criterion is built on a gross recoverables number the 10-K itself qualifies — 84%, $23.5bn, collateralised — so the honest net exposure is ~$4.5bn on $10,906m of equity, and the criterion is replaced. Fourth: the 2025 bonus paid 175% on "Actions to Improve Distributable Earnings", a metric whose constituent actions were "reviewed by the CFO as meeting the criteria established by the Committee", and which the Compensation Committee justified partly by an RBC ratio that rose "inclusive of the remaining proceeds from the Bain Capital transaction" — the same issue that diluted the 45%-weighted per-share metric. Fifth: the only director holding LNC preferred sold his family trust's entire position at $26.50-26.54 on 2026-08-12, two days after the company offered $26.30 for it, and did not tender. Sixth: the cluster files' P/B of 0.70 divides total equity including preferred by common shares; the company's own BVPS is $53.68 and the honest P/B is 0.76x. TOOLING, new and affecting every S5 on a name with listed preferred:threespread.py holders LNCresolves to CUSIP 534187885, the Series D depositary share, and returns one filer and 81,775 shares; the common is 534187109, which returns 413 filers and 110.4m shares. It does not error — it answers a different question. Fourth distinct 3spread defect after the empty-ADR-CUSIP answers, the incomplete-quarter lag and the Sixth Street / Schwab duplication (which appears here for the eighth issuer). Also:ownersprints the issuer's own name in the Filer column for every row, and Bain's 2026-08-12 13D/A is missing from that list although EDGAR carries it. Evidence and access limits indossier-2026-09-23.md§6. Nothing here is human-verified. - 2026-09-23 — stage redefinition, owner decision (WATCHLIST_PLAN.md §25): S8 is now Management credibility and is not yet run for this name; the old S8 valuation figures moved to the
valuation:line under S7, and any proposed buy price or position size was removed (the pipeline no longer drafts either). No research was redone. S2 capital allocation and S3 earnings quality are also pending, in the same backfill slot. - 2026-09-24 — correction, by hand in a session (model-drafted; nothing here is human-verified). Read the stock purchase agreement itself (Exhibit 99.2 to Bain's 2025 13D, accession 0000950170-25-085594), which the first pass had not. §6.2 prices Bain's sell-back at LNC's own monthly buyback VWAP and, if Bain declines, lets LNC buy anyway with Bain's votes above 10% frozen; §6.3(b) bars other sales by Bain until 2028-06-05. The $44.00 in the 2026-08-10 election is Bain's own condition for accepting. Retracted: "every further share retired forces the company to take Bain's stock at $44.00", "four-fifths of the $714m authority runs into the floor", and the kill criterion built on them. Rewritten: the finding paragraph, the S7 share- count note, that kill criterion,
dossier-2026-09-23.md§1.2 and the Bain edge inrelationships.yaml, which now cites the agreement. The run-finding text inschedule.yamlslotnames-insurance-2bis left as the record of what that session concluded. - 2026-09-24 — backfill, slot
backfill-2026-09-23-6, model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine. Wrote the three checks added on 2026-09-23 (WATCHLIST_PLAN.md §25) intodossier-2026-09-24.mdand updated this file: S8 management credibility (5 rows, 3 beat / 2 met / 0 missed / 0 withdrawn — reliable, closed ✅ (partial) because four of the five and the whole 2026 outlook belong to the departed CFO), S2 capital allocation (neutral) and S3 earnings quality (3 flags). No other stage was redone. Sources: FY2025 10-K, Q2 2026 10-Q, the 2026-08-10 Item 5.02 8-K, the DEF 14A of 2026-04-16 read for Exhibit 2's incentive definitions rather than the ownership table, XBRLcompanyfacts, and all seven archived market data transcripts. Run finding — the RBC ratio has two values in the same year and the higher one is the one that pays. The call of 2026-02-12 gives investors 439% and says it "excludes the remaining Bain proceeds that are earmarked for deployment next year"; the proxy filed nine weeks later certifies the Actions to Improve Distributable Earnings goal at 175% of target on an RBC ratio that went "from 433% to 460%, inclusive of the remaining proceeds from the Bain Capital transaction". The 21 points between them are unspent shareholder money. Second finding: the per-share metric carrying the largest AIP weight (45%) is not the published one. Exhibit 2 defines Income from Operations per Share as income from operations plus defined exclusions, and every exclusion is a one-directional reduction — from reinsurance transactions (D), actuarial assumption and model changes (G) and strategic-project costs (H), which are the three levers management says it will keep pulling. FY2025 came out at $8.72 against $8.26 reported, a 154.1% payout. Third: the annual assumption review has been routed around the measure the company is scored on — impact on income from operations −$131m (2023), +$8m (2024), +$2m (2025), while the impact on net income over the same three years was −$167m, +$216m, −$50m. Fourth: annuity DAC deferrals are at 4.0% of sales/deposits from 3.2% two years ago — the 10-K discloses the ratio itself — with deferrable commissions up 71% in two years against amortisation up 9%. Fifth: the 2026 free-cash-flow conversion target's denominator was redefined in the target year and the CFO agreed on the call that it helps the ratio, then resigned six months later. Sixth: $3,221m was returned to common over five years against $1,144m of cumulative operating cash flow — 282% — with the difference funded by disposals, debt and finally by issuing stock at $44.00 into a market that now prices it at $41.01. Nothing here is human-verified.
Full notes, 24 Sep 2026 22 min read
LNC — dossier, 2026-09-24 (backfill: S8, S2 capital allocation, S3 earnings quality)
Slot backfill-2026-09-23-6. Model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine; nothing here is human-verified. This file holds only the three checks added on 2026-09-23 (WATCHLIST_PLAN.md §25). Every other stage stands as written in dossier-2026-09-23.md. Anything from background knowledge is marked [background].
Sources this pass. EDGAR, User-Agent ddboard-research gorkem@celebico.com (CIK 59558): the FY2025 10-K (0000059558-26-000016, filed 2026-02-19) for the consolidated statements, the segment note, the annual-assumption-review table, the commissions-and-expenses tables and the preferred note; the Q2 2026 10-Q (0000059558-26-000060); the Item 5.02 8-K of 2026-08-10 (0001193125-26-341190); the DEF 14A of 2026-04-16 (0001193125-26-157983) — read this pass for the incentive-plan definitions in Exhibit 2, not just the ownership table; and XBRL companyfacts for CIK 59558. Transcripts entirely from the archive ledger/research/_transcripts/LNC/ (market data, seven quarters FY2024-Q3 through FY2026-Q1, call dates from _transcripts/index.json). Equibles: 0 calls. market data: 0 calls. 3spread: 0 calls. Nothing was fetched from the open web.
Transcript coverage. Seven quarters, FY2024-Q3 (2024-10-31) to FY2026-Q1 (2026-05-07). There is no FY2026-Q2 call in the archive — LNC's Q2 2026 results were filed 2026-07-30 but no transcript has been retrieved from market data, which is the same gap dossier-2026-09-23.md recorded. So the most recent call read here is 2026-05-07, three months before the CFO resigned. Nothing in this file reflects a call held after that event, because there is not one to read.
Quote discipline: every transcript quote was located by exact substring in the archived JSON bytes and copied from it; filing quotes were matched against a whitespace-collapsed text extraction of the EDGAR HTML. Turn numbers [n] are newline positions in the market data content string.
S8 — management credibility
How Lincoln guides: a multi-year outlook deck, restated every February. Unlike the two insurers in the slots either side of this one, LNC publishes dated, quantitative, multi-year targets — a 2026 free-cash-flow conversion range, a 2026 leverage range, an RBC goal, a Group Protection margin objective, an annual alternative-investment return assumption — and then reports against them each quarter. That makes this the most checkable S8 in the insurance group, and the record is good.
Who promised, and who is still here. market data labels turns by name only; roles are read off EDGAR as of each call date.
- Ellen G. Cooper, Chair, President and Chief Executive Officer throughout the window and still in the role (nominee 1b on the proxy card for the 2026 annual meeting, DEF 14A of 2026-04-16). Made row 1.
- Christopher Neczypor, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer for the whole window — and departed. 8-K of 2026-08-10, Item 5.02: "On August 6, 2026, Christopher Neczypor, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer ("CFO"), notified Lincoln National Corporation (the "Company") of his intention to leave the Company to pursue another employment opportunity outside of our industry, and his departure is not related to the Company's financial or operating results or to any disagreements with the Company... Mr. Neczypor will remain with the Company through the end of August to help with the transition." He made rows 2, 3, 4 and 5 and the open 2026 outlook row — every quantitative commitment in this table except the RBC goal.
- Adam M. Cohen, SVP, Chief Accounting Officer and Treasurer, interim CFO effective 2026-08-10 (same 8-K), joined the company March 2022. He has made no guide.
Four of five scored rows, and the whole 2026 outlook, belong to an executive who has left.
Say vs do (guides made 2024-10-31 → 2026-05-07)
| # | Promise (period · metric · figure) | Made where · by whom | Result · locator | Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | standing · RBC ratio of 420% — a 20-point buffer over the 400% target | call 2025-02-06 [1] · Ellen G. Cooper (Chair, President & CEO): "Last year, we communicated our goal to build and maintain an RBC ratio of 420%, a 20-point buffer over our 400% RBC target." | above 430% at 2024-12-31 (same call [2], Neczypor: "we were able to end the year with RBC above 430%") and 439% at 2025-12-31 (call 2026-02-12 [15], Neczypor: "we ended the year at 439%"). DEF 14A 2026-04-16: "our capital levels remained well above our RBC ratio goal of 420%" | beat — but see the 21-point wedge under the tally |
| 2 | by end of 2026 · Group Protection margin of 8% | restated on the call of 2026-02-12 [5] · Christopher Neczypor (EVP & CFO): "Two years ago, we outlined an objective of achieving an 8% margin by the end of 2026." | achieved in each of 2024 and 2025, two years early — same sentence, continued: "We have now achieved that target in each of the last two years, and our goal remains to continue operating at 8% or above." | beat |
| 3 | FY2024 · common dividend ≈$300m | call 2024-10-31 [7] · Neczypor: "we obviously are on track to pay $300 million of a dividend" | $307m — XBRL PaymentsOfDividendsCommonStock, FY2024 | met |
| 4 | FY2026 · leverage ratio 25%–26.5%, revised down from the prior year's 25%–28% outlook | call 2025-02-06 [2] · Neczypor: "an improvement in expected leverage, down from a range of 25% to 28% in last year's outlook to 25% to 26.5% in this year's outlook" | 25.0% at 2026-03-31 — call 2026-05-07 [1]: "leverage ratio improved further during the quarter to 25%, which is now at our long-term target" — and 25.1% at 2026-06-30 (Q2 2026 10-Q, scorecard.md S2). Inside the revised range and at the bottom of it, two years early | beat |
| 5 | annual · alternative investments ~10% return, the assumption the quarterly beat/miss is reported against | stated every quarter as "our return target" and sized on the call of 2026-05-07 [2]: "above our 10% annualized target" | FY2025 ≈10% — call 2026-02-12 [11] · Neczypor: "For the full year, alternative returns of approximately 10% were in line with our annual return target." The quarterly path either side: +$7m (Q3 2024), +$8m (Q4 2024), −$18m (Q1 2025), −$2m (Q3 2025), +$16m (Q4 2025), +$19m (Q1 2026), all after tax | met |
Not scored (open) — and the open one is the one that matters.
- FY2026 free-cash-flow conversion of 45%–55%, set in the early-2024 outlook and widened at the top end to 45%–60% a year later. Management announced the change rather than hiding it — call 2025-02-06 [2], Neczypor: "we made two changes to our 2026 outlook. The first being a widening of the upper bound of expectations for free cash flow conversion from 45% to 55% in last year's outlook to 45% to 60%" — so it is not a withdrawal under §S8. The path to date is good: 35% (2023) → 39% (2024) → 45% (2025) (call 2025-02-06 [2] for the first two; call 2026-02-12 [5] for "a 2025 conversion ratio of 45%, 10 points higher than 2023"). The 2026 result lands with the FY2026 10-K in February 2027. ⚠️ But the denominator was redefined in the year the target comes due, and the CFO agreed on the record that it helps the ratio. Call 2026-02-12 [23], Thomas Gallagher (Evercore): "just a question on this redefinition of NII... And I presume also, since you are redefining earnings a bit lower, on an apples-to-apples basis, that would, at the margin, make your cash flow conversion better, all things equal." Neczypor [24]: "So on that last point, yes, but I think that is just definitional. Right? I mean, we are focused on the absolute dollars of free cash flow. When you are comparing it to the GAAP number, yes, that would have a slight positive to it, but that is just, call it, optics." He describes it as small and as an annual housekeeping exercise, and it may be both. It is still a change to the denominator of the one multi-year number the company is scored on, made in the target year, by the executive who left six months later. A 2026 conversion ratio of 45–60% should be read against the 2024 definition before it is called met.
- Medium-term capital return of "$400 to $600 million plus" (slide 18 of the Q4 2025 deck; put to management by Joel Hurwitz on the call of 2026-02-12 [14] and not disputed) and medium-term subsidiary remittances of $1.2–1.3bn [33]. Medium term is undated; nothing is due.
- Resuming the buyback. Not a promise — a question deferred twice; see the dodge log.
Tally: 5 rows — 3 beat, 2 met, 0 missed, 0 withdrawn. Four of the five, and the entire open 2026 outlook, were made by a CFO who left on 2026-08-06.
Three things sit on top of that tally, and together they are why the verdict is not simply conservative.
- The RBC beat has a 21-point wedge in it, and the wedge is where the pay is. The number given to investors for 2025 is 439%, and management said on the call exactly what it excludes: "we ended the year at 439%, and by the way, that excludes the remaining Bain proceeds that are earmarked for deployment next year" (2026-02-12 [15]). The number used to pay the 2025 bonus is 460%: "During 2025, the RBC ratio increased from 433% to 460%, inclusive of the remaining proceeds from the Bain Capital transaction earmarked for future deployment. Based on its review of the actions and the resulting significant increase in distributable earnings and the RBC ratio, the Compensation Committee determined that this goal had been achieved at 175% of target" (DEF 14A 2026-04-16). Same year, same ratio, two figures, and the more flattering one is the one attached to a 175% payout. The capital that makes up the difference is shareholders' own, issued to Bain at $44.00 in June 2025 and not yet deployed.
- The guides were met, and one of the means was issuing equity. The RBC rebuild, the leverage ratio and the free-cash-flow conversion all improved on a share count that went from 170.7m (2023) to 191.4m (2026-06-30). An analyst put this directly to management on the call of 2025-07-31: "it seems to me that, that guidance was given pre-Bain. And so if one of the objectives here of the Bain Capital is to improve risk-adjusted returns and free cash flow conversion, it would seem that with the Bain Capital, you should be perhaps above the target that you gave". The targets were not re-based for the new equity.
- The promiser is gone, four months before the verdict. §S8's explicit flag — a CEO or CFO leaving within two quarters of a missed or withdrawn guide — does not fire, because nothing here is missed or withdrawn. What did happen is adjacent and worth the same attention: the CFO who set the 2026 outlook, widened its upper bound, redefined its denominator and answered every question about it resigned on 2026-08-06, and the FY2026 result will be reported by an interim successor who has never spoken to it. There is no call after his departure in the archive, so nobody has yet been asked whether the 2026 outlook survives him.
Dodge-log roll-up (§3.1). The existing log (three entries, all from the call of 2026-05-07) stands and is extended by this pass, which read the FY2025-Q4 call (2026-02-12) — the more recent of the two calls the earlier pass did not reach in full.
- Resuming the share buyback — asked and deferred in two consecutive quarters, and the deferral was to a date that then passed. Q3 2025 (2025-10-30): Joel Hurwitz asked "with leverage essentially back to your 25% target and a much improved capital position, where do you guys stand on resuming a share repurchase program?" [8]; Neczypor answered "we tend to talk in more detail about our capital plans and free cash flow outlook and so forth as part of our fourth quarter earnings call when we give the outlook... we'll go through that in more detail" [9]. Q4 2025 (2026-02-12): Hurwitz asked the arithmetic version — $400–600m of capital return less a ~$350m dividend "is that implying at least $50 million of buybacks in 2026?" [14]; the answer restated the three capital priorities and closed "we are not going to give you a 2026 versus 2027" [15]. The question was deferred to a specific call, and on that call it was deferred again. Under §3.1 that is a thread to pull, and on this name it is the thread —
scorecard.md's finding paragraph turns on the interaction between a resumed buyback and Bain's §6.2 sell-back right. - Note, not a dodge. "Tom, if you are looking for 2028 and 2029 guidance, I will have to get back to you" (2026-02-12 [22]) is a refusal to extend an outlook, and it is followed by an answer to the question actually asked.
Verdict — ✅ (partial): reliable under the team that set the targets, but the record belongs to a CFO who has left. On the rows alone this is conservative: five for five, three of them beaten, two of them beaten two years early, and the one revision to a multi-year range was announced and was upward. Against that, §S8 says the verdict is about the team in charge now, and four of five rows plus the entire 2026 outlook belong to Christopher Neczypor, who resigned on 2026-08-06; the interim CFO has no record at all. Add the 439%-vs-460% wedge and the redefinition of the conversion denominator in the target year, and the honest closing is a partial one: the targets were hit, and two of the measures moved toward the company while they were being hit.
Consequence for S7: no haircut to the base case — the operating forecast in scorecard.md's S7 table is built on segment run-rates, not on management guidance, so there is no guide in it to discount. Two assumption notes are added instead: the free-cash-flow conversion that supports the medium-term remittance path is measured on a definition changed in 2026, and the share count in the bull column still depends on a buyback that has been deferred twice.
S2 — capital allocation
All figures $m, calendar fiscal years. Sources: XBRL companyfacts (CIK 59558) — OCF NetCashProvidedByUsedInOperatingActivities, buybacks PaymentsForRepurchaseOfCommonStock, dividends PaymentsOfDividendsCommonStock and PaymentsOfDividendsPreferredStockAndPreferenceStock, SBC AllocatedShareBasedCompensationExpense, GoodwillImpairmentLoss, ProceedsFromIssuanceOfCommonStock, StockholdersEquity, AccumulatedOtherComprehensiveIncomeLossNetOfTax, CommonStockSharesOutstanding, WeightedAverageNumberOfDilutedSharesOutstanding — plus the FY2025 10-K segment note for income from operations and the preferred note for the $986m carrying value.
| FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | 5y total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating cash flow | (217) | 3,609 | (2,074) | (2,007) | (167) | 1,144 |
| Buybacks | 1,105 | 550 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,655 |
| Common dividends paid | 319 | 310 | 305 | 307 | 325 | 1,566 |
| Preferred dividends paid | 0 | 0 | 82 | 91 | 91 | 264 |
| Common stock issued | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 825 (Bain) | 825 |
| Stock-based compensation | 61 | 51 | 61 | 64 | 78 | 315 |
| SBC as % of revenue | 0.34% | 0.27% | 0.52% | 0.35% | 0.43% | |
| Goodwill impairment | 0 | 634 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 634 |
| Diluted weighted-average shares (m) | 189.6 | 172.7 | 170.7 | 173.1 | 186.1 |
Where the cash went — and where it came from. $3,221m went to common shareholders over five years ($1,655m of buybacks and $1,566m of dividends) against $1,144m of cumulative operating cash flow. That is 282% of five years of operating cash flow, and it is the number this check exists to surface. The difference was funded by the balance sheet: the Fortitude Re and Resolution Life reinsurance transactions, the sale of the wealth management business (2024) and of Elephant Insurance, debt, and finally by issuing $825m of new common stock to Bain Capital in June 2025. The dividend was held at roughly $300m a year through 2023 and 2024 — two years of operating cash outflows of $2,074m and $2,007m and, in 2023, a GAAP net loss of $752m.
The caveat that keeps this from being an indictment, stated plainly. For a life and annuity writer, deposit-type contract flows run through financing, not operating, so negative operating cash flow is partly a presentation artefact rather than a cash shortfall; scorecard.md S2 already says so. What the artefact does not explain is the shape: buybacks of $1,655m in 2021–22, then four consecutive years of none, then equity issued at $44.00 in 2025 — the company bought its own stock when it was expensive and sold it when it was cheap. At 2026-09-22 the shares closed at $41.01 (scorecard.md S7), below the price Bain paid.
Buybacks at what price. Nothing was repurchased in 2023, 2024 or 2025, so there is no average price to compute for the window; $714m remains on the 2021 authorisation, untouched since Q3 2022 (scorecard.md S5). The last two years of purchases were made at a share count of 189.6m and 172.7m weighted-average, i.e. before the 2022 equity collapse — LNC's total equity fell from $19,915m (2021-12-31) to $5,102m (2022-12-31) — so those buybacks were made into the balance sheet that then had to be rebuilt with Bain's money three years later.
What the acquisitions and disposals were worth. No acquisitions in the window. One impairment: $634m of goodwill written off in 2022, the only such charge in five years. The disposals (wealth management in 2024, Elephant, and the Fortitude Re and Resolution Life risk transfers) are what funded the capital rebuild, and one of them is the subject of the only non-reliance event on this registrant's record — the 2023-03-27 Item 4.02 restatement of ~$498m of gain on the 2021 Resolution Life coinsurance deal (scorecard.md S3).
What the bonus is paid on — read this pass, and it is the finding. DEF 14A of 2026-04-16: the 2025 Annual Incentive Program's largest financial measure is Income from Operations per Share at a 45% weighting ("This is a key measure of profitability that management uses to evaluate our business and that investors commonly use to value companies in the financial services industry"). The §25 "EPS-based pay plus buybacks" flag does not fire in its usual form — there have been no buybacks for four years — but it fires in reverse, and harder: the per-share metric was diluted by 12% by an equity issue whose proceeds lifted the RBC ratio used to certify a different goal at 175% of target. One transaction, two incentive measures, opposite directions.
And the per-share metric is not the reported one. Exhibit 2 of the same proxy defines it as "the sum of Income from Operations and defined exclusions... divided by average diluted shares", where the defined exclusions are one-directional. Among them:
D. Reductions in earnings resulting from the sale or reinsurance of a business or block of business, including reductions related to timing, consideration, or ongoing impacts associated with the sale;
G. Reduction in earnings resulting from initial and ongoing impacts from changes in the assumptions used in our actuarial models and systems, the changes resulting from the review of such models and systems and the changes to or conversion of actuarial systems;
H. Reduction in earnings from costs associated with strategic projects not considered in plan;
Every one is a reduction; there is no symmetric clause removing an increase. So the three things this management says it will keep doing — reinsurance transactions, the annual assumption review, and strategic projects — count against the bonus only when they help. The arithmetic is disclosed: "Income from Operations per Share as calculated under the 2025 AIP was $8.72, resulting in a 154.1% payout for this goal." Reported adjusted operating income available to common for FY2025 was $1,537m ($1,628m of segment income from operations less $91m of preferred dividends) on 186.1m diluted shares — $8.26. The pay measure is 5.6% above the published one, and above GAAP by more than double.
Returns. GAAP return on equity is unusable on this registrant and the scorecard already says so: net income of $3,778m (2021), $1,358m, $(752)m, $3,275m and $1,177m against an equity base that fell by three-quarters in 2022 produces ROEs of 17.7%, 10.9%, −12.5%, 43.2% and 12.3% — none of which is a return on anything. The defensible series is the operating one:
| FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Segment income from operations ($m, 10-K Note 19) | 990 | 1,315 | 1,628 |
| less preferred dividends | (82) | (91) | (91) |
| Available to common ($m) | 908 | 1,224 | 1,537 |
| Diluted weighted-average shares (m) | 170.7 | 173.1 | 186.1 |
| Adjusted operating EPS | $5.32 | $7.07 | $8.26 |
| Memo: the AIP's version of the same measure | $8.72 |
Earnings up 69% in two years; earnings per share up 55%. The 14-point gap is the Bain issue. And the series has already turned on the per-share line: H1 2026 adjusted operating EPS of $3.89 against $3.97 a year earlier, on adjusted operating income to common that rose from $427m to $439m (scorecard.md S2).
Book value per common share, computed here (total equity less the $986m carrying value of the Series C and Series D preferred, over common shares outstanding), because the 10-K does not state it:
| 2023-12-31 | 2024-12-31 | 2025-12-31 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Common equity ($m) | 5,907 | 7,283 | 9,920 |
| Shares outstanding (m) | 169.7 | 170.4 | 190.1 |
| BVPS incl. AOCI | $34.81 | $42.74 | $52.20 |
| BVPS excl. AOCI | $55.30 | $72.30 | $73.55 |
Both series are flattered by the same thing that makes GAAP ROE useless — the market-risk-benefit marks run through net income and therefore into retained earnings and into the ex-AOCI figure. The company's own figures at 2026-06-30 are $53.68 including AOCI, $77.39 excluding it and $79.45 on an adjusted basis (scorecard.md S7).
Verdict: neutral. It is neutral as the average of two opposite records rather than as a steady middle. 2021–2023 destroys: $1,655m of buybacks and $924m of dividends paid into a balance sheet that lost three-quarters of its equity, a $634m goodwill write-off, and a dividend maintained through a loss year. 2024–2026 repairs: leverage 28%→25%, RBC 400%→439%, free-cash-flow conversion 35%→45%, adjusted operating income +69% in two years, a Bermuda affiliate, an expense programme, and a preferred tender that takes $437.3m of 9%+ capital out of the stack. The repair is real and it is not yet a return — it was paid for with a 12% increase in the share count, and per-share earnings have already stopped rising. It is not a capital destroyer today, so no kill criterion is added on that basis; what is added below is a criterion on the two measures that moved.
S3 addendum — earnings quality
Sources: the FY2025 10-K (segment note, annual-assumption-review table, commissions-and-other- expenses tables for Annuities and Life Insurance, balance sheet); the DEF 14A of 2026-04-16 Exhibit 2; XBRL companyfacts.
- The non-GAAP bridge. Flag 1, and it has two parts. (a) The pay version of the measure. There are three earnings numbers for FY2025: GAAP net income $1,177m; income from operations available to common $1,537m / $8.26 a share; and the AIP's income from operations per share, $8.72, which is the reported measure plus a one-directional list of "reductions in earnings" (S2 above, exhibits D, G and H). The published non-GAAP measure is defensible and is the industry convention. The pay measure is a third, more generous one, and it is the number the 45%-weighted goal was certified against at 154.1%. (b) The annual assumption review is being routed around the measure the company is scored on. 10-K table:
| Annual assumption review impact ($m) | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Within income (loss) from operations | (131) | 8 | 2 |
| Excluded from income (loss) from operations | (36) | 208 | (52) |
| Net income impact | (167) | 216 | (50) |
In 2023 the review cost income from operations $131m, almost all of it in Life Insurance ($(156)m). In the two years since, the same annual exercise has swung net income by $216m and $(50)m while touching income from operations by +$8m and +$2m. The company's disclosure is complete and the split follows its stated policy; the observation is that the measure investors and the AIP are scored on has been insulated from the single largest annual judgement management makes, two years running.
- Stock-based compensation. Clean, and the usual test cannot run. FY2025 SBC $78m = 0.43% of revenue. The "FCF after SBC below half of reported FCF" test is not computable: free cash flow on a GAAP basis is negative (see 3), and the company's own free-cash-flow measure is a statutory remittance concept, not OCF less capex. Stated, not scored.
- Cash conversion. Flag 2, and it is structural rather than an accusation. Operating cash flow was negative in three of the last four years — $(2,074)m (2023), $(2,007)m (2024), $(167)m (2025) — and $(420)m in H1 2026 against $+741m a year earlier (
scorecard.mdS2). Against net income that gives OCF/NI of −0.61x (2024) and −0.14x (2025); accruals ((net income − OCF) / average total assets) are positive in all three years at +0.36% (2023), +1.38% (2024) and +0.33% (2025) — the exact opposite sign to KNSL's and ACGL's. The caveat is real and is the reason this is a flag rather than a finding: for a life and annuity writer, policyholder deposits and withdrawals sit in financing, so a growing annuity book can show negative operating cash flow while collecting cash. It is still the case that reported profit here has not been cash for four years, and that the dividend paid across those years came from somewhere else (S2). - Working capital — the insurer equivalent. Clean, and improving. Reinsurance recoverables net of allowance $28,012m at 2025-12-31 against $28,750m at 2024-12-31, i.e. falling, on total assets of $417,204m.
scorecard.mdS0/S3 already carry the qualification that matters: the 10-K states "84%, or $23.5 billion, of our total reinsurance recoverable was secured by collateral for our benefit", so the net exposure is ~$4.5bn on $10,906m of equity. - Costs moved onto the balance sheet. Flag 3, and this is the one the test was written for. The FY2025 10-K discloses the ratio itself for the Annuities segment: "DAC Deferrals — As a percentage of sales/deposits | 4.0% | 3.6% | 3.2%" for 2025, 2024 and 2023. Rising two periods running. The components:
| Annuities segment ($m, 10-K) | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deferrable commissions | 354 | 425 | 605 |
| DAC deferrals (cost capitalised) | (411) | (498) | (693) |
| DAC, VOBA and other amortisation | 433 | 432 | 472 |
Deferrable commissions are up 71% in two years and deferrals up 69%, while amortisation is up 9%. The Life Insurance segment runs the other way (DAC and VOBA deferrals $671m → $543m → $553m), and the consolidated DAC/VOBA/DSI balance is $12,827m (2025) against $12,537m (2024), +2.3% on revenue of $18,212m against $18,442m, −1.2%. So the balance-sheet total is only mildly up; the composition is what moved, and it moved toward capitalising a rising share of the cost of writing annuities in the years the annuity book was the growth story.
- Sector equivalents. The life-writer test is the assumption unlocking, covered in 1(b) above — charges to net income in two of the last three years, the §4.3 test-1 result the S0 lens scored 0 on, and unchanged by this pass. One item of history belongs beside it because the lever is still live: the only Item 4.02 non-reliance event on this registrant's record (2023-03-27) restated roughly $498m of gain on the 2021 Resolution Life coinsurance transaction (
scorecard.mdS3), and management has said the next levers include "another external risk transfer deal" (call 2026-02-12 [37]).
EQ summary: 3 flags — (1) three different earnings measures for one year, with the one used to pay the 45%-weighted bonus ($8.72) above the published operating figure ($8.26) on a one-directional exclusion list, and an annual assumption review whose impact on income from operations has been +$8m and +$2m in the two years it swung net income by +$216m and −$50m; (2) operating cash flow negative in three of the last four years with positive accruals throughout, partly structural for a deposit-taking writer and partly not; (3) annuity DAC deferrals at 4.0% of sales/deposits from 3.2% two years earlier, with deferrable commissions up 71%, against amortisation up 9%. Clean: SBC at 0.43% of revenue, reinsurance recoverables falling and 84% collateralised, the consolidated DAC balance up only 2.3%.
Full notes, 23 Sep 2026 22 min read
LNC — dossier, 2026-09-23
Slot names-insurance-2b, a one-name pass. Model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine; nothing here is human-verified. Every figure carries the filing it came from. Dated file — never edited after today.
Price context: $41.01 close 2026-09-22 (market data NYSE:LNC). ADV over the 21 sessions to 2026-09-22: $85.6m/day, 1,987,257 shares.
1. What this pass found
Three facts that are not in the cluster files and change how the name reads.
1.1 The capital structure was rebuilt in three months, and the equity story is a swap
- June 2026. $500,000,000 of 6.800% Fixed-to-Fixed Reset Rate Subordinated Notes due 2056, ~$493m net. The prospectus says the money is for "which may include the repurchase and/or redemption of shares of our outstanding 9.250% Fixed Rate Reset Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, Series C" (424B2 filed 2026-06-26, accession 0001193125-26-285466, Use of Proceeds, page S-12). The notes let LNC defer interest for up to five years.
- 10 August 2026. Issuer tender for up to $500m of liquidation preference across the 9.250% Series C and 9.000% Series D depositary shares (Schedule TO, accession 0001193125-26-341416). Wachtell on the cover.
- 9 September 2026. Results: $265,945,000 of Series C at $1,055.00 per $1,000, and $171,355,350 of Series D at $26.30 per $25, for ~$461.8m of cash, settling 2026-09-10. "The shares accepted for purchase represent approximately 53.2% of the Company's issued and outstanding Series C Depositary Shares and approximately 34.3% of the Company's issued and outstanding Series D Depositary Shares as of the date hereof." (exhibit (a)(5)(ii) to the Schedule TO/A, accession 0001193125-26-385942).
Read as arithmetic: $437.3m of 9%-ish perpetual preferred equity replaced with $500m of 6.8% deferrable subordinated debt, at a 5.2-5.5% premium to par. Preferred dividends fall by about $40m a year (Series C 9.25% x $265.9m = $24.6m; Series D 9.00% x $171.4m = $15.4m); the notes cost $34m a year pre-tax, roughly $27m after tax at 21%. Net benefit to the common is on the order of $13m a year, about $0.07 a share, for ~$25m of premium paid and a permanent step down in the quality of the capital. The 2026-07-30 release calls it "Completed $500 million subordinated debt issuance with proceeds supporting capital flexibility to repurchase and/or redeem outstanding preferred stock."
The leverage ratio was 25.1% at 2026-06-30 against a 25% target (Q2 earnings supplement, page 9) before the tender settled. That ratio is the first thing to check in the Q3 release.
1.2 Bain is the largest holder, the buyback is its only exit before June 2028, and Bain will not use it below $44
- 5 June 2025. LNC sold Bain Capital Prairie, LLC 18,759,497 new common shares at $44.00, $825,417,868, "based on a 25% premium to the 30-day volume-weighted average price as of April 8, 2025" (Q2 2026 10-Q, Issuance of Common Stock note). Bain part-funded it with $550,000,000 borrowed from SMBC, secured on the equity interest that holds the LNC shares (13D, accession 0000950170-25-085594, Item 4). $800m of the $825m went straight into LNL as a capital contribution (10-Q, Subsidiaries' Capital).
- Bain got a board observer, convertible from 2026-06-05 into a voting director (the "Prairie Designee"), approval rights over charter changes, liquidation, deregistration and delisting, and a standstill below 10%.
- 10 August 2026. Bain elected under Section 6.2 of the purchase agreement to sell shares back to the company as it repurchases, "to the extent necessary to prevent the Reporting Person from beneficially owning 10% or more of the voting securities of the Company, subject to a floor price equal to the Reporting Person's initial acquisition price of the Common Stock." (13D/A No. 1, accession 0001193125-26-347363, Item 4.)
The floor is $44.00. LNC closed at $41.01 on 2026-09-22 — 6.8% below it, and it has been below it every session since 2026-09-14.
Corrected 2026-09-24 against the stock purchase agreement itself (Exhibit 99.2 to the 2025 13D, accession 0000950170-25-085594). The first pass read only the 13D/A's one-sentence summary of the election and concluded that past 10%, every share LNC retires forces it to buy Bain's stock at $44.00, so that four-fifths of the $714m authorisation was encumbered. The agreement does not support that. What Section 6.2 actually says:
- LNC "will not engage in any Common Stock share repurchase program or self-tender that would result in Buyer violating the Voting Ownership Cap" (10% of total voting power, §6.1(a)), unless it offers to buy from Bain "such number of shares ... as would be necessary to prevent Buyer from violating the Voting Ownership Cap, at a purchase price equal to the applicable Share Repurchase Price."
- The Share Repurchase Price for an open-market programme is "the volume weighted average price paid by the Company to the other holders ... over the applicable month" (definitions, §1.1). LNC never pays Bain more than it pays the market. There is no $44 in the agreement.
- If Bain rejects the offer, LNC may still repurchase: "Buyer hereby agrees that it shall not vote ... any Voting Securities of the Company in excess of the Voting Ownership Cap unless and until it obtains ... approval of the acquisition of 'control' or receives a disclaimer of 'control'" from the insurance subsidiaries' domiciliary regulators.
- Until the third anniversary of closing (2028-06-05), Bain may not transfer the purchased shares "other than as provided in Section 6.2" (§6.3(b)); from year four it may sell a third a year.
So the $44.00 in the 2026-08-10 election is Bain's condition, not LNC's cost. Bain has accepted in advance only for months in which LNC's buyback VWAP is at or above its own cost; below that it has, in effect, declined, and LNC can keep buying with Bain's excess votes sterilised. The size of the sell-back is also smaller than the first pass assumed: once Bain is at the cap, keeping it just under 10% takes about one share from Bain for every nine bought in the market — not every share.
What the filings do support, restated:
- Bain holds 18,759,497 shares, 9.80% of 191,425,371 (the 13D/A uses 191,447,336 at 2026-07-24). It reaches 10% when the count falls to ~187.6m, ~3.8m shares, ~$157m at $41.01, a fifth of the $714,000,000 authorisation remaining at 2026-06-30 (Equibles, from the 10-Q).
- Past that point, with the stock below $44, the buyback does not get more expensive. It pushes Bain's economic stake over 10% with the excess votes frozen, unless Bain obtains a regulatory control approval or disclaimer.
- At $44 or above, Bain sells ~1 in 10 of the shares retired at LNC's own monthly VWAP. On the remaining ~$557m that would be ~$56m of Bain stock, at market.
- The signal is Bain's, not the buyback's. The buyback is Bain's only permitted exit before June 2028, and Bain has said it will not take it at a loss. That is a statement about Bain's patience and its SMBC-financed cost basis, not a constraint on LNC's capital return.
LNC has not repurchased a common share since Q3 2022: $0 in 2023, $0 in 2024.
1.3 The cluster's kill criterion for LNC is measured on a number the 10-K itself qualifies
_clusters/cluster-insurance-2026-09-22.md §5 sets LNC's kill criterion as "recoverables/equity rising above 3.0x", and the re-score scored capital 0 on $28,012m of reinsurance recoverables against $10,906m of equity, 2.57x. Both are gross.
The same 10-K says, in the MD&A's Reinsurance section:
"As of December 31, 2025, 84%, or $23.5 billion, of our total reinsurance recoverable was secured by collateral for our benefit."
with $22.0bn in reserve credit trusts held by non-affiliated reinsurers, $1.4bn in funds withheld and $142m of LOCs. Uncollateralised recoverable is therefore about $4.5bn against $10,906m of equity — 41%, not 257%. At 2026-06-30 gross recoverables are $27,225m against $11,349m of equity, 2.40x, i.e. falling.
That does not make the counterparty exposure trivial: LNC "ceded $1.2 trillion of life insurance in force to reinsurers for reinsurance protection", the collateral share is management's own number and is not audited as a covenant, and trust assets are marked. But a kill criterion set at 3.0x of a gross number that is already falling, against a collateralised net number a quarter of the size, is not a test that can fire for the reason the cluster intended. It is replaced in the scorecard.
2. S2 — kill test
| Measure | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | H1 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($m) | 19,230 | 18,810 | 11,645 | 18,442 | 18,212 | 9,848 |
| Net income ($m) | 3,778 | (2,227) | (752) | 3,275 | 1,177 | 1,160 |
| Stockholders' equity ($m) | 19,915 | 5,102 | 6,893 | 8,269 | 10,906 | 11,349 |
| Diluted shares (m) | 189.6 | 172.7 | 170.7 | 173.1 | 186.1 | 196.5 |
| Operating cash flow ($m) | 151 | 4,033 | (2,074) | (2,007) | (167) | (420) |
| Reinsurance recoverables ($m) | 20,295 | 19,953 | 29,843 | 28,750 | 28,012 | 27,225 |
| Net investment income ($m) | 6,115 | 5,515 | 5,900 | 5,544 | 6,075 | — |
| Interest credited ($m) | 2,929 | 2,877 | 3,248 | 3,443 | 3,743 | — |
All XBRL from data.sec.gov/api/xbrl/companyfacts/CIK0000059558.json, 10-K and 10-Q values only.
Survives, and the solvency question is not close. RBC is ">420%" in every quarter of the Q2 2026 release's capital table, and the proxy discloses the real number: "During 2025, the RBC ratio increased from 433% to 460%, inclusive of the remaining proceeds from the Bain Capital transaction earmarked for future deployment." Holding-company available liquidity is $1,803m gross, $903m net of the $400m debt prefunding and the $500m preferred prefunding. Total debt $6,465m at 2026-06-30, leverage 25.1%.
Three things the kill test does flag.
- Operating cash flow has been negative in three of the last four years (−$2,074m, −$2,007m, −$167m, and −$420m in H1 2026 against +$741m in H1 2025). For a life and annuity writer this is less damning than it looks — deposit-type contract flows sit in financing, not operating — but the direction is the wrong one while the company is buying back preferred with borrowed money.
- The share count is the story. 169.7m outstanding at end-2023 to 191,425,371 at 2026-06-30, +12.8%, of which 18.76m is the single Bain issue. Diluted weighted average 180.6m (Q2 2025) to 196.4m (Q2 2026), +8.8%.
- Adjusted operating EPS is going backwards while GAAP EPS looks spectacular. Q2 2026 GAAP diluted EPS $6.72 against adjusted operating EPS $2.24 — and $2.24 is down from $2.36 a year earlier. H1: $3.89 against $3.97. Adjusted operating income available to common actually rose, $427m to $439m; the per-share line fell because of the extra shares. The gap between the two EPS numbers is $1,497m pre-tax of "net annuity product features" in the quarter — market risk benefit marks, which the company itself calls "the non-economic impact of changes in market risk benefits".
Analyst coverage count: not obtained (no source in this environment).
3. S3 — filings, at gate-minimum
Read: FY2025 10-K Item 1A in management's own ordering, the MD&A Executive Summary, Significant Operational Matters and Reinsurance sections, and the EY report; the Q2 2026 10-Q MD&A, segment tables, equity note and liquidity section; the 2026-04-16 DEF 14A ownership and compensation sections; the Q2 2026 earnings release and the Q2 2026 earnings supplement; the June 424B2; the 2026-08-10 8-K; the Schedule TO and its results amendment; the two Bain 13Ds; four Form 4s; and a full efts.sec.gov red-flag sweep.
3.1 The three biggest risks management itself discloses
Item 1A opens with "Market Conditions" and these are its first three headings, in the company's order:
- > "Weak conditions in the global capital markets and the economy generally may materially > adversely affect our business and results of operations."
- > "Changes in interest rates and sustained low interest rates may cause interest rate > spreads to decrease, impacting our profitability, and make it more challenging to meet > certain statutory requirements."
- > "Increases in interest rates and sustained higher interest rates may negatively affect our > profitability, capital position and the value of our investment portfolio and may also > result in increased contract withdrawals and surrenders."
All three located in FY2025 10-K, Part I Item 1A, "Market Conditions". The third is the one with a live number attached in the same paragraph: "during 2024 and 2025, our Annuities business experienced an increased outflow rate primarily due to an increase in full surrenders as a result of the elevated interest rate environment and strong equity markets."
The fourth, and the one this repo's cluster thesis rests on, is under "Operational Matters": "We face risks of non-collectability of reinsurance and increased reinsurance rates, which could materially affect our results of operations." — §1.3 above is the reading of it.
Gate: met. Three risks, management's words, locators given.
3.2 Auditor and red-flag sweep
- Ernst & Young LLP, PCAOB ID 42, unqualified on the FY2025 statements and on internal control, report dated 2026-02-19. Two critical audit matters: the $42.1bn future contract benefits liability (universal life with secondary guarantees; investment margin, mortality and lapse assumptions) and market risk benefits ($4.8bn asset, $1.1bn liability).
efts.sec.govfull text for CIK 0000059558: zero hits for"changes in accountants"; no NT 10-K in the index; 30 hits for"material weakness", all in 2023 filings or older; 8 for"non-reliance".- The one that matters is history with a live rhyme. The 2023-03-27 8-K carries Items 2.02, 4.02 and 7.01. It says of the 2021 Resolution Life coinsurance transaction: "The Company has determined that the realized gain should have been recognized at the time of the transfer of the assets" — restating ~$498m of one-time gain into 4Q21 and adding ~$467m to 2022 year-end equity. LNC's only non-reliance event on the public record is about reinsurance transaction accounting, and reinsurance transaction accounting is exactly the lever management says it is pulling next: LPINE affiliate reinsurance, the fourth-quarter 2025 captive restructuring, and "looking at an external risk transfer deal" in 2026-2027.
3.3 Compensation — what the bonus is paid on
2025 AIP, corporate financial measures 75% for the CEO:
| Measure | Weight (CEO) | Target | Certified | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income from operations per share | 45% | $8.19 | $8.72 | 154.1% |
| Business unit sales and capital usage | 15% | — | — | 143.8-200.0% |
| Actions to Improve Distributable Earnings ("DE Actions") | 15% | — | — | 175.0% |
| Strategic Priorities | 10% | — | — | 100.0% |
| Enterprise controllable costs | 15% | 100% | 99.4% | 110.2% |
CEO payout 147.6% of a $3,630,000 target, $5,357,880. Two things are worth stating plainly.
- The 45% metric is a per-share metric, calculated "in accordance with the terms of the 2025 AIP" with "certain defined exclusions" listed in an exhibit. It still certified at $8.72 in the year the company issued 18.76m new shares.
- The 15% DE Actions metric is certified through the CFO. "each management action to increase distributable earnings was reviewed by the CFO as meeting the criteria established by the Committee for inclusion in the DE Actions goal based on its impact to increase the Company's distributable earnings and RBC ratio." It paid 175%, and the committee's own explanation of why is the RBC sentence quoted in §2 — which credits "the remaining proceeds from the Bain Capital transaction". An equity raise that diluted the 45% metric helped the 15% one. The CFO who signed off on that metric gave notice five months later.
3.4 The transcript — Q1 FY2026, read Q&A-first
Only one transcript was read, not two. Equibles has no transcript for the Q2 FY2026 call of 2026-07-30 (ListInvestorEvents reports the event with transcript "not available"), and fool.com has no LNC Q2 2026 page. The Q2 earnings supplement was read from EDGAR instead, which is primary but is not a call.
Speaker resolution is unreliable in this source and the repo has a standing warning about it: in this transcript only "Suneet Kamath (Analyst — Jefferies)" is resolved; the CEO and CFO appear as "Speaker 2" and "Speaker 3". Every quote below is given as a located span with the speaker label as the source printed it, not as an attribution to a named person.
Guidance and capital changes (the CFO section): holding company cash "increased to over $800 million, net of the prefunding for the quarter. It's the highest it's been in a long time"; alternative investments "about $4.2 billion in size", "over 400 funds", "about 10% returns with relatively minimal volatility over the past couple of years", explicitly on a lag; earnings growth "came through at 16%".
What analysts asked about, by topic: free cash flow conversion and how much of holdco cash is real (Wells Fargo); alternatives mark lag into Q2 (Wells Fargo); the disability loss ratio and PFML (KBW); the annuities ROA guide of 66-70bp (KBW); the other-operations loss (Dowling); fixed annuity sales mix, FIA versus MYGA (Dowling); whether the industry's first merger of equals in twenty years forces consolidation (Jefferies); how much of the Bain money has been spent (Jefferies); Apollo's "irrational competition" comment (Evercore); the large-case group lapse (Evercore). Seven of ten questions are about whether the earnings are durable; two are about scale; one is about the balance sheet.
Dodges, marked:
- PFML sizing. Analyst asks to "help us size the PFML impact on either in dollars or on the disability loss ratio". Answer: "we're not going to size the specific impact", then a discussion of claim-resolution normalisation. A stated refusal, not an evasion, but the number was not given.
- Bain deployment — the real one. Analyst asks "can you give us a sense of how much of that has been deployed at this point?". The answer opens "I don't know that I would add a lot to what we said at the fourth quarter" and then restates the three uses without a figure, closing "we like the trajectory of the deployment". Fifteen months after the money arrived, the amount deployed is not on the public record.
- Competitive conduct. Analyst quotes Apollo on "irrational competition in the annuity market coming from incumbent insurers". Answer: "I obviously can't speak to the comment of another peer", then a pivot to product differentiation. Partial.
Nothing in the dodge log before today — this is the first pass on the name.
4. S5 — ownership
13F by manager at 2026-06-30, from 3spread. The default resolution was wrong and the run had to override it — see §6.
| Manager | Shares | $m | QoQ | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bain Capital Prairie, LLC | 18,759,497 | 663.1 | +0 | 9.80% of the class; the block from §1.2 |
| BlackRock, Inc. | 18,561,962 | 656.2 | +63,858 | within 200k shares of Bain |
| MFS | 6,373,067 | 226.6 | +491,735 | largest active add |
| State Street | 6,106,302 | 215.9 | +215,007 | |
| T. Rowe Price | 4,993,803 | 176.5 | +565,854 | |
| Jennison | 3,772,433 | 133.4 | −50,719 | |
| LSV | 2,540,296 | 89.8 | −19,800 | |
| Balyasny | 1,383,992 | 48.9 | −701,627 | largest cut |
| Wells Fargo | 817,235 | 28.9 | −600,393 |
⚠️ 413 filers this quarter against 609 last — the quarter is not fully ingested. Both Vanguard entities, Dimensional, Morgan Stanley, Geode, First Trust, Northern Trust, UBS and Jupiter have no 2026-06-30 filing in the stream; no exit was read from an absence. The Vanguard disappearance has a documented cause and this proxy confirms it for a third issuer after APH and ALL: "The Vanguard Group subsequently reported that due to an internal realignment it no longer has, or is deemed to have, beneficial ownership over Company securities beneficially owned by various Vanguard subsidiaries and/or business divisions."
⚠️⚠️ The Sixth Street / Charles Schwab Investment Management 13F defect appears for the eighth issuer: both report exactly 2,193,476 shares / $77.5m, Sixth Street flagged NEW. Discarded per the standing rule, not carried as a holding.
13D/G. Bain's is the only 13D on the common. The 2026-04-20 and 2026-05-18 Schedule 13Ds in the feed are LNC itself reporting stakes in the Lincoln Bain Capital Total Credit Fund (5,202,624.72 shares, 5,237,272.66 at the amendment) and the Lincoln Partners Group Royalty Fund (9,787,323.12) — i.e. LNC seeding Bain-managed and affiliated credit vehicles. The same counterparty sits on both sides of the relationship: Bain is the anchor shareholder and a manager of Lincoln money.
Insider ownership: 0.64%. All 20 directors and executive officers together held 1,233,827 common shares at 2026-03-20, 1,974,460 including phantom units (1.03%), with 666,064 of the common being options exercisable within 60 days. The CEO holds 672,832 including 362,342 options. No individual is at 1%.
Insider transactions, 12 months. 171 Form 4 filings. Four read in detail:
- 2026-08-12 — Gary C. Kelly (director). Sold the family trust's entire 15,006.550 Series D depositary shares at a weighted $26.50, "prices ranging from $26.50 to $26.54, inclusive", shares owned after: 0. The proxy says he was the only director or officer holding any LNC preferred. He sold two days after the company launched a tender for that exact security at $26.30 and did not tender into it. Entirely proper; also a precise reading of the company's own offer by the one insider who could take it.
- 2026-08-17 — Sean Woodroffe (EVP). Sold 11,000 common at $45.28, 119,947 after.
- 2026-08-24 — Adam M. Cohen (interim CFO). Two awards, 7,866 and 23,597 shares, holding 71,375 after — the retention and LTIP grants the 2026-08-10 8-K described.
- 2026-08-17 — Curtis Chesney (EVP, President of Annuities). Gift of 637 shares.
Five Form 144s since 2026-03-27 (2026-06-01, 06-05, 08-17, 08-18, 09-03). Transaction codes were not itemised across all 171 filings — the 3spread endpoint returns them only per filing.
Short interest (FINRA, via Equibles):
| Settlement | Position | Change | Days to cover |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-30 | 10,612,934 | +1,007,956 | 5.5 |
| 2026-07-31 | 10,527,973 | −40,312 | 4.6 |
| 2026-08-14 | 10,350,862 | −177,111 | 5.6 |
| 2026-08-31 | 13,811,317 | +3,460,455 | 7.6 |
+33% in one settlement, to 7.2% of shares outstanding and 7.6 days to cover, across exactly the window that contains the CFO's notice (08-06), the tender launch (08-10) and Bain's sell-back election (08-12). Equibles' model puts the unpublished 2026-09-15 settlement at ~14.5m shares — that is an estimate, not a FINRA figure, and FINRA publishes the real one on 2026-09-24, the day after this pass.
Shelf, ATM, buyback. No ATM. The June notes were drawn off registration 333-292076, so a live shelf hangs over the name and has just been used. Buyback: the 2021-11-10 $1.5bn authorisation with $714,000,000 remaining at 2026-06-30 — untouched since Q3 2022 ($0 in 2023, $0 in 2024). Bain's $44 sell-back floor does not raise its cost; see §1.2 as corrected 2026-09-24.
5. S8 — valuation
Modelled on adjusted operating income available to common, because GAAP is unusable here: Q2 2026 GAAP EPS was $6.72 against $2.24 adjusted, and the difference is market risk benefit marks the company calls non-economic.
H1 2026 actual, annualised as the base year: Annuities $562m, Life Insurance $98m, Group Protection $259m, Retirement Plan Services $92m, Other Operations $(201)m → $810m of adjusted income from operations in the half, $1,620m annualised, less ~$92m of preferred dividends (falling to ~$52m from Q4 2026 after the tender).
| Line, 2028E ($m) | Bear | Base | Bull |
|---|---|---|---|
| Annuities | 1,000 | 1,180 | 1,300 |
| Life Insurance | 150 | 260 | 340 |
| Group Protection | 440 | 520 | 570 |
| Retirement Plan Services | 170 | 200 | 225 |
| Other Operations (incl. the new notes' interest) | (430) | (400) | (370) |
| Adjusted income from operations | 1,330 | 1,760 | 2,065 |
| Preferred dividends, post-tender | (52) | (52) | (52) |
| Available to common | 1,278 | 1,708 | 2,013 |
| Diluted shares (m) | 198 | 194 | 188 |
| Adjusted EPS | $6.45 | $8.80 | $10.71 |
| Exit multiple | 4.5x | 6.0x | 7.5x |
| Value | ~$29 | ~$53 | ~$80 |
Base ~$53 against $41.01 is about 29% of upside. On this repo's running count that makes LNC the third name in thirteen — after AX and AIG — whose correct operating forecast produces a materially positive return at the traded price.
Assumptions, stated so they can be disagreed with. Base 2028 adjusted operating income of $1,760m is +4.2% a year off the annualised H1 2026 run rate — spread earnings compounding on a $182bn annuity book growing 9% and a scaling funding-agreement programme, against a Group Protection loss ratio that management has already said is normalising (70% to 73% year on year) and a variable annuity block running off at ~10% a year. Bear assumes an assumption unlocking charge and continued spread compression; bull assumes the legacy life risk-transfer deal lands. The share count barely moves in base because the buyback is constrained (§1.2); the bull column is the only one that assumes LNC buys stock in size, which at $44 to Bain is a worse trade than it looks.
Cross-check on book, which is the denominator that matters for a risk carrier. At $41.01:
| Measure, 2026-06-30 | Value | Multiple |
|---|---|---|
| BVPS including AOCI | $53.68 | 0.76x |
| BVPS excluding AOCI | $77.39 | 0.53x |
| Adjusted BVPS | $79.45 | 0.52x |
Correction to the cluster files. cluster-insurance-2026-09-22.md §6 puts LNC at book $59.29 and P/B 0.70, and the re-score at 0.71. $59.29 is total stockholders' equity ($11,349m) divided by common shares (191.4m) — it includes the $1bn of preferred. The company's own BVPS including AOCI is $53.68 and the honest common P/B is 0.76x. Both cluster files carry a caveat that the preferred is not tagged at a current date; the caveat is right and the number in the table is still the wrong one.
The AOCI hole is the whole of the gap: a $8.5bn pre-tax net unrealised loss on AFS securities at 2026-06-30, down from $9.1bn, about $23.71 a share of the difference between the two book values. That accretes back as bonds pull to par, which is why the base case does not need a re-rating to work.
Buy price and size: ⏳ OPEN (user).
6. Access, tooling and what was thin
- SEC EDGAR — reachable throughout, User-Agent sent on every call. XBRL companyfacts, submissions, Archives and
efts.sec.govfull text all answered. - 3spread — key present, HTTP 200. New failure mode, the fourth distinct one this repo has found.
threespread.py holders LNCresolved the ticker to CUSIP 534187885, which is the Series D depositary share, and returned one filer holding 81,775 shares. The common is 534187109. Re-run with--cusip 534187109it returns 413 filers and 110,445,310 shares. Any name with listed preferred is exposed to this; it does not error, it answers a different question. Recorded in the scorecard and in the README-level list of 3spread defects.ownersalso prints the issuer's name in the Filer column for every row, so a 13D/G row cannot be attributed without opening its index, and Bain's 2026-08-12 13D/A is absent from theownerslist although EDGAR carries it under LNC. - Equibles — reachable. 6 calls of the 25 cap:
ListInvestorEvents,GetEarningsCallTranscript(Q1 FY2026),GetShortInterest,GetBuybackPrograms(four distinct endpoints; the transcript came back in one page). No Q2 FY2026 transcript exists in the source. Speaker resolution is again poor — the CEO and CFO are unnamed speaker numbers — which is the fourth name in a row where Equibles transcript attribution could not be trusted. - market data — prices fine. The earnings calendar again requires a paid plan, sixth consecutive slot.
- fool.com — 404 for the Q2 2026 call; a WebSearch restricted to fool.com found LNC Q1 2026 and nothing later.
- EDINET DB / eu_data — not applicable to a US domestic filer; not called.
Thin, named:
- One transcript, not two — the Q2 FY2026 call is not available from any rung reachable here. Substituted the Q2 earnings supplement, which is primary but has no Q&A.
- No scuttlebutt of this pass's own. S6 is carried forward and the carried row is
[search-summary]only: Morgan Stanley Equal Weight, PT $42, dated before the CFO departure, the tender and the Bain election. Nothing in this repo about LNC comes from a customer, an agent, an employee or a competitor. - Form 4 transaction codes not itemised across all 171 filings — four read in full.
- No analyst-coverage count.
- Next earnings date DERIVED from filing cadence (Q3 calls 2024-10-31 and 2025-10-30; Q1 2026-05-07, Q2 2026-07-30) → ~2026-10-29, not a scheduled date.
- The annual assumption review is the single biggest unmodelled item and it lands in Q3. The re-score's evidence has it at −$50m (2025), +$216m (2024), −$167m (2023) on net income. Nothing in this pass improves on that.