ORCLOracle Corporation
Industry AI datacenter Updated 24 Sep 2026
The idea
Base lands essentially ON the traded price, so the multiple is not the argument — the share count is. Oracle exhausted a $20bn ATM inside one quarter (141m shares, +5.0%), bought back nothing, and funded $28.5bn of quarterly capex partly with $11.4bn of customer prepayments its own accounting calls a significant financing component. Every further $20bn raise at ~$150 is another ~4.4% of the company. The CFO declined to give a free-cash-flow date.
Events to watch
- October 2026 Investor Day — the CFO deferred BOTH the gross-margin and free-cash-flow questions to it
- Q2 FY27 results 2026-12-14
- the Note 1 prepayment line ($11.4bn vs $0 a year earlier) and RPO ($664bn, 13% inside twelve months)
- a second ATM authorisation
- the Ellison 10b5-1 plan for up to 50m shares running to 2026-10-24
How we got the target
Dossier model table: FY2028 revenue $85bn/$115bn/$130bn at 20%/31%/33% operating margin, $8bn net interest, 18% tax, 3,150m shares (Series D converted plus one further $20bn-scale raise); EPS $2.25/$7.11/$8.50 at 21x/20x/25x. Time frame: FY2028 (May 2028).
Target: from the research notes. Prices: market data get_latest_stock_price, close of 2026-09-22 (fetched 2026-09-23)
What would prove it wrong
7 warning signsRemaining performance obligations stop growing, or their conversion schedule stretches.
Details
RPO was $664 billion at 2026-08-31, with only 13% expected as revenue in the next twelve months, 37% in months 13–36, 34% in months 37–60 and the rest beyond. Both numbers are disclosed every quarter. A flat RPO, or a falling next-twelve-months percentage, says the backlog is being re-phased rather than delivered — and re-phasing is how a contract dispute looks before it is announced.
Customer prepayments stop arriving.
Details
Oracle took $11.4bn of prepayments with a significant financing component in Q1 FY2027 and $0 in Q1 FY2026. That single line is roughly half the quarter's operating cash flow. It is the customers funding Oracle's capex, and Oracle's own accounting calls it financing. A quarter with capex above $25bn and prepayments near zero is the funding model failing in public.
FY2027 capex overshoots its guide the way FY2025 and FY2026 did (added 2026-09-24 from S8).
Details
The guide is "around $70 billion" of net cash outlay plus "$20 billion to $25 billion" of prepayments and timing, i.e. ~$90-95bn reported (call 2026-06-10, Hilary Maxson). The previous finance lead raised the FY2026 number three times and finished 2.2x her first guide. A first upward revision to the FY2027 figure — at the December or March call — is the signal, and it is testable the day it is said, because the funding plan around it ($40bn, half of it already spent) was sized against the unrevised number.
The prepaid / bring-your-own-hardware share of new contracts falls (added 2026-09-24 from S3).
Details
$4.6bn of prepayments with a significant financing component in FY2026 against zero in FY2025 and FY2024, then $11.4bn in Q1 FY2027; "The prepaid and customer supplied hardware portions of our large AI contracts now total $75 billion" (release 2026-06-10). Asked where that mix goes, the CEO said "I cannot tell you exactly the mixture" (call 2026-06-10). This is the mechanism that keeps Oracle's cash capex below its reported capex; if the mix reverts toward Oracle-funded contracts, the funding requirement rises without any change in RPO, revenue or margin.
The ATM is re-upped.
Details
Oracle authorised $20bn on 2026-02-02 and spent all of it by 2026-08-31 — 141m shares, 5.0% of the company, in three months. A second ATM of similar size is the clearest signal that the prepayment-and-supplier-financing model is not covering the build.
Gross margin keeps falling after the ramp.
Details
The CFO conceded a step down this year and said margin should "flatten" as the ramp completes, while redirecting attention to operating margin. If gross margin is still falling two quarters after the Q1 FY2027 850MW delivery, the pricing is not covering the cost of the capacity, whatever operating margin does.
A named large customer's credit deteriorates.
Details
Oracle's own 10-K says "In certain OCI offerings, we are more concentrated among a number of large customers" and that if a key customer cannot pay "we could be locked into multi-year commitments for excess data center space and related capital expenditures, as well as associated financings, without receiving corresponding revenue." It also discloses that data-centre lease terms "typically do not align with the duration and pricing of customer contracts". That is the asset-liability mismatch stated by the issuer.
How far along
7 of 10 steps done · 3 done in a group review
Next step
read the DEF 14A (2025-09-26) for Ellison's beneficial ownership percentage and the compensation structure — this pass has the 50-million-share 10b5-1 plan but not the denominator it is struck against. Second: Oracle's October Investor Day, which the CFO twice named as where the gross- margin and free-cash-flow questions would be answered. That is the single highest-information event on this name's calendar and it falls before the next 10-Q.
Needs your decision
S6 product test / expert call, S7 conviction.
Failed checks
none. S0/S4/S7 are not closed by design (cluster stages, carried forward). S8 closes closed (partial) rather than closed because the team being judged has three quarters of record, not eight.
Who runs it
The Front OfficeStep by step
- S0How it does as AI gets cheapDone in a group review
carry-forward (cluster: AI-capex complex — cluster pass, 2026-09-20)
that file names Oracle as the complex's hinge: "the first large spender to cross into sustained negative free cash flow and to stop buybacks", capex 6.9 → 21.2 → 55.7 against operating cash flow 18.7 → 20.8 → 32.0.
Full notes
Owner checks dropped 2026-09-21 (README §Stage 0 override).
- S1Where the idea came fromDone
watchlist (owner, Apple Stocks, 2026-09-20), coverage sec_domestic, cik 1341439, cluster ai_datacenter; no Tier 0 promotion.
- S2Quick deal-breaker checkDone
FY2026 (to 2026-05-31) rev $67,357m +17.3%, operating income $20,606m (30.6%), net income $17,087m, OCF $31,977m. Q1 FY2027 (to 2026-08-31) rev $19,345m +29.6%, operating income $6,728m (34.8%), net income $4,760m +62.6%.
Full notes
The income statement is not the risk here.
⚠️ Capex $28,499m in ONE quarter, against $8,502m a year earlier. OCF of $23,103m in the same quarter leaves FCF of −$5.4bn — and $11.4bn of that OCF is customer prepayment, so FCF ex-prepayments is ≈ −$16.8bn for the quarter.
⚠️ Funded by dilution: the whole $20bn ATM was used inside the quarter, 141 million shares for $19.9bn net, taking shares outstanding 2,880m → 3,024m (+5.0% in three months). Buybacks are zero. Total debt $125,337m against $36,369m cash. Survives comfortably; the question is at what share count. · capital allocation (2026-09-24, dossier-2026-09-24.md): neutral. FY2022-26 capex $96,950m = 98.8% of $98,175m of operating cash flow — but 47% of OCF in FY2022 and 174% in FY2026 — plus $27.9bn of acquisitions (Cerner), $22,046m of dividends (raised every year, including through FY2026's -$23.7bn free cash flow) and $19,445m of buybacks. Funded by debt: $75,859m → $129,541m, and "In fiscal year 2026, Oracle raised $43 billion in debt financing and $5 billion in equity financing" (release 2026-06-10). The pricing was good: 217.7m shares retired at a weighted-average $89.32, hardest in FY2022 at $87.45 and switched off at $237.50 in FY2026, then 141m shares issued at ~$141 through the ATM. ROIC 12.7% (FY2022) → 9.7% (FY2026) at the 19% guided tax rate; incremental return on the $102,410m added ≈ +7.7%. No goodwill or property impairment in any of the five years. SBC $19,619m, 7.1% of FY2026 revenue and ahead of the buybacks in four years of five.
- S3Reading the company's reportsDone
(gate-minimum)
FY2026 10-K risk factors + MD&A; Q1 FY2027 10-Q MD&A delta and Notes 1/7/Item 5. Q1 FY2027 transcript turns 7-37 of 37 read Q&A-first per SKILL §3.1. Form 4 cadence and Form 144s via 3spread. DEF 14A 2025-09-26 located but not read (see.
⚠️). Three disclosed risks named with locators in dossier-2026-09-23.md. EQ: 3 flags + 1 mild (2026-09-24) — $0.80 of FY2026's $7.63 non-GAAP EPS is one-time investment gains (Ampere, Bloom warrants) left inside the measure and then excluded from the FY2027 growth base; ex-gains FY2026 non-GAAP EPS is $6.83, +13% not +27% (release 2026-06-10, Footnotes). SBC $4,811m = 7.1% of revenue against negative FCF of $23.7bn. $4.6bn of customer prepayments with a significant financing component in FY2026 and $0 in FY2025/FY2024 (10-K revenue note), plus $11.4bn in Q1 FY2027 — the MD&A credits the FY2026 OCF rise to it, which is why OCF grew 54% on 17% revenue. Mild: DSO 54.4 → 56.3 days. Clean and checked: capitalised software "not material" (10-K), server useful life six years in both the FY2025 and FY2026 10-Ks — no extension, depreciation $3.9bn → $7.6bn, accruals -5% to -7% of assets. Note: finance-lease ROU assets in PP&E $2.9bn → $7.5bn in one year.
- S4Rivals and suppliersDone in a group review
carry-forward (cluster: AI-capex complex — cluster pass, 2026-09-20)
- S5Who owns the stockDone
13F register at 2026-06-30 via 3spread (2,513 filers, 852.8m shares, every row with its SEC filing URL), Form 4 cadence, four Form 144s, FINRA short interest, the exhausted ATM, the idle buyback authorisation and the Series D mandatory convertible preferred.
⚠️ Lawrence J. Ellison adopted a new Rule 10b5-1 plan on 2026-06-22 permitting the sale of up to 50 million shares, scheduled to terminate 2026-10-24. At $149.20 that is ~$7.5bn. Disclosed in the 10-Q's Item 5. The Form 144s on file through 2026-09-16 total well under $70m, so the plan had not been executed in size on this evidence.
- S6What workers and customers sayDone
carry-forward (cluster: AI-capex complex — cluster pass 2: S6 for 41 names, S0/S4/S7 for three, 2026-09-21, §ORCL row: seven board claim rows, sharpest being Steve Eisman
"If OpenAI fails, Oracle is in immediate trouble."). Product test / expert call open OPEN (user)
- S7The case for it, and pricesDone in a group review
carry-forward (cluster: AI-capex complex — cluster pass, 2026-09-20)
conviction open OPEN (user) · valuation (bear/base/bull; moved from S8 2026-09-23): $149.20 close 2026-09-22; 3,024m shares → ~$451bn market value, ~$544bn enterprise value including $88.3bn net debt and $5.0bn of preferred.
Full notes
The out-year model in dossier-2026-09-23.md puts BASE at ~$142 — essentially the traded price — with BEAR ~$48 and BULL ~$213. The sensitivity that decides it is not the multiple; it is how many more shares get sold to fund capex. Base case adjusted 2026-09-24: S8 does not score over-promises — it scores new team, thin record — so no mechanical haircut is applied to the revenue guide. But the departed team missed every full-year capex guide it gave (FY2025 ≈$13.7bn guided → $21.2bn. FY2026 "over $25 billion" → $55.7bn, raised three times), so the base case takes FY2027 capital spending from the guide plus that overshoot, not from the guide: the current guide is ~$70bn net cash outlay and ~$90-95bn reported (call 2026-06-10). Every dollar above it is more of the dilution the bear case is built on.
- S8Do the bosses keep their word?Done
(partial)
new team, thin record. 13 scored rows: 4 beat, 6 met, 3 missed, 0 withdrawn.
Full notes
Ten of the thirteen were guided by Safra Catz, who has held neither the CEO nor the PFO role since 2025-09-22 (8-K 0001193125-25-210089); two more by Douglas Kehring, PFO for two quarters (out 2026-04-06). The current CFO Hilary Maxson (from 2026-04-06) owns 2 rows and the co-CEOs Magouyrk/Sicilia 3 — all beats, all quarterly, none a capital number.
⚠️ The shape: seven quarterly revenue/EPS guides, seven hits — and every full-year capex guide missed, both after repeated upward revisions (FY2025 ≈$13.7bn → $16bn → $21.2bn actual; FY2026 "over $25 billion" → "$35 billion" → ≈$50bn → $55.7bn actual). Third miss: FY2026 cloud revenue +37% cc against "over 40% in constant currency". Dodge roll-up: 5 over two calls, gross-margin direction dodged in both. dossier-2026-09-24.md
- S9What to watch nextDone
trigger written; next earnings 2026-12-14 (stated by IR on the call), Investor Day October 2026. Tier 0 EDGAR sweep covers the feed (cik 1341439)
Sources and notes
Sources 8 documents
- Full notes, 24 Sep 2026
- Full notes, 23 Sep 2026
- AI-capex complex — cluster pass, 2026-09-20
- AI-capex complex — cluster pass 2: S6 for 41 names, S0/S4/S7 for three, 2026-09-21
- EDGAR filings CIK 1341439
| Short name | Document | Where it came from | Read on |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10K-FY26 | Oracle 10-K for FY ended 2026-05-31, filed 2026-06-22 | https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1341439/000119312526277521/orcl-20260531.htm | 2026-09-23 |
| 10Q-Q1-FY27 | Oracle 10-Q for the quarter ended 2026-08-31, filed 2026-09-11 | https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1341439/000119312526389274/orcl-20260831.htm | 2026-09-23 |
| CALL-Q1-FY27 | Q1 FY27 Oracle earnings call, 2026-09-10 20:00 UTC — turns 7-37 of 37 | Equibles GetEarningsCallTranscript ORCL 2027 Q1 — https://equibles.com/stocks/orcl/earnings-calls | 2026-09-23 |
| 13F-Q2-26-3S | 3spread 13F holders, CUSIP 68389X105, report date 2026-06-30 (2,513 filers, 852,832,150 shares; prior quarter 3,419 filers) | python ledger/research/tools/threespread.py holders ORCL | 2026-09-23 |
| 144-2026-06-24 | Form 144 for ORACLE CORP, accepted 2026-06-24, approx. sale date 06/24/2026, aggregate market value $66,064,000.00, relationship Director/Officer | https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1341439/000195004726006460/primary_doc.xml | 2026-09-23 |
| 144-2026-09-16 | Form 144 for ORACLE CORP, accepted 2026-09-16, approx. sale date 09/16/2026, aggregate market value $1,522,827.08, relationship Officer/Director | https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1341439/000195917326006996/primary_doc.xml | 2026-09-23 |
| SI-FINRA-EQ | FINRA bi-monthly short interest, settlements 2026-05-15 to 2026-08-31 | Equibles GetShortInterest ORCL — https://equibles.com/stocks/orcl/short-interest | 2026-09-23 |
| EDGAR-INDEX | Oracle EDGAR filing index (CIK 1341439) — 10-K 2026-06-22, 10-Q 2026-09-11, DEF 14A 2025-09-26, 424B5s 2026-02 and 2026-06 | https://data.sec.gov/submissions/CIK0001341439.json | 2026-09-23 |
Links to other companies 29 links
| From | Link | To | Date | Where it says so |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oracle's concentrated OCI large customers (not named in the 10-K, the 10-Q or on the call) | customer of | ORCL | 2026-08-31 | 10Q-Q1-FY27 — Note 1, 'Remaining Performance Obligations from Contracts with Customers' |
| Oracle's concentrated OCI large customers (not named in the 10-K, the 10-Q or on the call) | channel concentration | ORCL | 2026-05-31 | 10K-FY26 — Risk Factors — 'If we are unable to secure data center capacity at affordable rates or do not accurately plan for and manage our infrastructure capacity requirements, our profitability may decline.' |
| ORCL | supplier dependency | Oracle's concentrated OCI large customers (not named in the 10-K, the 10-Q or on the call) | 2026-05-31 | 10K-FY26 — Risk Factors — data centre capacity risk factor |
| Oracle's concentrated OCI large customers (not named in the 10-K, the 10-Q or on the call) | financing partner | ORCL | 2026-08-31 | 10Q-Q1-FY27 — Note 1, 'Customer Prepayments and Sales of Financing Receivables' |
| ORCL | event | ORCL | 2026-08-31 | 10Q-Q1-FY27 — MD&A, Liquidity and Capital Resources — Capital Expenditures |
| $20bn at-the-market equity programme, agreement dated 2026-02-02, amended 2026-06-23 | issuer of | ORCL | 2026-08-31 | 10Q-Q1-FY27 — Note 7, Stockholders' Equity — Common Stock |
| ORCL | context | ORCL | 2026-08-31 | 10Q-Q1-FY27 — Note 7, Stockholders' Equity — Common Stock Repurchases |
| 6.50% Series D Mandatory Convertible Preferred Stock | issuer of | ORCL | 2026-08-31 | 10Q-Q1-FY27 — Condensed consolidated balance sheets, preferred stock line; Note 7, Dividends on Preferred and Common Stock |
| Sales agents under the 2026-02-02 equity distribution agreement (not named in the 10-Q) | counsel to | ORCL | 2026-06-23 | 10Q-Q1-FY27 — Note 7, Stockholders' Equity — Common Stock |
| Lawrence J. Ellison, Executive Chair and CTO | insider transaction | ORCL | 2026-06-22 | 10Q-Q1-FY27 — Item 5, Rule 10b5-1 Trading Arrangements |
| Lawrence J. Ellison, Executive Chair and CTO | officer of | ORCL | 2026-08-31 | 10Q-Q1-FY27 — Item 5, Rule 10b5-1 Trading Arrangements |
| Hilary Maxson (CFO) | officer of | ORCL | 2026-09-10 | CALL-Q1-FY27 — Q&A, Brad Zelnick and John DeFucci exchanges |
| Ken Bond (Head of Investor Relations, retiring) | key person risk | ORCL | 2026-09-10 | CALL-Q1-FY27 — Q&A opening remarks and closing |
| Unidentified Oracle executive, Q1 FY2027 call (Equibles 'Speaker 9'; identity not resolved by the connector) | officer of | ORCL | 2026-09-10 | CALL-Q1-FY27 — Q&A, turns 8, 12, 16 and 22 |
| Bloom Energy (fuel cells for the New Mexico site) | supplier dependency | ORCL | 2026-09-10 | CALL-Q1-FY27 — Q&A, Sidi Panigrai (Mizuho) exchange |
| New Mexico air-permitting authority, Doña Ana County | regulator of | ORCL | 2026-09-10 | CALL-Q1-FY27 — Q&A, Sidi Panigrai (Mizuho) exchange |
| Public Service Commission of Wisconsin | regulator of | ORCL | 2026-09-10 | CALL-Q1-FY27 — Q&A, Sidi Panigrai (Mizuho) exchange |
| We Energies (Wisconsin site power) | supplier dependency | ORCL | 2026-09-10 | CALL-Q1-FY27 — Q&A, Sidi Panigrai (Mizuho) exchange |
| ATC — American Transmission Company (Wisconsin grid) | supplier dependency | ORCL | 2026-09-10 | CALL-Q1-FY27 — Q&A, Sidi Panigrai (Mizuho) exchange |
| ORCL | context | Oracle's concentrated OCI large customers (not named in the 10-K, the 10-Q or on the call) | 2026-05-31 | 10K-FY26 — Risk Factors — supply chain |
| ORCL | holds | TikTok USDS Joint Venture LLC | 2026-08-31 | 10Q-Q1-FY27 — Note 1, non-marketable equity securities |
| BlackRock, Inc. | holds | ORCL | 2026-06-30 | 13F-Q2-26-3S — row 1 of the holders table, with its SEC filing URL |
| STATE STREET CORP | holds | ORCL | 2026-06-30 | 13F-Q2-26-3S — row 2 of the holders table |
| Susquehanna International Group, LLP | holds | ORCL | 2026-06-30 | 13F-Q2-26-3S — row 3 of the holders table |
| Jane Street Group, LLC | holds | ORCL | 2026-06-30 | 13F-Q2-26-3S — row 4 of the holders table |
| Goldman Sachs Group Inc | holds | ORCL | 2026-06-30 | 13F-Q2-26-3S — row 5 of the holders table |
| Jupiter Topco LLC | holds | ORCL | 2026-06-30 | 13F-Q2-26-3S — row 13 of the holders table, marked NEW |
| ORCL | context | ORCL | 2026-08-31 | SI-FINRA-EQ — settlements 2026-05-15 through 2026-08-31 |
| ORCL | context | ORCL | 2026-06-30 | 13F-Q2-26-3S — header line: 'filers: 2513 (prior 3419)' |
History 3 entries
- 2026-09-23 — first pass, slot
names-ai-capex-4, model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine. S1, S2, S3 (gate-minimum), S5 and S9 closed; S0/S4/S7 carried forward from the 2026-09-20 cluster file and S6 from the 2026-09-21 one; S8 modelled and left open. Evidence and access limits in dossier-2026-09-23.md. Nothing here is human-verified. - 2026-09-23 — stage redefinition, owner decision (WATCHLIST_PLAN.md §25): S8 is now Management credibility and is not yet run for this name; the old S8 valuation figures moved to the
valuation:line under S7, and any proposed buy price or position size was removed (the pipeline no longer drafts either). No research was redone. S2 capital allocation and S3 earnings quality are also pending, in the same backfill slot. - 2026-09-24 — backfill, slot
backfill-2026-09-23-4, model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine. S8 closed ✅ (partial) — new team, thin record (13 scored rows, only 5 by people still in the seat that made them); S2 gained its capital-allocation table — verdict neutral; S3 gained its earnings-quality check — 3 flags and 1 mild, ✅ kept at gate-minimum. Glyphs on S2 and S3 unchanged. Two kill criteria added (a first upward revision to the FY2027 capex guide; the prepaid/BYOH mix reverting), the ⚠️ block rewritten to carry the twice-dodged gross-margin topic and the already-spent equity leg of the FY2027 funding plan, and the S7 valuation line told to take FY2027 capital spending from the guide plus the historical overshoot. Evidence in dossier-2026-09-24.md; 0 Equibles calls, 0 market data calls, EDGAR and the transcript archive only. Nothing here is human-verified.
Full notes, 24 Sep 2026 20 min read
ORCL — dossier, 2026-09-24 (backfill: S8, S2 capital allocation, S3 earnings quality)
Slot backfill-2026-09-23-4. Model-drafted unattended by the cloud research routine; nothing here is human-verified. This file holds only the three checks added on 2026-09-23 (WATCHLIST_PLAN.md §25) plus the transcript section for the call read for them. Every other stage stands as written in dossier-2026-09-23.md. Anything from background knowledge is marked [background].
Fiscal year. Oracle's year ends 31 May. FY2026 = 2025-06-01 to 2026-05-31; Q1 FY2027 ended 2026-08-31. "Calendar 2026" in management's funding statements is not the fiscal year and the distinction decides one of the rows below.
Sources this pass. EDGAR only, User-Agent ddboard-research gorkem@celebico.com (CIK 1341439): the seven quarterly earnings releases (8-K Item 2.02, Ex. 99.1) filed 2025-03-10, 2025-06-11, 2025-09-09, 2025-12-10, 2026-03-10, 2026-06-10 and 2026-09-10; the five Item 5.02 8-Ks in the window (2025-09-22, 2025-11-21, 2026-01-09, 2026-04-06, 2026-05-12); the FY2026 and FY2025 10-Ks; XBRL companyfacts. Transcripts from the archive ledger/research/_transcripts/ORCL/ (market data, eight calls FY2025-Q2 to FY2027-Q1; call dates from _transcripts/index.json) — the FY2027-Q1 call was read in dossier-2026-09-23.md and the FY2026-Q4 call (2026-06-10) is read here. Equibles: 0 calls. market data: 0 calls.
Quote discipline: transcript quotes were checked by exact substring against the archived JSON bytes; filing quotes against a whitespace-collapsed text extraction of the EDGAR HTML. Turn numbers [n] are line positions in the market data content string. The archive's speaker labels for the newer executives are garbled — "Clay McGork" for Clayton Magouyrk, "Mike Cecilia" for Michael Sicilia, "Doug Caring" for Douglas Kehring — so every attribution below is taken from the EDGAR 8-K that appointed the person, and the transcript label is quoted only where it is legible.
S8 — management credibility
How Oracle guides. One quarter ahead, given verbally by the finance lead in the prepared remarks and repeated in the press release: total revenue growth and total cloud revenue growth as ranges, in constant currency and USD, and non-GAAP EPS as a four-cent range in each. Separately, full-year commitments on revenue, cloud/OCI growth and — the number that matters for this name — capital expenditure, revised on the calls as the year runs. Since the October 2025 Financial Analyst Meeting there is also a five-year OCI revenue ramp and a long-term CAGR outlook. Scored below against the first guide with the revision path recorded.
Who promised, and who is still in the seat. This is the decisive fact for this stage.
- Safra Catz — CEO and Principal Financial Officer, and the person who gave every guide from the 2024-12-09 call through the 2025-09-09 call. 8-K 0001193125-25-210089 Item 5.02: "In connection with these leadership transitions, Safra Catz will no longer serve as Chief Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer of Oracle as of the Effective Date. Ms. Catz will take on a new role as Executive Vice Chair of the Board and will continue as a director of Oracle." Effective 2025-09-22. She is still at Oracle; she no longer holds either role that made the promises.
- Clayton Magouyrk and Michael Sicilia — "promoted to the roles of Chief Executive Officer of Oracle and members of the Board as of the Effective Date" (same 8-K), 2025-09-22. Their performance-based options "will vest over a three-year performance period ending May 31, 2028, subject to the achievement of certain revenue metrics" — pay geared to revenue, not to returns.
- Douglas Kehring — Principal Financial Officer 2025-09-22 to 2026-04-06 (same 8-K; then 0001193125-26-142939: "Douglas Kehring will transition his role and step down as Principal Financial Officer and a Section 16 officer, effective as of April 6, 2026"). Two quarters.
- Hilary Maxson — CFO from 2026-04-06, hired from Schneider Electric (8-K 0001193125-26-142939). She has given exactly two guides: Q1 FY2027 and FY2027.
So in the eight-quarter window Oracle has had three different finance leads and a change of CEO, and the current CFO owns two of the thirteen scored rows.
Say vs do (guides for Q3 FY2025 → Q1 FY2027, plus the annual commitments)
Quarterly actuals from the following quarter's press release headline bullets; annual actuals from the 2026-06-10 release and XBRL companyfacts.
| # | Promise (period · metric · range) | Made where · by whom | Result · locator | Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Q3 FY2025 · total rev +9–11% cc / +7–9% USD · non-GAAP EPS $1.50–1.54 cc | call 2024-12-09 [2] · Safra Catz (CEO and PFO) | rev $14.1bn, +8% USD; non-GAAP EPS $1.47, +4% USD, +7% cc — release 2025-03-10 | met (departed from role) |
| 2 | Q4 FY2025 · total rev +9–11% cc / +8–10% USD · non-GAAP EPS $1.62–1.66 cc / $1.61–1.65 USD | call 2025-03-10 [2] · Safra Catz | rev $15.9bn, +11%; non-GAAP EPS $1.70 USD — release 2025-06-11. Catz on the call: "With Q4 total revenue and EPS both exceeding my guidance." | beat (departed from role) |
| 3 | Q1 FY2026 · total rev +11–13% cc / +12–14% USD · non-GAAP EPS $1.44–1.48 cc / $1.46–1.50 USD | call 2025-06-11 [2] · Safra Catz | rev $14.9bn, "up 12% in USD and up 11% in constant currency"; non-GAAP EPS $1.47 — release 2025-09-09. Both at the bottom of both ranges | met (departed from role) |
| 4 | Q2 FY2026 · total rev +12–14% cc · non-GAAP EPS $1.58–1.62 cc / $1.61–1.65 USD | call 2025-09-09 [2] · Safra Catz | rev $16.1bn, +14% USD / +13% cc; non-GAAP EPS $2.26. The EPS beat is a divestiture gain, not operations: "Our GAAP and non-GAAP earnings per share were both positively impacted by a $2.7 billion pre-tax gain in the sale of Oracle's interest in our Ampere chip company" (release 2025-12-10, quoting PFO Doug Kehring) | met — scored on revenue; the EPS line is not credited |
| 5 | Q3 FY2026 · total rev +16–18% cc / +19–21% USD · non-GAAP EPS $1.64–1.68 cc / $1.70–1.74 USD | call 2025-12-10 [1], read by Ken Bond (IR) under the new co-CEOs; PFO Douglas Kehring | rev $17.2bn, +22% USD / +18% cc; non-GAAP EPS $1.79, +21% — release 2026-03-10, which says "total revenue was at the high end of constant currency guidance and above USD guidance, and non-GAAP earnings per share were above our guidance in both USD and constant currency" | beat |
| 6 | Q4 FY2026 · total rev +18–20% cc / +19–21% USD · non-GAAP EPS $1.92–1.96 cc / $1.96–2.00 USD | release 2026-03-10, Guidance for Q4 FY 2026 · PFO Douglas Kehring (departed the role 2026-04-06) | rev $19.2bn, +21% USD / +20% cc; non-GAAP EPS $2.11, +24% — release 2026-06-10 | beat (departed from role) |
| 7 | Q1 FY2027 · total rev +27–29% · non-GAAP EPS $1.71–1.75 cc / $1.72–1.76 USD | release 2026-06-10 · Hilary Maxson (CFO) | rev $19.3bn, +30%; non-GAAP EPS $1.92, +30% — release 2026-09-10 | beat |
| 8 | FY2025 · capex "double what it was in fiscal year FY '24" (FY2024 = $6,866m, so ≈ $13.7bn) | call 2024-12-09 [2] · Safra Catz. Raised on 2025-03-10 [2] to "a little more than double what it was last year at around $16 billion" | $21,215m — XBRL PaymentsToAcquirePropertyPlantAndEquipment FY2025, and Catz's own call of 2025-06-11 [2]: "free cash flow was a negative $400 million with $21.2 billion of CapEx". 55% above the first guide, 33% above the raised one | missed (departed from role) |
| 9 | FY2026 · capex "higher at over $25 billion" | call 2025-06-11 [2] · Safra Catz. Raised 2025-09-09 [2] to "around $35 billion"; raised again 2025-12-10 [1] to "about $15 billion higher than we forecasted after Q1" (≈ $50bn) | $55,663m — XBRL FY2026. Net cash outlay $48bn (call 2026-06-10 [2], Hilary Maxson: "Our net cash outlay for capital expenditures for the full year was $48 billion"). 2.2× the first guide, raised three times in six months | missed (departed from role) |
| 10 | FY2026 · total revenue "at least $67 billion, up 16% in constant currency" | call 2025-06-11 [2] · Safra Catz | $67.4bn, "up 17% USD, and up 16% constant currency" — release 2026-06-10 | met (departed from role) |
| 11 | FY2026 · total cloud revenue "grow over 40% in constant currency" | call 2025-06-11 [2] · Safra Catz | "FY 2026 Total Cloud Revenues $34.0 billion, up 39% USD, and up 37% constant currency" — release 2026-06-10. Three points short of the guide on the basis it was given | missed (departed from role) |
| 12 | FY2026 · OCI revenue "grow over 70%"; raised 2025-09-09 [2] to "grow 77% to $18 billion" | call 2025-06-11 [2] and 2025-09-09 [2] · Safra Catz | "FY 2026 Cloud Infra (IaaS) Revenue $18.1 billion, up 77% USD, and up 75% constant currency" — release 2026-06-10. Exactly the raised figure | met (departed from role) |
| 13 | FY2027 · total revenue $90bn and non-GAAP EPS $8.05 | release 2026-06-10, Guidance for Full FY 2027: "we confirm our prior revenue guidance of $90 billion total revenue and raise our non-GAAP EPS guidance to $8.05" · Hilary Maxson | reports June 2027 | not scored — open |
Row 13 is listed for the record and excluded from the tally. Note that it replaces an earlier, lower number from the departed CEO: on 2025-03-10 [2] Catz said "I now expect that our fiscal year '27 growth rate will be around 20%, which is even higher than I previously guided"; the current guide is +34%. A guide raised is not a guide missed, but it is the fourth time in this window that a forward number has been re-set upward, and every previous one moved capex with it.
Not scored (open commitments, all of them live):
- "In fiscal year 2027, Oracle expects to raise approximately $40 billion through a combination of debt and equity financing including its previously announced $20 billion at-the-market equity issuance. Oracle does not expect to issue additional debt in calendar year 2026." (release 2026-06-10). The equity half was executed in full in the first quarter — "During Q1 FY 2027, Oracle successfully completed the sale of $20 billion of common stock (before commissions) through an At-the-Market (ATM) equity program" (release 2026-09-10). One quarter into the fiscal year, the equity leg of the funding plan is spent and the debt leg is fenced off until calendar 2027.
- FY2027 capex: "an expected net cash outlay for capital expenditures of around $70 billion" plus "$20 billion to $25 billion" of prepayments and timing, "so our reported CapEx will be higher by this amount" (call 2026-06-10 [5], Hilary Maxson) — i.e. reported capex of roughly $90–95bn against FY2026's $55.7bn.
- The OCI five-year ramp — "$18 billion this fiscal year and then increase to $32 billion, $73 billion, $114 billion, and $144 billion over the following four years" (call 2025-09-09 [2], Safra Catz). Year one delivered ($18.1bn). Year two is FY2027's $32bn.
- "As a foundational principle, we expect and are committed to maintaining our investment-grade debt rating" (call 2025-12-10 [1]).
- Project-level returns: "return on invested capital in the high 20s at a steady state" (call 2026-06-10 [15], Hilary Maxson) — see S2 below for why that number and the one in Oracle's own accounts are not the same measure.
- Long-term outlook reconfirmed by the new CFO on her first call: "full reconfirmation from my side on the long term targets" (call 2026-06-10 [11]), against "+31% revenue CAGR and +28% EPS CAGR through our fiscal year 2030" [5].
Tally: 13 scored rows — 4 beat, 6 met, 3 missed, 0 withdrawn.
The shape of the record matters more than the tally. Oracle has never missed a quarterly revenue or EPS guide in this window — seven for seven — and has missed every full-year capital expenditure guide it has given, both of them by a wide margin and both after multiple upward revisions. The third miss, FY2026 cloud revenue at +37% against "over 40%", is the one that sits between the two: the growth that was supposed to justify the spending came in below guide in the year the spending doubled twice.
By team. Ten of the thirteen rows were guided by Safra Catz, who has held neither the CEO nor the PFO role since 2025-09-22. Two more were guided by Douglas Kehring, who held the PFO role for two quarters. The current CFO has two rows and the current CEOs three, all of them beats, all of them quarterly, none of them yet tested on a capital number. The FY2027 capex guide of roughly $90–95bn reported is the first structural promise this team will be scored on, and it is the same kind of number the previous team missed twice.
Dodge-log roll-up (§3.1; calls FY2026-Q4 and FY2027-Q1). Five dodges across the two calls. One topic dodged in both quarters running: gross margin direction.
- Q4 FY2026, Mark Moerdler (Bernstein) asked where Oracle sits competitively as capacity floods in and, explicitly as his third part, how that affects the ability to "maintain or improve margins" [19]. Clayton Magouyrk answered with customer relationships, utilisation and renewal dynamics, and closed on a hope rather than a number: "I think there is ways that Oracle gets higher and higher margins, but we offer lower and lower prices to our customers." [20] No margin figure, no renewal rate.
- Q1 FY2027, John DeFucci (Guggenheim) asked the same thing directly and was told gross margin "would flatten … But we haven't given any particular guidance today. We'll speak more about some of this stuff on the upcoming Investor Day" (
dossier-2026-09-23.md§Transcript).
Also on the Q4 FY2026 call, and not a dodge — a stated refusal on the number that decides the funding requirement: Kirk Materne asked where the split between prepaid / bring-your-own-hardware contracts and Oracle-funded contracts "could ultimately go" [30]; Magouyrk answered "I cannot tell you exactly the mixture of what we do bring your own hardware versus when we do prepay versus when we bring the capital" [31], and Maxson followed with the mechanics but not the mix [32]. It is adjacent to the Q1 FY2027 dodge on which customers drive the RPO, and both are about concentration inside the $664bn backlog.
Verdict — new team, thin record; ✅ (partial). The team scored by this stage has been in place for three quarters (CEOs) and two (CFO) and has beaten every guide it has given, but all five of those guides are quarterly and none is a capital commitment. The team that made ten of the thirteen rows — Safra Catz as CEO and PFO — left both roles on 2025-09-22, and its record is the one that carries information: 2 beat, 4 met, 3 missed, and every miss is a spending or cloud-growth number, never the headline revenue or EPS. On the rule's own terms that old record is reliable on guidance and over-promises on capital, and the S7 base case should take FY2027 capex from the guide plus the historical overshoot, not from the guide.
S2 — capital allocation
All figures $m, fiscal years to 31 May, from XBRL companyfacts (CIK 1341439). Buyback share counts from StockRepurchasedAndRetiredDuringPeriodShares.
| FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 | 5y total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating cash flow | 9,539 | 17,165 | 18,673 | 20,821 | 31,977 | 98,175 |
| Capex | 4,511 | 8,695 | 6,866 | 21,215 | 55,663 | 96,950 |
| Acquisitions (cash) | 148 | 27,721 | 63 | 0 | n/t | ~27,932 |
| Buybacks | 16,248 | 1,300 | 1,202 | 600 | 95 | 19,445 |
| — shares retired (m) | 185.8 | 17.0 | 10.6 | 3.9 | 0.4 | 217.7 |
| — implied price | $87.45 | $76.47 | $113.40 | $153.85 | $237.50 | $89.32 |
| Dividends | 3,457 | 3,668 | 4,391 | 4,743 | 5,787 | 22,046 |
| Debt repaid | 8,250 | 21,050 | 3,500 | 15,841 | 6,942 | 55,583 |
| Stock-based comp | 2,613 | 3,547 | 3,974 | 4,674 | 4,811 | 19,619 |
| SBC as % of revenue | 6.2% | 7.1% | 7.5% | 8.1% | 7.1% |
Where the cash went. Capex took 98.8% of five years of operating cash flow — and the average conceals the shape completely: it was 47% of OCF in FY2022 and 174% in FY2026. On top of it, $27.9bn of acquisitions (almost all Cerner, FY2023), $22.0bn of dividends and $19.4bn of buybacks. The gap was debt: total debt $75,859m (FY2022) → $129,541m (FY2026), and the FY2026 release states the year's financing plainly — "In fiscal year 2026, Oracle raised $43 billion in debt financing and $5 billion in equity financing" — against FY2026 free cash flow of negative $23.7 billion (same release).
Buybacks at what price — and this is the one thing Oracle did unambiguously well. 217.7m shares retired over five years at a weighted-average $89.32, against $149.20 on 2026-09-22. The programme was run hardest when the stock was cheapest ($87.45 on 185.8m shares in FY2022, $76.47 in FY2023) and switched off almost entirely as the price rose ($237.50 on 0.4m shares in FY2026). Then the company did the other half correctly too: it sold 141m shares through the ATM in Q1 FY2027 for $19.9bn net, ≈ $141 a share (release 2026-09-10; the share count is in scorecard.md S2). Buying at $89 and issuing at $141 is the right way round, and few large issuers manage it.
Share count: diluted weighted-average 2,786m (FY2022) → 2,914m (FY2026), +4.6% despite $19.4bn of buybacks, because SBC of $19.6bn ran ahead of them in four of the five years. Then outstanding shares went 2,880m → 3,024m in the single quarter to 2026-08-31, +5.0%, all of it the ATM.
Dividend: raised every year through the window, $3,457m → $5,787m, including in FY2026 when free cash flow was −$23.7bn. Oracle is paying a rising dividend out of debt while telling investors it needs $40bn of new capital.
What the acquisitions were worth: GoodwillImpairmentLoss is $0 in every one of the five years, and the FY2026 10-K records no property impairment either ("We did not recognize any significant property impairment charges in fiscal 2026, 2025 or 2024"). Cerner has not been written down. [background] It has also not obviously earned its $27.7bn — the FY2026 release's only forward claim for it is that a new AI version will "push the growth rate of the overall Oracle Health business to double-digits in fiscal year 2027", which is a target, not a return.
Returns. Invested capital (total debt DebtLongtermAndShorttermCombinedAmount + equity attributable to parent): $69,639m at FY2022 → $172,049m at FY2026. NOPAT at the 19% base tax rate management guides to: $8,850m (FY2022 operating income $10,926m) → $16,691m (FY2026 operating income $20,606m). ROIC 12.7% → 9.7%. Incremental return on the $102,410m of invested capital added over the window is +7.7% — positive, and materially below where it started.
That figure sits against the new CFO's own: "return on invested capital in the high 20s at a steady state", with her stated arithmetic, "I am just calculating return on invested capital as after tax operating margin plus depreciation. Divided by gross investments, so total gross CapEx at the project level" (call 2026-06-10 [15]). Adding depreciation back to the numerator makes that a cash yield on a project, not a return on capital — it is the pre-depreciation payback rate, and it will exceed a true ROIC by roughly the depreciation rate of a six-year asset. The two numbers are not comparable and should never be put side by side without saying so. That is this run's reading of a stated formula, not a claim that the figure is wrong for what it measures.
Verdict: neutral. The capital pricing is good — buybacks at $89, issuance at $141, no impairments, positive incremental returns — and the capital scale is unproven: invested capital 2.5x in five years for a 3-point fall in ROIC, with the whole bet landing in the last eighteen months. A rising dividend through a −$23.7bn free-cash-flow year is the one clearly questionable call, because it converts debt into a payout while the company is asking the market for $40bn. This verdict is a backward look at five years, four of which do not resemble the one Oracle is now in; S7's thesis, not this line, is where the FY2027–FY2030 build gets judged.
S3 addendum — earnings quality
Sources: the FY2026 10-K (CIK 1341439, accession 0001193125-26-277521) and FY2025 10-K; the quarterly press releases' non-GAAP reconciliations; XBRL companyfacts.
- The non-GAAP bridge. Flag 1 — one-time investment gains are inside non-GAAP EPS. FY2026 GAAP net income available to common shareholders $17.0bn / EPS $5.83; non-GAAP $22.2bn / EPS $7.63. The release's own footnote gives the rest: "Q4 and FY 2026 results include one-time net investment gains from certain transactions. Excluding these investment gains, Q4 non-GAAP EPS would be $2.03, up 20% in USD and up 18% in constant currency and FY 2026 non-GAAP EPS would be $6.83, up 13% in USD and up 11% in constant currency" (release 2026-06-10, Footnotes). So $0.80 of the $7.63 — a tenth of the headline, and half the reported growth rate — is the Ampere sale and the Bloom Energy warrants. Gains from selling assets were left in a measure whose stated purpose is to show operating performance, and then taken out again to set the FY2027 growth base ("raise our non-GAAP EPS guidance to $8.05, which is growth of 18% after adjusting for the one-time events"). The asymmetry is disclosed, in a footnote, and it flatters FY2026 and the FY2027 comparison at the same time. The rest of the bridge is ordinary: stock-based compensation and acquisition-related amortisation, neither growing faster than revenue (SBC +2.9% in FY2026 on revenue +17%).
- Stock-based compensation against cash flow. Flag 2. FY2026 SBC $4,811m = 7.1% of revenue, and 7.5–8.1% in the two prior years — high in absolute terms and, unlike Intel's, still rising in dollars. Free cash flow in FY2026 was negative $23.7bn, so there is no positive FCF for SBC to be measured against; on the $98.2bn of five-year operating cash flow, SBC of $19.6bn is 20%.
- Cash conversion. Clean on its face, but read flag 3 with it. OCF/net income: 1.42 (FY2022), 2.02, 1.78, 1.67, 1.87 (FY2026) — consistently near or above 2x on a software depreciation base, as it should be. Accruals ((net income − OCF) / average total assets) are −5% to −7% across the window: earnings well below cash, the benign direction. Flag 3 — a new and large slice of that cash is customers funding the capex, and Oracle's own accounting calls it financing. FY2026 10-K, revenue note: "During fiscal 2026, we received $ 4.6 billion of prepayments from customers that included a significant financing component. No prepayments were received from customers that included a significant financing component during fiscal 2025 and 2024." The MD&A attributes the OCF increase to it directly: operating cash flow "increased by $11.2 billion in fiscal 2026 … which includes $4.6 billion cash inflows from customer prepayments with significant financing component". A further $11.4bn arrived in Q1 FY2027 alone (
scorecard.mdS2). That is $16.0bn in five quarters, from a base of zero — 14% of FY2026 operating cash flow and roughly half of the Q1 FY2027 quarter's. It is real money and a genuine commercial advantage; it is also, by the issuer's own classification, financing sitting inside the operating line, and it is the reason FY2026 OCF grew 54% while revenue grew 17%. The scale of the structure is disclosed: "The prepaid and customer supplied hardware portions of our large AI contracts now total $75 billion" (release 2026-06-10).
- Working capital. Flag 4 (mild). Days sales outstanding on year-end receivables over revenue: 51.2 (FY2022) → 50.5 → 54.3 → 54.4 → 56.3 (FY2026), rising two periods running while revenue grew 17% — the pattern the test names, though the absolute drift is small for a business invoicing annually in advance.
IncreaseDecreaseInAccountsReceivablejumped to $2,190m in FY2026 from $653m in FY2025. At 2026-08-31 receivables were $11,394m against a $19,345m quarter, ≈ 53.6 days annualised — no worse.
- Costs moved onto the balance sheet. Clean, and checked rather than assumed.
- Capitalised software: FY2026 10-K: "Software development costs required to be capitalized under ASC 985-20 … and under ASC 350-40, Internal-Use Software, were not material to our consolidated financial statements in fiscal 2026, 2025 and 2024."
- Depreciable life — no extension. The FY2026 10-K carries servers and networking equipment at "1 - 6 years", footnoted "Comprised primarily of servers and networking equipment with estimated useful life of six years"; the FY2025 10-K's identical table already read "1 - 6 years". No useful-life change in the window — the single most common way a cloud build is flattered, and Oracle has not used it. Depreciation expense went $3.1bn (FY2024) → $3.9bn (FY2025) → $7.6bn (FY2026), which is the honest consequence of the capex.
- Finance leases, worth watching: PP&E "includes ROU assets recorded in connection with lease arrangements that are accounted for as finance leases, totaling $ 7.5 billion and $ 2.9 billion as of May 31, 2026 and 2025" (FY2026 10-K, Note 4). The principal portion of finance lease payments is a financing outflow, so capacity taken this way grows the asset base without passing through operating cash flow. 2.6x in one year. Recorded as a note, not a flag — the disclosure is complete.
- Deferred sales commissions are amortised "over an average benefit period that we estimate to be four years" (FY2026 10-K), unchanged.
- Sector equivalents: n/a.
EQ summary: 3 flags and one mild — $0.80 of FY2026's $7.63 non-GAAP EPS is investment gains left inside the measure and then excluded from the FY2027 base; SBC at 7.1% of revenue against negative free cash flow; and $16.0bn of customer prepayments with a significant financing component in five quarters, from zero, inflating operating cash flow by the issuer's own explanation. DSO rising two years running is the mild one. Against them, the two checks that usually break on a company building like this — capitalised software and depreciable life — are clean, with locators, and cash conversion is genuinely good.
Full notes, 23 Sep 2026 15 min read
ORCL — dossier, 2026-09-23
Slot names-ai-capex-4. Drafted by Claude in an unattended cloud routine. Nothing here is human-verified. Every figure carries the document it was read from; anything from background knowledge is marked [background]. Quotes were located by substring search in the source and copied, never re-typed. Never edited after today.
Price reference: $149.20 close, 2026-09-22, volume 31,194,188 (market data NYSE:ORCL).
The one-line version
Oracle's income statement looks better than ever — revenue +29.6%, operating margin 34.8%, net income +62.6% — and in the same quarter it spent $28.5 billion of capex, took $11.4 billion of customer prepayments that its own accounting calls financing, sold its entire $20 billion ATM in three months, and bought back nothing. The 2026-09-20 cluster file called Oracle the first large spender to cross into sustained negative free cash flow and stop buybacks. This quarter's primary documents confirm both and add the funding mechanism: the customers are paying for the buildout in advance, and Oracle discloses it as a significant financing component.
S1 — Source
watchlist (owner, Apple Stocks, 2026-09-20), row: {ticker: "ORCL", label: "Oracle Corporation", coverage: sec_domestic, cluster: ai_datacenter, cik: 1341439}. No Tier 0 promotion.
S2 — Kill test
From XBRL company facts (data.sec.gov, User-Agent sent) and the two filings. Oracle's fiscal year ends 31 May, so FY2026 = year to 2026-05-31 and Q1 FY2027 = quarter to 2026-08-31.
| $m | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 | Q1 FY26 | Q1 FY27 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 52,961 | 57,399 | 67,357 | 14,925 | 19,345 |
| Operating income | 15,353 | 17,678 | 20,606 | — | 6,728 |
| Operating margin | 29.0% | 30.8% | 30.6% | — | 34.8% |
| Net income | 10,467 | 12,443 | 17,087 | 2,927 | 4,760 |
| Operating cash flow | 18,673 | 20,821 | 31,977 | 8,140 | 23,103 |
| Capex | 6,866 | (see below) | (see below) | 8,502 | 28,499 |
The balance sheet in three months (2026-05-31 → 2026-08-31): total assets $261,759m → $303,259m; PP&E net $99,957m → $127,845m; cash $31,289m → $36,369m; current deferred revenue $9,916m → $14,686m; other non-current liabilities $16,178m → $28,183m; total debt (current + non-current notes payable) $129,541m → $125,337m; Oracle stockholders' equity → $66,772m; common shares outstanding 2,880m → 3,024m.
Survives-or-dies. Oracle does not die on the income statement — it is compounding revenue at 29.6% with an expanding operating margin. It dies, if it dies, on the funding of the build and on the share count that funding produces. Read the quarter as cash: operating cash flow $23,103m minus capex $28,499m is −$5.4bn of free cash flow; strip out the $11.4bn of customer prepayments that sit inside operating cash flow and it is −$16.8bn in a single quarter. That gap was closed with $19.9bn of equity sold through an at-the-market programme that was exhausted inside the quarter, and Oracle bought back nothing while paying $1,565m of dividends. Net debt is ~$88.3bn. There is no solvency question at this size and this margin; there is a dilution question, and it is live.
The share-count arithmetic. 2,880m shares at 2026-05-31 → 3,024m at 2026-08-31 is +5.0% in three months, all of it the ATM. The $20bn authorisation granted on 2026-02-02 lasted two quarters. The $4,954m of 6.50% Series D mandatory convertible preferred converts on top. If the FY2027/FY2028 "peak capex" years run at anything like the Q1 FY2027 rate, the question is not whether Oracle raises again but how.
S3 — Filings, gate-minimum
Read: FY2026 10-K (2026-06-22) risk factors and MD&A; Q1 FY2027 10-Q (2026-09-11) MD&A delta, Notes 1 and 7, Item 5; the Q1 FY2027 call (turns 7–37 of 37); Form 4 cadence and Form 144 primary documents via 3spread and EDGAR. Not read: the DEF 14A (2025-09-26), the FY2025 10-K, older 10-Qs, any transcript before Q1 FY2027, and the efts.sec.gov auditor/restatement sweep.
The three biggest risks management itself discloses
- "If we are unable to secure data center capacity at affordable rates or do not accurately plan for and manage our infrastructure capacity requirements, our profitability may decline." — 10-K FY2026, Risk Factors, heading. Three things inside it matter more than the heading:
- "In certain OCI offerings, we are more concentrated among a number of large customers, which could increase these risks." — the concentration admission, with no customer named anywhere.
- "if we overestimate customer demand or any of our key customers are unable to pay or otherwise perform under their contracts with us, we could be locked into multi-year commitments for excess data center space and related capital expenditures, as well as associated financings, without receiving corresponding revenue."
- "the terms, renewal options and pricing adjustments in our long-term data center leases typically do not align with the duration and pricing of customer contracts" — the maturity mismatch, stated by the issuer.
- "There are risks associated with our outstanding and future indebtedness." — 10-K FY2026, Risk Factors, heading. The body names refinancing risk, rating actions, and that a downgrade could "affect the terms or availability of certain long-term commitments (including data center leases)" and increase collateral and credit-support requirements. On $125.3bn of debt against a build funded partly by counterparties' credit, that is not boilerplate.
- Supply terms as a disclosed concession. "industry supply capacity for AI accelerators, including graphics processing units, as well as memory devices, is competitive, and we at times have to accept less favorable terms with suppliers to minimize supply constraints" — with the consequence stated: increased excess and obsolescence risk, and operating costs for capacity that is not yet revenue-generating.
The number that reframes the name: $664 billion of RPO
"Remaining performance obligations were $ 664 billion as of August 31, 2026 , of which we expect to recognize approximately 13 % as revenues over the next twelve months" — with 37% in months 13–36, 34% in months 37–60 and the remainder thereafter (10-Q Note 1).
Against FY2026 revenue of $67.4bn that is roughly ten years of sales, booked and not delivered, and 87% of it is more than twelve months out. Oracle has never disclosed which customers it belongs to. On the call an analyst asked directly whether the RPO growth comes from AI labs, semiconductor companies or sovereigns; the answer was "really broad-based" (see Dodges). The 10-K's own concentration language sits next to it.
Where the cash came from: the customer financed the seller
"During the first quarter of fiscal 2027, we received $ 11.4 billion of prepayments from customers that included a significant financing component. No prepayments from customers that included a significant financing component were received during the first quarter of fiscal 2026." (10-Q Note 1.) Oracle recognises interest expense on these separately from revenue, and discounts them at a rate reflecting "the credit characteristics of the party receiving financing" — i.e. Oracle's own.
This is the third distinct shape of the routine's standing cross-cutting finding about who funds whom in this complex:
names-ai-capex-1: sellers underwrite buyers — NVDA's $105bn capped guarantee, AMD's penny warrants to OpenAI and Meta, AVGO co-sponsoring XPV with Apollo and Blackstone.names-ai-capex-3(CBRS): buyers finance sellers — OpenAI's ~$1.0bn loan to Cerebras at 6% against the MRA, plus a penny warrant amortised as contra-revenue.- Here: customers pre-fund the seller's capex, and the seller books it as financing. An executive laid out all three mechanisms on the call in one answer: supplier financing that lets Oracle "pay for the capacity as the customers pay us"; the customer buying the hardware outright and renting Oracle's operations around it ("bring your own hardware"); and the customer prepaying. His framing of the distinction was precise and worth keeping: "I didn't say, and I don't think myself nor Hillary said that it doesn't require additional CapEx. We said it doesn't require additional cash from Oracle."
Capex still happens. It is simply not on Oracle's cash flow statement, which is what "capex-light growth" means in practice for this name.
Transcript — Q1 FY2027 call, 2026-09-10 (read Q&A-first, SKILL §3.1)
Turns 7–37 of 37. Turns 1–6 (safe-harbor and prepared remarks) not read — one transcript call at this depth. Six analyst questions: Deutsche Bank, Mizuho, Barclays, Bernstein, Guggenheim, Jefferies, Evercore ISI.
A note on attribution. The Equibles transcript resolves the CFO (Hilary Maxson) and the IR head (Ken Bond) but leaves the two executives who answer the infrastructure and applications questions as "Speaker 9" and "Speaker 5". The connector's documentation says identities appear only when resolution is trusted. The four answers that decide this name are "Speaker 9"'s. No name is guessed here or in relationships.yaml.
Guidance and changes.
- FY2027 revenue guide raised to "at least $90 billion" (stated in the Mizuho question and not corrected) — against FY2026's $67,357m, ~+34%.
- FY2027 and FY2028 are "peak CapEx years" (stated in the Deutsche Bank question, not corrected).
- 850 megawatts delivered in Q1, and explicitly not from Shackelford, New Mexico, Wisconsin or Michigan — the four sites the market watches.
- Gross margin stepped down this quarter, as pre-guided at Q4; expected to "flatten" as the ramp completes; no new guidance until the October Investor Day.
- Renewal pricing: "when we go out and we have capacity up for renewal, that we actually can achieve higher prices to the order of 20%." Component cost inflation is expected to pass through with no gross-margin impact.
- Next earnings: 2026-12-14 (IR, closing remarks). Ken Bond is retiring; this was his last call.
What the analysts asked about. Five of the seven questions were about the same thing from different angles: how is this being paid for, and by whom. Zelnick on capex beyond FY2028 and on free-cash-flow timing; Panigrai on New Mexico and Wisconsin delivery risk to the FY2027 guide; Lenschau on component pricing and gross margin; Modler on which customers drive the capex-light RPO; DeFucci on gross margin, twice. Only Thill (SaaS) and Materne (AI data platform) asked about the product.
Dodges.
- Free-cash-flow timing. Zelnick asked when Oracle returns to positive free cash flow. The executive answering opened "I think there's like four questions in there, so I'm going to answer the parts that I want to answer, and then I'll make Hillary do the hard work", answered the funding-model part, and handed over. The CFO: "We haven't given a particular time frame on that yet, and we don't expect to give that." She then argued each project converts at roughly 100% of post-tax EBITDA once ramped, so the business is "somewhat quote self-funding at some point" — which is a claim about project economics, not an answer about consolidated free cash flow.
- RPO composition. Modler asked whether the capex-light RPO growth is AI labs, semiconductor companies or sovereigns. The answer corrected the premise, explained the three funding mechanisms, and said "it's really broad-based right … it doesn't matter if it's a startup or … the most valuable investment grade companies." No category, no concentration number, on a $664bn backlog the 10-K says is concentrated.
- Gross margin direction. DeFucci asked how to think about gross margin going forward; the answer was a case for watching operating margin instead. Pushed a second time — "Should gross margins continue to go down now from here, or should they be steady?" — the CFO gave "you can reasonably expect that gross margin would flatten" and deferred: "we haven't given any particular guidance today. We'll speak more about some of this stuff on the upcoming Investor Day."
Two of the three dodges point at the same October event. That makes the Investor Day the highest- information date on this name's calendar, and it falls before the 2026-12-14 10-Q.
What was answered well, and is checkable. The New Mexico / Wisconsin answer was specific and falsifiable: New Mexico construction on track, air permit in process, Bloom fuel cells for on-site generation; Wisconsin grid-delivered with the Public Service Commission, ATC and We Energies, "constantly evolving" energy design; and the flat claim that neither site affects FY2027 revenue or earnings guidance. Those are three statements a later filing can contradict.
S5 — Ownership
13F register at 2026-06-30 (3spread, CUSIP 68389X105, every row carrying its SEC filing URL; 2,513 filers against 3,419 the prior quarter — ingestion is incomplete and no exit is read from an absence):
| Holder | Shares | $m | QoQ |
|---|---|---|---|
| BlackRock, Inc. | 145,353,687 | 21,301.6 | +1,971,313 |
| State Street Corp | 78,645,193 | 11,525.5 | +2,342,018 |
| Susquehanna International Group | 42,915,997 | 6,289.3 | −2,108,378 |
| Jane Street Group | 40,984,803 | 6,006.3 | +3,426,892 |
| Goldman Sachs Group | 27,871,708 | 4,084.6 | +10,699,971 |
| Citadel Advisors | 25,388,229 | 3,720.6 | +5,357,691 |
| Bank of America | 23,954,012 | 3,510.5 | +8,570,333 |
| T. Rowe Price | 19,407,007 | 2,844.1 | +912,642 |
| First Eagle Investment Management | 17,033,756 | 2,496.3 | +163,400 |
| Loomis Sayles | 16,698,361 | 2,447.1 | −140,879 |
| Jupiter Topco LLC | 12,732,052 | 1,866.0 | NEW |
Like INTC, the quarter's marginal buyers are dealers and multi-strategy funds rather than long-only managers. Jupiter Topco LLC appearing new at 12.7m shares was not identified in this pass and is flagged for a later look.
The insider item. Item 5 of the 10-Q: "Lawrence J. Ellison , our Executive Chair of the Board of Directors and Chief Technology Officer , adopted a new trading plan on June 22, 2026 . Mr. Ellison's plan is scheduled to terminate on October 24, 2026 … The trading plan is intended to permit Mr. Ellison to sell up to 50 million shares of Oracle common stock." At the 2026-09-22 close that is ~$7.5bn, and it runs out four days before the plan window closes on 2026-10-24.
Against that, the Form 144s 3spread holds for ORCL since 2026-03-07 are four and small: $66,064,000 proposed on 2026-06-24 (Director/Officer), $2,576,855.73 on 2026-06-23 (Officer), $1,522,827.08 on 2026-09-16 (Officer/Director), and one on 2026-04-16. On this evidence the 50m-share plan had not been executed at scale by 2026-09-16 — but Form 144 coverage on this source is not guaranteed complete, and the ownership denominator (Ellison's total holding) was not read because the DEF 14A was not opened. Both caveats belong with the figure.
- Form 4 cadence: 46 filings since 2026-03-07, a cluster of eleven on 2026-09-18 (a week after the 10-Q, i.e. the post-earnings window).
- Short interest (FINRA, via Equibles): 36,356,379 (2026-05-15) → 41,966,703 (2026-06-30) → 50,143,917 (2026-07-31) → 47,767,442 (2026-08-14) → 44,597,874 (2026-08-31); days to cover 1.6 → 2.3. It built 38% into midsummer and has eased since. Under 1.5% of 3,024m shares — small, and the shape matches the capex disclosures rather than the price. Equibles also returns a model estimate for the 2026-09-15 settlement (~47.8m, +7.1%, P10–P90 41.7–55.1m); it is an estimate, not a FINRA figure, and is not used here.
- Shelf / ATM / buyback: the $20bn ATM (2026-02-02, amended 2026-06-23) is exhausted — 141m shares for $19.9bn net. ~$6.3bn of buyback authorisation remains and nothing was repurchased in the quarter (0.4m shares / $93m a year earlier). Dividends continue at $0.50 per common share quarterly plus $1,625 per preferred share. Oracle is issuing equity and paying a dividend at the same time.
S8 — Valuation and sizing ⏳ OPEN (user)
Today. $149.20 (2026-09-22). 3,024m common shares → ~$451bn of market value; plus $4,954m of preferred and ~$88.3bn of net debt → ~$544bn enterprise value. FY2026 net income $17,087m puts the trailing P/E near 26x; on the Q1 FY2027 run rate it is nearer 24x.
Out-year model. Assumptions, all stated: FY2027 revenue $90bn (management's own raised guide), FY2028 $115bn (+28%, slower than FY2027's +34%); operating margin held at 31%, i.e. below the 34.8% Q1 FY2027 printed, because the ramp adds depreciation faster than revenue; net interest $8bn on $125bn of debt growing with the build; an 18% tax rate; and 3,150m shares, which assumes the Series D converts and roughly one further $20bn-scale equity raise. Preferred dividends $324m.
| FY2028 case | Revenue | Op margin | Op income | Net to common | EPS | Multiple | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear — a large counterparty cannot pay, capacity is stranded, leases run past the contracts | $85bn | 20% | $17.0bn | $7.1bn | $2.25 | 21x | ~$48 |
| Base — the guide is met, margin holds, one more equity raise | $115bn | 31% | $35.7bn | $22.4bn | $7.11 | 20x | ~$142 |
| Bull — 20% renewal pricing sticks, capex peaks on schedule, FCF turns in FY2029 | $130bn | 33% | $42.9bn | $26.8bn | $8.50 | 25x | ~$213 |
What that says. Unlike INTC, ORCL's base case lands essentially on the traded price. The multiple is not the argument here; the share count is. Every further $20bn of ATM at ~$150 is ~133m shares, ~4.4% dilution — and Oracle consumed a $20bn authorisation in a single quarter. Two more of those between here and FY2028 take the base case from ~$142 to roughly $130 with nothing else changing. The model's sensitivity is entirely to how the peak-capex years get funded, which is exactly the question the CFO declined to timeframe.
The bear case is not a multiple compression; it is the 10-K's own sentence about being locked into multi-year commitments and associated financings without corresponding revenue, applied to a $664bn backlog whose counterparties are undisclosed.
Buy price and size are owner-only (skill §5). Liquidity: 31.2m shares on 2026-09-22, ~$4.7bn.
S9 — Monitoring
- Next earnings: 2026-12-14, stated by IR in the call's closing remarks. Before that, the October 2026 Investor Day, to which the CFO twice deferred the gross-margin and free-cash-flow questions.
- Feed: Tier 0 EDGAR sweep covers cik 1341439.
- Leading indicator between quarters: the prepayment line in Note 1 — $11.4bn this quarter, $0 a year ago. It is disclosed quarterly, it is roughly half of operating cash flow, and it is the clearest single measure of whether customers are still willing to fund the build. Read it beside RPO ($664bn) and the next-twelve-months conversion percentage (13%).
- Trigger that converts this to a buy: capex peaking on the stated FY2027–FY2028 schedule with the prepayment line holding and no second ATM — i.e. the funding model proving out before the free-cash-flow crossover. A date for positive free cash flow given at the October Investor Day would be the single cleanest confirmation available, because management has so far refused to give one.
- Trigger in the other direction: a new ATM authorisation, or RPO flat-to-down in the 2026-12-14 10-Q, or the next-twelve-months conversion percentage falling below 13%.
Access and evidence limits, this run
- DEF 14A not read (2025-09-26). No insider ownership percentage, no compensation structure, no denominator for the 50-million-share Ellison plan. Largest gap; it is the scorecard's next action.
- One transcript, not two. Q1 FY2027 only, turns 7–37; prepared remarks not read.
- Two speakers unresolved in that transcript. The executive who answered the four questions that decide this name is "Speaker 9" to the connector, and this dossier does not guess who that is.
- No
efts.sec.govfull-text sweep for auditor change or restatement language. - No
GetCustomerConcentration/GetGoingConcernStatus/GetExecutiveChangescalls — Equibles budget. Customer concentration would have been the most valuable of the three and is the one place the budget bit; the 10-K's qualitative admission is what stands in for it. - Form 144 coverage may be incomplete on 3spread; the four filings found are treated as a floor, not a census.
Jupiter Topco LLCnot identified — new at 12.7m shares in the quarter.- The out-year model is the routine's own, on stated assumptions. FY2027 revenue is management's guide; everything from FY2028 is not.